Hitesman v. Univ. of Utah
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20190884-CA,20190884-CA |
| Citation | 499 P.3d 167 |
| Parties | Misty Vondell HITESMAN, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Mary J. Woodhead, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and J. Clifford Petersen, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 For nearly nine years, Misty Vondell Hitesman worked as a sponsored project officer at the University of Utah in its Office of Sponsored Projects (the OSP). After resigning in 2017, she brought a claim against the University for violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, a federal statute that protects against wage discrimination based on sex.
¶2 The University moved for summary judgment, arguing that it paid Hitesman less than her male colleagues due to factors other than gender. The district court was persuaded and granted the University's motion. Hitesman now appeals, contending that there are material questions of fact that preclude summary judgment on her claim. We agree and reverse.
¶3 The University hired Hitesman in January 2008 to work in the OSP as a sponsored project officer. In that role, Hitesman primarily analyzed and facilitated the assignment, allocation, and budgeting of grants and contracts brought to the University by faculty. She also ensured that grants complied with federal law and University policies.
¶4 Hitesman was just one of many sponsored project officers in the OSP, including W.E. and J.P.—both men. W.E. was hired by the University more than a decade before Hitesman; J.P. was hired one and a half years after Hitesman. All three employees were paid different salaries and all were supervised by B.B., Director of the OSP (Director). Director assigned work to the sponsored project officers and he was aware of, and had input on, the salaries they received.
¶5 In 2008, Hitesman's starting salary was $53,325. When she resigned nine years later, her salary had increased by approximately $6,000—to $59,648.
¶6 According to Director, the OSP bases salary on Director would, at times, advocate for salary adjustments for sponsored project officers in the OSP, although not always at the same rates. In 2013, Director advocated for a salary increase for Hitesman and other OSP employees so as to compensate them "commensurate with their experience levels." Director did the same in 2014, explaining that the "minimal increases" Hitesman in particular had received since she joined the OSP "ha[d] certainly not kept pace with the skills and experience that [she] ha[d] gained over the last 6 years."
¶7 Although Hitesman was consistently paid less than W.E.—who was making $75,940 at the time of Hitesman's resignation—her salary was "generally on par" with J.P.’s until "approximately the first part of 2013." By the time Hitesman resigned in 2017, J.P.’s salary had increased to $68,340—nearly $9,000 more than Hitesman's.
¶8 Director testified that W.E.’s twenty-year "career and experience at age 66 justify a salary differential in relation to Hitesman's approximately 9 years with the OSP." Director also compared the number of "transactions" W.E. completed against the number Hitesman completed between July 1, 2013, and June 30, 2015. W.E. completed 831 transactions compared to Hitesman's 269.
¶9 In comparing J.P. to Hitesman, Director testified that J.P.’s higher salary was "supported by [his] very good performance and high quantity of work in relation to his peers," including Hitesman. Between July 1, 2013, and June 30, 2015, J.P. completed 390 transactions compared to Hitesman's 269.
¶10 Director also attributed Hitesman's lower pay raise in 2016 in comparison to her male colleagues to her "low productivity, and her failure to build positive working relationships in performing her work." In addition, Director referenced a complaint he received in 2013 from a faculty member "about Hitesman's performance, professionalism, and attitude." However, one of Hitesman's other supervisors told her that the faculty member was a "habitual complainer," and the complaint never led to a written notice or any other discipline. (Cleaned up.)
¶11 In fact, during Hitesman's tenure at the OSP, she never received any written evaluation or other written notice that her performance "was other than acceptable." Hitesman received her last formal evaluation in 2013 and was told she "[met] expectations." She "never received another formal evaluation and never received any written evaluation or other written notice that [her] performance was other than acceptable." Instead, she "often received positive feedback from departments with whom [she] worked."
¶12 With regard to productivity, Hitesman had no ability to influence the number of transactions her assigned departments received. Some transactions could be "very simple and take very little time to negotiate and finalize," while others "involved substantial work and were more difficult depending on the other party and the research or other work involved." Further, during Hitesman's time at the OSP, "discussions of productivity, performance and customer service were not tied to numbers of transactions" and "[p]roductivity statistics were never part of salary or performance reviews." Director "never indicated that he considered numbers of transactions when determining the salaries of other employees," nor did he keep Hitesman up to date on her transaction rates.
¶13 After resigning in 2017, Hitesman sued the University under the Equal Pay Act, alleging that the University paid her less than several male employees, including W.E. and J.P., for performing the same work.
¶14 Following discovery, the University filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that Hitesman had not established a prima facie case under the Act because "the work she performed was not substantially equal to that of the male employees she name[d] as comparators." In the alternative, the University invoked affirmative defenses under the Act and claimed that Hitesman's lower pay was based on factors other than her gender. Specifically, it argued that W.E. and J.P. were paid more than Hitesman because of their higher transaction numbers. It further justified Hitesman's lower salary by pointing out that Director had "received complaints about Hitesman's unprofessional work performance" but had not received comparable complaints about J.P. Lastly, regarding W.E., the University argued that his higher salary was, at least in part, due to his years of experience.
¶15 The district court first determined that Hitesman "was unable to meet her prima facie burden as it related to" five of the employees she named in her complaint.2 Next, it rejected the University's argument that Hitesman could not make out a prima facie case for an Equal Pay Act claim regarding W.E. and J.P. But the court agreed with the University that Hitesman's difference in pay was based on either a "system that measures earnings by quantity [or quality]" or "factors other than sex." (Cleaned up.) The court thus granted the University's motion and dismissed Hitesman's claim. Hitesman appeals.
¶16 Hitesman contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in the University's favor on her claim for violations of the Equal Pay Act. In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review its legal conclusions and its ultimate grant of summary judgment for correctness. Cochegrus v. Herriman City , 2020 UT 14, ¶ 14, 462 P.3d 357.
¶17 The district court rejected the University's argument that, on summary judgment, Hitesman could not make out a prima facie case for Equal Pay Act violations with regard to two of her coworkers: W.E. and J.P. Still, it granted summary judgment to the University on Hitesman's claim, concluding that the University established one of two statutory affirmative defenses to the pay disparity between Hitesman and her male colleagues. Citing W.E.’s twenty years of experience and the men's greater transaction numbers, the court concluded that the University demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the pay disparity was attributable to "a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production" or a "factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iii), (iv).
¶18 Hitesman appeals, challenging the district court's determination that the University proved any one affirmative defense as a matter of law. Specifically, she contends that questions of material fact regarding why W.E. and J.P. were paid more preclude summary judgment in the University's favor. In contrast, the University defends the court's decision, arguing that it firmly established an affirmative defense to Hitesman's claim. Alternatively, the University invites this court to affirm on the ground that Hitesman cannot make a prima facie case.
¶19 "Summary judgment is only appropriate ‘if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Arnold v. Grigsby , 2018 UT 14, ¶ 8, 417 P.3d 606 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). Accordingly, "[t]he district court must deny a motion for summary judgment if it finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact that bears on its legal determination or if it finds, as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, that the moving party is not entitled to a legal ruling in its favor." Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc. , 2009 UT 44, ¶ 9, 215 P.3d 152. To determine whether a genuine factual dispute exists, we ask "whether reasonable jurors, properly instructed, would be able to come to only...
To continue reading
Request your trial