Hirsch v. Olson
| Decision Date | 13 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-00107-NT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
| Parties | ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, Plaintiff, v. ANGELYN A. OLSON, Defendant. |
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS
Before me is the Plaintiffs motion to dismiss five of the Defendant's six counterclaims and the Defendant's requests for exemplary damages[1] and attorney's fees. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted as to Counterclaim Count IV insofar as it relates to the testamentary disposition and denied as to Counterclaim Counts I, II, III, and V.
BACKGROUND[2]
These counterclaims arise out of an action originally brought by the Plaintiff, Andreas von Hirsch, a citizen and resident of Germany, against the Defendant, Angelyn A. Olson, a resident of Vinalhaven, Maine. Def.'s Original Answer to Pl.'s Compl., Countercl. Against Pl., & Jury Demand (“Countercl.”) ¶¶ 287-88 (ECF No 5). Von Hirsch purchased a home on Vinalhaven in 1975, and soon after hired Bill and Mary Olson, Angelyn Olson's parents-in-law, as the property's caretakers. Countercl. ¶¶ 169, 171-72, 176. After her marriage to their son, Angelyn began to assist Bill and Mary in this role, and she became the primary caretaker in 2000. Countercl. ¶¶ 177-79.
While she was originally hired simply as a summer caretaker, over the years Olson's responsibilities grew to include ensuring the maintenance of von Hirsch's sailboat overseeing extensive renovations to von Hirsch's Vinalhaven home, and providing medical care to von Hirsch as he recuperated from various physical injuries. Countercl. ¶¶ 183, 187, 191, 214, 217-19, 225, 231-33, 238, 240, 249, 263, 273. Olson's work for von Hirsch also took her abroad on at least one occasion. In the fall of 2019, von Hirsch was locked out of his bank accounts, and he had Olson accompany him to Germany while he sorted out his finances. Countercl. ¶ 267-68. Olson asserts that during the period he was locked out of his accounts, von Hirsch asked her to cover his expenses using her own funds, promising that he would reimburse her at a later date. Countercl. ¶ 269.
Olson alleges that, during her employment with von Hirsch, he repeatedly orally promised that he would leave the Olson family his Vinalhaven property. Countercl. ¶¶ 181, 230, 266. In addition, in 2018, von Hirsch promised to switch Olson's role to a salaried position, with a hefty bonus and a sizable future raise. Countercl. ¶¶ 238-39, 249-50. Olson claims that these promises were memorialized in a handwritten document authored by von Hirsch, titled “Angie's Compensation.”
Countercl. ¶ 251; see Countercl. Ex. A (“Angie's Compensation Document” or the “Document”) (ECF No. 5-1). This document, dated September 18, 2018, includes the following provisions:
Countercl. ¶¶ 251-53; Countercl. Ex. A.
On December 23, 2020, von Hirsch terminated Olson's employment. Countercl. ¶ 275.
Several months after ending Olson's employment, in April of 2021, von Hirsch sued Olson, alleging breaches of her fiduciary duties, excessive compensation, breaches of her duty of loyalty, and conversion. Compl. (ECF No. 1). In conjunction with her answer, Olson brought the following counterclaims against von Hirsch.
Counterclaim Count I (Fraud) alleges that von Hirsch used the promises contained in the Angie's Compensation Document to fraudulently induce Olson into remaining in his employ. Countercl. ¶¶ 291-305. Olson asserts that the representations made by von Hirsch in the Document “were false” and that “von Hirsch had no intention to compensate Mrs. Olson in full in the manner prescribed by the [Document] at the time he drafted” it. Countercl. ¶¶ 296, 303. According to Olson, “von Hirsch intended to use his stature and education to his advantage in inducing Mrs. Olson to act in reliance on his representations, ” and he intentionally misled Olson in order to “entice her to continue to provide her services as caretaker to his Property, sailboat, and person despite the growing needs and expectations he presented.” Countercl. ¶¶ 298, 300. Olson seeks punitive damages on this Count. Countercl. ¶¶ 399-411.
Counterclaim Count II (Breach of Contract) alleges that von Hirsch breached his contract with Olson by failing to compensate Olson for work done between July 2020 and December 2020 in the amount promised in the Angie's Compensation Document. Countercl. ¶¶ 311-13.
Counterclaim Count III (Anticipatory Breach of Contract) alleges that von Hirsch has anticipatorily breached the “testamentary disposition” portion of the Angie's Compensation Document, which, according to Olson, provides that Olson will inherit von Hirsch's Maine home upon von Hirsch's death and receive $50, 000 per year for upkeep for fifteen years. Countercl. ¶¶ 325-27. Based on von Hirsch's “present breach of the written agreement” and his “pending allegations and subsequent lawsuit filed against Mrs. Olson, ” Olson alleges that “it is anticipated that [von Hirsch] has repudiated the remainder of the written agreement” and that his “conduct evidences his presumed refusal to perform.” Countercl. ¶¶ 326-27.
Counterclaim Count IV (Promissory Estoppel) asserts that von Hirsch's promise of testamentary disposition of his home is enforceable under a theory of promissory estoppel. Countercl. ¶¶ 335-39, 343.[3] Olson asserts that von Hirsch made these promises “to induce her into continuing her employment with him” and claims that “von Hirsch knew that . . .[] Olson was relying on his promises.” Countercl. ¶¶ 336, 339.
Counterclaim Count V (Unjust Enrichment) alleges that Olson conferred a benefit on von Hirsch by caring for and maintaining his sailboat and his Vinalhaven home, as well as by providing him personal care.[4] Countercl. ¶¶ 359, 367, 370. Olson claims that von Hirsch was unjustly enriched by these services. Countercl. ¶¶ 360, 368, 374.
In addition to other forms of relief, Olson requests that she be awarded attorney's fees. Countercl. 51.
Von Hirsch has moved to dismiss Counterclaim Counts I-V and Olson's claims for exemplary damages and attorney's fees, arguing that Olson has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pl.'s Mot. to Dismiss Countercl. (“Mot. to Dismiss Countercl.”) (ECF No. 8).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, I take “as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.” Alston v. Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011)). “[A] complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is “plausible” if the facts alleged give rise to a reasonable inference of liability. Id. “Plausible” means “more than merely possible.” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) governs the pleading requirements for fraud claims. Per Rule 9(b), “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “[T]he circumstances to be stated with particularity under Rule 9(b) generally consist of the who, what, where, and when of the allegedly misleading representation.” Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 934 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Kaufman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 2016)). “[Elements [that] do not fall within the who, what, where, and when' taxonomy . . . need only comply with the plausibility standard that customarily controls the adequacy of pleadings.' ” Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Inst., 967 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 2020). The purposes of Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements are “to place the defendants on notice and enable them to prepare meaningful responses, to preclude the use of a groundless fraud claim as pretext for discovering a wrong, and to safeguard defendants from frivolous charges that might damage their reputation.” Dumont, 934 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Von Hirsch begins his motion to dismiss with two arguments aimed at all of Olson's counterclaims. The first is that any claims for future recompense under the Angie's Compensation Document fail because Olson was an at-will employee. According to von Hirsch, any obligations that he might have had under that Document ended when he fired Olson. Mot. to Dismiss Countercl. 4-5. Von Hirsch develops this argument when he aims specifically at Olson's counterclaim for anticipatory breach of contract, and I will address this argument when I reach that count.
Von Hirsch's second overarching argument is that Olson's claim to future testamentary gifts fails because the promises she identifies are too vague to enforce. Mot. to Dismiss Countercl. 5-7. Testamentary gifts are generally revocable during the testator's lifetime. See Busque v Marcou, 86 A.2d 873, 877 (Me. 1952) (). There is no language in the testamentary disposition provision that suggests irrevocability, and the provision itself is extremely sparse and may lack sufficient detail to allow me to interpret the...
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