Hishon v. King Spalding, No. 82-940

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBURGER
PartiesElizabeth Anderson HISHON, Petitioner, v. KING & SPALDING
Decision Date22 May 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-940

467 U.S. 69
104 S.Ct. 2229
81 L.Ed.2d 59
Elizabeth Anderson HISHON, Petitioner,

v.

KING & SPALDING.

No. 82-940.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 31, 1983.
Decided May 22, 1984.
Syllabus

Petitioner, a woman lawyer, was employed in 1972 as an associate with respondent law firm, a general partnership, but her employment was terminated in 1979 after respondent decided not to invite her to become a partner. Petitioner filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, petitioner brought this action in Federal District Court under Title VII. Her complaint included allegations that respondent used the possibility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to induce her and other young lawyers to become associates at the firm; that respondent represented that advancement to partnership after five or six years was "a matter of course" for associates who received satisfactory evaluations and that associates would be considered for partnership "on a fair and equal basis"; that she relied on these representations when she accepted employment with respondent; that respondent's promise to consider her on a "fair and equal basis" created a binding employment contract; and that respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her sex when it failed to invite her to become a partner. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partnership, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Petitioner's complaint states a claim cognizable under Title VII, and she therefore is entitled to her day in court to prove her allegations. Pp. 73-79.

(a) Once a contractual employment relationship is established, the provisions of Title VII attach, forbidding unlawful discrimination as to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," which clearly include benefits that are part of the employment contract. If the evidence at trial establishes petitioner's allegation that the parties contracted to have her considered for partnership, that promise clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Independent of the alleged contract, Title VII would then bind respondent to consider petitioner for partnership as the statute provides, i.e., without regard to her sex. Moreover, an employer may provide its employees with benefits that it

Page 70

is under no obligation to furnish by any express or implied contract. Such a benefit, though not a contractual right of employment, may qualify as a "privilege" of employment under Title VII that may not be granted or withheld in a discriminatory fashion. Pp. 73-76.

(b) Even if respondent is correct in its assertion that a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply. The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege of employment. It is also of no consequence that employment as an associate necessarily ends upon elevation to partnership; a benefit need not accrue before a person's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of that employment relationship. Nor does the statute or its legislative history support a per se exemption of partnership decisions from scrutiny. And respondent has not shown how application of Title VII in this case would infringe its constitutional rights of expression or association. Moreover, "[i] nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2813, 37 L.Ed.2d 723. Pp. 77-78.

678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir.1982), reversed and remanded.

Emmet J. Bondurant, II, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.

Paul M. Bator, Cambridge, Mass., for U.S. as amicus curiae.

Charles Morgan, Jr., Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Page 71

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the District Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that a law partnership discriminated against petitioner, a woman lawyer employed as an associate, when it failed to invite her to become a partner.

I
A.

In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law firm established as a general partnership. When this suit was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and employed approximately 50 attorneys as associates. Up to that time, no woman had ever served as a partner at the firm.

Petitioner alleges that the prospect of partnership was an important factor in her initial decision to accept employment with respondent. She alleges that respondent used the possibility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to induce petitioner and other young lawyers to become associates at the firm. According to the complaint, respondent represented that advancement to partnership after five or six

Page 72

years was "a matter of course" for associates "who receive[d] satisfactory evaluations" and that associates were promoted to partnership "on a fair and equal basis." Petitioner alleges that she relied on these representations when she accepted employment with respondent. The complaint further alleges that respondent's promise to consider her on a "fair and equal basis" created a binding employment contract.

In May 1978 the partnership considered and rejected Hishon for admission to the partnership; one year later, the partners again declined to invite her to become a partner.1 Once an associate is passed over for partnership at respondent's firm, the associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere. Petitioner's employment as an associate terminated on December 31, 1979.

B

Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ten days later the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and on February 27, 1980, Hishon brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, backpay, and compensatory damages "in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to partnership." This, of course, negates any claim for specific performance of the contract alleged.

The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners

Page 73

by a partnership.2 24 FEP Cases 1303 (1980). A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 678 F.2d 1022 (1982). We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 1169, 103 S.Ct. 813, 74 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1983), and we reverse.

II

At this stage of the litigation, we must accept petitioner's allegations as true. A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The issue before us is whether petitioner's allegations state a claim under Title VII, the relevant portion of which provides as follows:

"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).

A.

Petitioner alleges that respondent is an "employer" to whom Title VII is addressed.3 She then asserts that consid-

Page 74

eration for partnership was one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" as an associate with respondent.4 See § 2000e-2(a)(1). If this is correct, respondent could not base an adverse partnership decision on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Once a contractual relationship of employment is established, the provisions of Title VII attach and govern certain aspects of that relationship.5 In the context of Title VII, the contract of employment may be written or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace. The contractual relationship of employment triggers the provision of Title VII governing "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Title VII in turn forbids discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Because the underlying employment relationship is contractual, it follows that the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" clearly include benefits that are part of an employment contract. Here, petitioner in essence alleges that respondent made a contract to consider her for partnership.6 Indeed, this promise was allegedly a key contractual

Page 75

provision which induced her to accept employment. If the evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to have petitioner considered for partnership, that promise clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Title VII would then bind respondent to consider petitioner for partnership as the statute provides, i.e., without regard to petitioner's sex. The contract she alleges would lead to the same result.

Petitioner's claim that a contract was made, however, is not the only allegation that would qualify respondent's consideration of...

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7576 practice notes
  • Burrell v. City University of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8711(RWS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • February 26, 1998
    ...relief." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In determining the suffic......
  • Coronet Ins. Co. v. Seyfarth, No. 86 C 1935.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • July 16, 1987
    ...granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must......
  • Craig v. Cohn, No. 3:99-CV-0689 AS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • January 7, 2000
    ...that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with his complaint that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Panaras v. Liquid Car......
  • In re Bernadin, Bky. No. 18-12717 ELF
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Third Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • October 28, 2019
    ...reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ; Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Board, 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). In doing so, the court may "c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7564 cases
  • Burrell v. City University of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8711(RWS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • February 26, 1998
    ...relief." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In determining the suffic......
  • Coronet Ins. Co. v. Seyfarth, No. 86 C 1935.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • July 16, 1987
    ...granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must......
  • Craig v. Cohn, No. 3:99-CV-0689 AS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • January 7, 2000
    ...that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with his complaint that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Panaras v. Liquid Car......
  • In re Bernadin, Bky. No. 18-12717 ELF
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Third Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • October 28, 2019
    ...reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ; Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Board, 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). In doing so, the court may "c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: the Role of the Solicitor General
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 41-3, September 1988
    • September 1, 1988
    ...Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555. Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728.Hishon v. Kings Spalding, 467 U.S. 69.Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. Abraham, Henry. 1974. Justices and Presidents. New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Freedom and the Cou......

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