Hitt v. Langel

Citation236 N.E.2d 118,93 Ill.App.2d 386
Decision Date29 March 1968
Docket NumberGen. No. 67--57
PartiesHelen HITT, Administratrix of the Estate of Norman M. Hitt, Deceased, and Rogers Cartage Company, a Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Delmar B. LANGEL, Administrator of the Estate of Ernest C. Langel, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Chapman, Strawn & Kinder, Granite City, Burroughs, Simpson & Burroughs, Edwardsville, for appellants.

James L. Reed, Reed, Armstrong & Gorman, Edwardsville, for appellee.

EBERSPACHER, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the defendant in an action for wrongful death and property damages.

The action was brought by Helen Hitt, the administratrix of the estate of Norman M. Hitt, deceased, and Rogers Cartage Company, a corporation. The cause of action was based upon a collision wherein the plaintiff's decedent driving a gasoline tanker truck owned by Rogers Cartage Company was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by Ernest C. Langel. As a result of the collision both the plaintiff's decedent and Ernest C. Langel were killed. Delmar B. Langel, the administrator of the estate of Ernest C. Langel, deceased, was named as the party defendant.

The collision occurred on December 30, 1964 at approximately 4:30 p.m. Norman Hitt was driving his truck in a northerly direction on Route 66 near Hamel, Madison County, Illinois. It was a clear day and the highway was dry. At this particular point Route 66 consists of two north bound lanes and two south bound lanes with a median strip dividing them.

From the evidence it appears that a man and wife by the name of Pattingale driving a 1956 Chevrolet automobile in the north bound lane had developed mechanical trouble and had parked their automobile on the shoulder to the right of the north bound lanes. The Pattingales had emerged from their automobile. Shortly thereafter a new Chrysler automobile driven by Ernest Langel also driving in a northerly direction with his wife as a passenger approached the Pattingale automobile. The Langels stopped their automobile in the right-hand lane about 100 to 200 yards in front of the place where the Pattingale car was parked in an apparent effort to render aid to the Pattingales. Moments later James Lamble, a witness, traveling north on Route 66, approached the scene from the south. He observed the Pattingale automobile, the Pattingales a short distance in front of their automobile sitting in the right lane, at a automobile sitting in the right lane, at a slight angle. As the witness Lamble passed the Langel Chrysler, it appeared to be backing toward the shoulder very slowly. Mr. Lamble testified that immediately after passing the Langel car he pulled back into the right-hand lane and looked into his rear-view mirror and observed a truck colliding with the Langel car and burst into flames.

There was about one-half mile of straight highway to the south of the place where the Pattingales parked their automobile. The highway gradually inclines and reaches a crest approximately 1,100 feet beyond the Pattingale automobile.

The Pattingales testified that after they parked their car on the shoulder they got out of their car and were walking north on the shoulder. They testified they saw the Langel car stop abruptly about 100 to 200 yards in front of their car and witnessed its movements prior to the collision. They testified that as the Langel car came to a halt the engine died. It was restarted and backed up 20 to 30 feet, then pulled forward 25 feet and was backing up again very slowly in the center of the outside lane at the time of the collision. They further testified that the truck did not appear to either slow or swerve either right or left prior to the collision. It appears that the Pattingales had walked about 70 feet between the time that the Langels stopped the car and the collision occurred.

Mr. Pattingale testified that as the truck passed him he saw a station wagon in the lane next to the truck also going north and that the front of the station wagon and that of the truck were pretty much in line. Mrs. Pattingale and Mr. Lamble testified that they did not see the station wagon.

There was also evidence that the plaintiff's decedent had gone on duty between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. that morning.

Upon this evidence the jury rendered a general verdict for the defendant and against both the plaintiff Hitt for the wrongful death and the plaintiff corporation for the loss of its truck. The court entered judgment on the verdict from which both plaintiffs appeal.

In support of the plaintiffs' effort to reverse the judgment, the plaintiffs allege that the court erred in failing to withdraw the issue of the defendant's negligence from the jury, that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the jury was improperly instructed, and that the court abused its discretion in not allowing a new trial due to the improper instruction.

Turning first to the specific allegations of error, the plaintiffs alleged that two of the defendant's instructions were erroneously given, that one of the plaintiffs' instructions was erroneously refused and that the court erred in giving the jury a general form of verdict.

The first instruction which the plaintiffs find objectionable is Defendant's Instruction No. 7. The instruction is I.P.I. No. 60.01 which provides:

'There was in force in the State of Illinois at the time of the occurrence in question a certain statute which provided that:

No person shall drive any vehicle upon any public highway of this state at a speed which

(1) Is greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use of the highway or endangers the safety of any person or property, or,

(2) Is greater than the applicable maximum speed limit. The fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when special hazard exists with respect to other traffic and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any vehicles on the highway in complinace with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.

'If you decide that a party violated the statute on the occasion in question, then you may consider that fact together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether a party was contributorily negligent before and at the time of the occurrence.'

The basis of the plaintiffs' objection is that the defendant injected into the case by way of instruction a statute which had no bearing on the factual situation and created an issue which had never been presented by pleading or evidence. Their argument continues that the evidence was that the day was clear, the pavement dry and that in the opinion of the witnesses the speed of the truck was from 50 to 55 m.p.h. and the speed limit for trucks was 55 m.p.h.

In Wrighthouse v. Brown, 52 Ill.App.2d 191, 196, 201 N.E.2d 752, 754 (1964), the Appellate Court, Fourth District, passed upon an instruction substantially the same as Defendant's No. 7. In passing on an objection much the same as is urged in this case, the Court said:

"It is elementary that every party has the right to have the law applicable to his case stated fairly, clearly, distinctly and conveyed to the jury with substantial accuracy so that it may not be misled to the prejudice of the party (citing cases). He has the right to have the jury instructed upon his theories of recovery or defense (citing cases). Failure to give a party these rights which are tantamount to a fair and just trial, whenever the case is close upon its facts or the evidence conflicting, and the failure is material, requires that the verdict be set aside, the judgment reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.' Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 7 Ill.App.2d 21, 29, 30, 129 N.E.2d 23, 27. Each party is entitled to have the court instruct the jury on his theory of the case, provided that there is an evidentiary basis for the instruction. 'All that is required in order to justify the giving of an instruction is that there is some evidence in the record to support the theory set out in the instruction.' Biggerstaff v. New York, C. & St. L.R. Co., 13 Ill.App.2d 85, 94, 141 N.E.2d 72, 77. 'The law is well settled that each party to a cause of action is entitled to direct and specific instructions embracing his theory of the facts where his evidence tends to prove such facts.' Kirchner v. Kuhlman, 334 Ill.App. 339, 346, 79 N.E.2d 628, 631. The issue of speed, as much as any other particular act of a party, is for the jury. Such an instruction calls upon the jury to examine all the facts and circumstances in evidence including the speed of the vehicle and then decide whether a party should have reduced his speed to avoid a collision. The fact that a party's speed was lower than the applicable maximum does not relieve that party from reducing his speed under certain circumstances.'

In the instant case, the fact that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had exceeded the speed limit does not make the instruction improper. The jury heard evidence not only on the speed of the plaintiffs' truck but also the hazard with which the plaintiff was confronted and the circumstances and conditions under which the hazard arose. The jury was succinctly instructed by instruction No. 7 that the speed of a vehicle on a highway should be governed by the traffic conditions and that adherence to the speed limit does not relieve the driver from duty of decreasing his speed under certain circumstances. Under the facts and circumstances of the case the issue of speed and whether the plaintiff should have reduced his speed was clearly a question for the jury.

Plaintiff contends that since there was no evidence of speed in excess of the statutory limit, and defendant did not plead a statutory...

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  • Berry v. American Commercial Barge Lines
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 1, 1984
    ...... (Law v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 701, 41 Ill.Dec. 728, 408 N.E.2d 74; Hitt v. Langel (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 386, 236 N.E.2d 118). The defendants do not contend that F.J.P.I. 80.16 is partial, misleading or argumentative. ......
  • Marek v. Stepkowski, 1-91-3336
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 22, 1992
    ...... (Hitt v. Langel (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 386, 395, 236 N.E.2d 118.) Defendants' objection to the form of the verdict in their post-trial motion came too ......
  • Greene v. Rogers, 3-85-0257
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 2, 1986
    ...... Hitt v. [147 Ill.App.3d 1022] Langel (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 386, 236 N.E.2d 118. .         Appellant lastly asserts (issue 6) that the trial court ......
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    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
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