Hisey v. Cashway Supermarkets, Inc.

• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NOBLE; CHZVEZ, C.J., and WOOD
• Citation: Hisey v. Cashway Supermarkets, Inc., 77 N.M. 638, 426 P.2d 784, 1967 NMSC 81 (N.M. 1967)
• Decision Date: 24 April 1967
• Docket Number: No. 8234,8234
• Parties: B. L. HISEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASHWAY SUPERMARKETS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Page 784

426 P.2d 784

77 N.M. 638

B. L. HISEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASHWAY SUPERMARKETS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 8234.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 24, 1967.

Norton & Ingraham, Lovington, for appellant.

Girand, Cowan & Reese, Hobbs, for appellee.

OPINION

NOBLE, Justice.

B. L. Hisey, plaintiff below, sought recovery of damages for personal injury caused by the malfunctioning of an automatic electric door maintained by defendant, Cashway Supermarkets, Inc. Hisey has appealed from a directed verdict for defendant.

Plaintiff, a customer at Cashway Supermarkets, was leaving the store with a bag of groceries, and stepped on the mat which activated an electrically operated exit door. When he was only partly through, the door suddenly 'slammed' shut, causing its handbar to strike the hand with which plaintiff was holding the bag of groceries. Plaintiff testified that immediately after the accident, he told the store manager what had happened and that the manager replied, 'we have recently spent a bunch of money having these doors repaired.'

The proof was limited to the occurrence of the accident and the resultant injuries. No other evidence was adduced respecting the door, its condition, or the cause of its malfunction. Plaintiff relied primarily upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and argues that the exclusive control of the automatic door by the defendant, and plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the functioning of the door or the cause of its malfunction, entitled him to invoke the doctrine, thus requiring the defendant to explain or otherwise overcome a presumption of negligence. But, more than the happening of an accident is necessary to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. McFall v. Shelley, 70 N.M. 390, 374 P.2d 141, 146; Renfro v. J. D. Coggins Co., 71 N.M. 310, 378 P.2d 130.

The factual basis necessary as a premise for application of res ipsa loquitur requires proof that (1) plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant; and (2) the incident causing the injury is of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence by the person having control of the instrumentality. Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197; Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575; McFall v. Shelley, supra; Renfro v. J. D. Coggins Co., supra; Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269. A proprietor of a store is not an insurer against all accidents and injuries to his customers. See Quick Shops, Inc. v. Oldham, 100 Ga.App. 551, 111 S.E.2d 920; Peretore v. Pennsylvania R.R., 284 App.Div. 472, 131 N.Y.S.2d 696. The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff had been a patron of the store and that he had gone out of this door other times when it operated properly. There is, likewise, testimony from which the trial court concluded that the plaintiff left the store by means of this same door following his conversation with the store manager and that the door then operated properly. Even though defendant argues that interpretation of the testimony is not justified, we think the trial court properly construed it. We find nothing in the record that the door was not suited to the use to which it was put.

The absence of any evidence, or reasonable inference to be drawn from evidence that this accident is the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of the negligence of someone alone defeats the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Renfro v. J. D. Coggins, Co., supra. The fact that the door had been operating properly before the...