Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(B) DC Plan
| Decision Date | 14 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-5942,16-5942 |
| Citation | 851 F.3d 552 |
| Parties | Eloise HITCHCOCK; Sheryl Kae, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CUMBERLAND UNIVERSITY 403(B) DC PLAN; Cumberland University; John Does 1–10, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Blair L. Byrum, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Karla M. Campbell, BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Daniel W. Olivas, LEWIS, THOMASON, KING, KRIEG & WALDROP, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Blair L. Byrum, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Karla M. Campbell, BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Charles W. Cagle, Laura H. Alrutz, Brian S. Faughnan, LEWIS, THOMASON, KING, KRIEG & WALDROP, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
Before: MERRITT, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
Eloise Hitchcock ("Hitchcock") and Sheryl Kae ("Kae") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") appeal from the order entered by the district court granting the motion of the Cumberland University 403(b) DC Plan (the "Plan") and Cumberland University (the "University") (collectively, "Defendants") to dismiss without prejudice this Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. , action.
For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiffs were employees of the University and were participants in the Plan. Hitchcock was the director of the University's library, and Kae was the director of business programs and a professor. Hitchcock worked at the University from August 27, 2007, to March 5, 2015. Kae worked at the University from January 31, 2012, to September 2014.
The Plan is a defined contribution pension plan sponsored by the University for its employees. In 2009, the University adopted a five percent matching contribution, whereby the University would match an employee's contribution to the Plan up to five percent of the employee's salary. The 2009 Summary Plan Description stated that "[i]f [the employee] contribute[s] 5% or more of [their] Compensation[,] ... [the] Employer will make a Matching Contribution of 5% of [the employee's] Compensation."
(R. 1-3, 2009 Summary Plan Description, Page ID #59–60.)
On October 9, 2014, the University amended the Plan to replace the five percent match with a discretionary match, whereby the University would determine the amount of the employer's matching contribution on a yearly basis (the "amendment"). (Compare R. 1-2, 2014 Plan Document, Page ID #40 (plan document indicating that the employer's matching contribution is discretionary and determined from year to year), with R. 1-1, 2009 Plan Document, Page ID #20 (plan document indicating that the employer's matching contribution is five percent of the employee's compensation if the employee contributes five percent or more of his or her compensation to the plan)).
The University made the amendment retroactive effective January 1, 2013. The University also announced that the employer matching contribution for the 2013–14 year would be zero percent, and on May 29, 2014, the University announced by way of email that the employer matching contribution for the 2014–15 year would be zero percent.
With regard to amending the Plan, the 2009 Summary Plan Description states that:
The Plan will be amended from time to time to incorporate changes required by the law and regulations governing retirement plans. [The] Employer also has the right to amend the Plan to add new features or to change or eliminate various provisions. An Employer cannot amend the Plan to take away or reduce protected benefits under the Plan (e.g., the Employer cannot reduce the vesting percentage that applies to [the employee's] current balance in the Plan).
(R. 1-3 at 66.)
With regard to receiving information about the Plan, the 2009 Summary Plan Description states that "all Plan Participants shall be entitled to ... [o]btain, upon request to the Employer, copies of documents governing the operations of the Plan, including ... updated Summary Plan Description." (Id. at 70.)
As of the date of oral argument in this case on January 25, 2017, the University had not produced a summary plan description subsequent to the 2009 Summary Plan Description despite Plaintiffs' repeated requests. Defendants have not provided formal written notice of the amendment regarding the matching provision, and have failed to provide formal written notice of the amendment regarding the annual matching provision within a reasonable period prior to the commencement of the Plan year.
On November 12, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Defendants alleging the following: (1) wrongful denial of benefits on behalf of the benefits class, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) anti-cutback violation on behalf of the benefits class, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (Count II); (3) failure to provide notice on behalf of the notice class, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (Count III); and (4) breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the benefits and notice classes, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (Count IV). On December 23, 2015, Defendants answered the complaint, and on February 9, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
On June 9, 2016, the district court construed Defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings because it was filed after Defendants answered the complaint. The district court then granted the motion, dismissed the case without prejudice so that "Plaintiffs may administratively exhaust their claims," and entered judgment. (R. 45, Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, Page ID #830.) Specifically, the district court dismissed Counts I, II, and IV for failure to exhaust administrative claim procedures, and dismissed Count III based on Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On June 22, 2016, Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court's dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV.
As an initial matter, we address whether we have jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal in light of the district court's order, which states that Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed without prejudice. The district court issued its order dismissing the "case" without prejudice, and on that same day, entered final judgment. Normally, a district court will dismiss a case without prejudice when it believes that the complaint can be saved by amendment. In such a case, a district court will not enter final judgment. Conversely, a district court will dismiss a case with prejudice and enter final judgment when it determines that no amendment can save a complaint from the strictures of the civil pleading requirements. Within thirty days after entry of judgment, the party appealing the order or entry of judgment must file the notice of appeal with the district court clerk. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In other words, a district court's entry of judgment starts the clock on a party's right to appeal. Here, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice and entered final judgment. Plaintiffs contend that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Under § 1291, we have jurisdiction over "final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ; see also Semerenko v. Cendant Corp. , 223 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2000) (). "A court of appeals independently evaluates its appellate jurisdiction over cases." United States v. Yeager , 303 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 2002). We must determine whether the district court intended its order to be final and appealable by dismissing all four claims without prejudice and entering final judgment.1
We have explained that " ‘[f]or a dismissal without prejudice to be inherently final, it must, as a practical matter, prevent the parties from further litigating the merits of the case in federal court.’ " Robert N. Clemens Tr. v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. , 485 F.3d 840, 845–46 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Yeager , 303 F.3d at 665 ). In Sanford v. Motts , 258 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit explained that "[w]here the district court dismisses an [entire] action without prejudice, ... the order is final and appealable." Accord Thompson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. , 23 Fed.Appx. 486, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2001) () (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court must have intended to dismiss Plaintiffs' entire action without prejudice because the court dismissed all four of Plaintiffs' claims and stated that it was dismissing the "case" without prejudice. Moreover, if it did not intend to dismiss the entire action, it would not have entered final judgment; rather, the court would have given Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint after they had exhausted their administrative remedies. See Clemens Tr. , 485 F.3d at 845–46 ().
Furthermore, by not attempting to amend their complaint or object to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Knick v. Twp. of Scott
...Cir. 2009) ; see also Limnia, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy , 857 F.3d 379, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ; Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC Plan , 851 F.3d 552, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2017) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc. , 452 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] dismissal without prejudice, ab......
-
Wallace v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.
...principles apply to Plaintiff’s benefits claim is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC Plan , 851 F.3d 552, 559 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 279 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2002) ; Diaz v. United Agric. Emp. ......
-
Clark v. Ford Motor Co.
...Circuit's controlling decision in Brown .3 Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that the Sixth Circuit in Hitchcock v. Cumberland University 403(b) DC Plan , 851 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2017) "actually endorsed the pleading of §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) claims simultaneously" (Pl.'s Resp. at 18-19,......
-
Hager v. DBG Partners, Inc., 17-11147
...Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. , 953 F.2d 1335, 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1992).20 See Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC Plan , 851 F.3d 552, 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2017).21 Id. at 561.22 See Geissal , 524 U.S. at 77–80 & n.3, 118 S.Ct. 1869 (examining Article III standing, but n......