Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 21 September 1909
• Citation: 172 F. 963
• Parties: HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO. v. MITCHELL et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

172 F. 963

HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO. v. MITCHELL et al.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. West Virginia.

September 21, 1909

An employer and its employees may lawfully contract with respect to the terms of the employment, and as incidental thereto that the employees shall not join a labor union and the employer shall not employ union men; and when such a contract has been made, a combination between officers or members of the labor union to induce either party to violate the contract, with which they have no rightful concern constitutes an unlawful conspiracy, to restrain the carrying out of which the other party is entitled to an injunction.

Upon October 24, 1907, the plaintiff corporation presented its bill for injunction to a judge of this court against John Mitchell and nine others, alleging itself to be a corporation under the laws of West Virginia and the defendants to be citizens and residents of several different states other than West Virginia; that nine of said defendants first named are presidents, vice presidents, and secretary-treasurers respectively, of the United Mine Workers of America, and of the International Union United Mine Workers of America, of District No. 6 United Mine Workers of America, and of subdistrict 5 of District No. 6 United Mine Workers of America, and the defendant Thomas Hughes to be an organizing agent of said organizations; that plaintiff is the owner of about 5,000 acres of coal, has a mining plant on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad that is mining and shipping a daily output of about 1,400 tons of coal, largely under contracts between 500 and 600 tons to the railroad for its daily engine fuel, and has large contracts for future delivery that prior to April 1, 1906, it operated its mine by employment of men affiliated with the United Mine Workers of America, but on that day a strike was ordered by the officers of the union, and on April 16, 1906, the men so employed, in obedience to the demands and orders of defendants, went out and ceased to work. It is charged that this strike was ordered because certain other operators refused to sign the scale demanded by the union; that so far as plaintiff was concerned it was wholly without justification or excuse, because it distinctly agreed to pay the scale price and any increased price fixed thereby from April 1, 1906, the date of the strike order, whenever it might be fixed and agreed upon, with which proposition the miners themselves, whose labor was involved, were entirely satisfied; that notwithstanding this, at the instance of defendants, its mine was shut down from April 16 to June 12, 1906, to its great financial loss and embarrassment by reason of its inability to comply with its existing contracts. The bill then sets forth in detail in effect that on the last-named date, in order to be able to run said mine, it entered into a contract with its men whereby it agreed with them to run its mining operation wholly upon a nonunion basis, refusing absolutely to employ any union men, and whereby the men on their part agreed not to join or become members of this union and to work for plaintiff as nonunion men; that plaintiff has since that time been running its mine under this contract with its men to the entire satisfaction of both, paying its men as high wages as paid in any of the union mines. It then charges the officers and agents of the union, with full knowledge of the existence of this contract, to have repeatedly sought to have plaintiff violate it and agree to reunionize its mine, which plaintiff has refused to do, whereupon such union officers and agents are seeking by inducements, threats, and intimidation to induce plaintiff's employes, bound by said contract with it, to leave its service, break their contract, join the union, and also to prevent other men from engaging in its employ, and this it is charged with the unlawful purpose to prevent any but union men to work in its mine, compel it to employ none but union men, and to submit its business and its property to the jurisdiction and control of said union and its officers. The bill then proceeds to charge the United Mine Workers' Union of America and its subordinate organizations to be unincorporated organizations, having unlawful purposes and designs to create a monopoly and trust in coal mining labor, and in support of these allegations sets forth in extenso what purports to be excerpts from the constitutions and by-laws of the supreme and subordinate unions, together with the obligation required to be taken by its members and extracts from the proceedings of its national conventions. A distinct conspiracy on the part of defendants as individuals is charged to secure, by reason of their positions as officers of this union, the abandonment by the men of their contract with plaintiff, their joining the union, the inability of plaintiff to employ others, and the entire shutting down of its mine, to its irreparable loss and injury. Presented with this bill were some 28 affidavits in support of its allegations. A temporary restraining order was granted until the next regular term of court, to be held at Parkersburg on January 14, 1908, for which date plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction was set down for hearing. This hearing, on motion of defendants, was continued until May 26, 1908, when plaintiff presented more than 20 additional affidavits and argued its motion for temporary injunction; counsel for defense stating they 'did not desire to be heard in opposition to said motion so far as the granting of a temporary injunction at the time was concerned, and not consenting, but objecting, thereto. ' The temporary injunction was on that day granted in exact accord with the terms of the restraining order.

Answers have been filed, exceptions entered thereto, motions as to certain unserved defendants to have said bill dismissed as to them have been made, and a motion by defendants, disclaiming 'any intention of conceding the truth of the allegations of the plaintiff's bill whereby fraud, coercion, and intimidation or violence in any form whatsoever is imputed to them,' has been entered to dissolve the injunction, 'on the face of the bill and exhibits,' in so far as said injunction restrained said defendants, or any of them, from the use of argument, reason, and persuasion, to induce the employes of the plaintiffs, or any of them, to become members of the United Mine Workers of America or any of its subordinate branches; in so far as it restrains them from interfering or talking to any person or persons in the employment of the plaintiff, or about to enter the employment of the plaintiff, for the purpose of inducing such persons to become members of the United Mine Workers of America or any of its subordinate branches, in a peaceable and law-abiding manner, and unaccompanied by intimidation, force, fraud, violence, or coercion; also in so far as it restrains defendants from visiting the homes of plaintiff's employes for the purpose of inducing them by reason, persuasion, and argument, unaccompanied by force, fraud, intimidation, violence, or coercion, to become members of the United Mine Workers of America or any of its subordinate branches; in so far as it restrains defendants from going near the premises of plaintiff for the purpose of talking with or inducing the employes of plaintiff to become members of the United Mine Workers of America; in so far as it restrains from unionizing or attempting to do so plaintiff's mine, if by 'unionizing' is meant action on the part of defendants to induce the employes of plaintiff to become members of the United Mine Workers of America by the use of argument, persuasion, and reason, unaccompanied by force, violence, coercion, or intimidation; and also in so far as it restrains defendants from interfering with plaintiff's employes, if by the term 'interfering' is meant that defendants shall be precluded from interviewing and visiting plaintiff's employes for the purpose of inducing them to become members of the union. This motion on April 7, 1909, was argued and submitted, and is now to be determined.

George R. E. Gilchrist, for plaintiff.

Charles E. Hogg, for defendants.

DAYTON District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

That this motion has been most thoroughly and ably argued goes without saying, when the character and ability of counsel engaged is considered. It is a source of regret that, because of a multitude of duties, I have not had even more time to consider the questions involved than I have taken; but the fact that all these questions may again be presented and considered upon a final hearing, and above all may be finally reviewed by a higher court, with full power to correct any error I may commit, has led me to comply with request of counsel for an early decision as to this motion. It is to be borne in mind that this motion is made only for partial dissolution, and that, too, without prejudice to defendants' right to move for full dissolution upon final hearing. It is based solely upon the ground that the allegations of the bill on its face warrant, if they do not demand, it. Under these circumstances, while I am entitled to construe the allegations of the bill, and all of them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as upon demurrer, I am not inclined, at this time, to consider the charges substantially made, that the United Mine Workers of America is an unlawful organization seeking to establish a monopoly in labor contrary to the common law, or a trust therein contrary to the Sherman act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200)). Such questions deserve more consideration than I have had time yet to give them, and may well be postponed to the final hearing after the case has...