Hixon v. Allphin

• Decision Date: 01 April 1955
• Docket Number: No. 8239,8239
• Citation: 281 P.2d 1042,76 Idaho 327
• Parties: Arlie S. HIXON, also known as A. Hixon, and Florence Hixon, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ray ALLPHIN, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1042

281 P.2d 1042

76 Idaho 327

Arlie S. HIXON, also known as A. Hixon, and Florence Hixon, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ray ALLPHIN, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 8239.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 1, 1955.

Richards, Haga & Eberle, Dale O. Morgan, Boise, for appellants.

J. F. and C. Ben Martin, Boise, for respondent.

ANDERSON, Justice.

This is an action for restitution. The facts are set out in appellants' amended complaint. It discloses that appellants, as husband and wife, purchased two milk routes designated 20 and 22 and operated them continually for several years prior to 1951, with the consent of the Ada County Dairymen's Association, for whom the routes were operated. Appellants collected all milk within the routes from member-producers and furnished their own hauling equipment and paid their own expenses. They received compensation at a stipulated rate per pound for milk hauled. The hauling contract was terminable upon notice by either appellants or the Association. The milk routes are alleged to be valuable rights and that it is the universal custom for haulers on such routes to sell them with the knowledge and consent of the Association.

On or about January 2, 1951, with the consent of the Association, appellants entered into a written instrument with respondent and L. E. and Beth Spraker for the sale of a certain truck and trailer, together with milk routes 20 and 22 and the right to operate them under the hauling contract with the Association. The total sale price was $7,500, of which $500 was cash, the balance to be paid at the rate of $200 per month, together with 6% interest paid semi-annually. Possession was delivered and respondent has since operated the milk routes. Total payments were made in the amount of $2,900 by January 1952, at which time respondent failed and neglected and refused to make further payments.

February 8, 1952, appellants gave notice that the contract would be forfeited unless delinquent payments were made by April 8, 1952. None was made and forfeiture was declared.

May 2, 1952, appellants brought action for forfeiture of their contract against respondent and L. E. and Beth Spraker in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho. The court subsequently ruled that contract was unenforceable and that it could not be reformed. No appeal was taken from such ruling. Later, this action was commenced, appellants claiming they have no adequate remedy at law. In addition to the above allegations, they allege they were induced to part with their equipment and routes under the above mentioned contract and that respondent has been unjustly enriched, to their detriment.

They also allege that at the time respondent took possession of the equipment and milk routes in January 1951, they were of the reasonable value of $7,500 and that the use and rental of same have been at all times of the reasonable value of $200 per month; that the sum respondent has paid was not the reasonable value of the equipment and rights transferred to him and that he has failed and refused to pay anything more. Appellants ask for return of their equipment and the milk routes, together with compensation for their use since January 2, 1952, and interest. In case return of the property cannot be made, appellants ask for $7,500 and interest, less payments. They also pray for general relief.

Respondent filed a general and special demurrer, a motion to strike, a motion to elect and a motion to separately state, against the amended complaint. The court sustained the general and special demurrer and granted in part the motion to strike. Appellants refused to further plead. The action was dismissed and this appeal taken.

Appellants contend the trial court erred in entering its order of dismissal and order striking certain allegations from the amended complaint relative to custom, the value of the milk routes, rental value, unjust enrichment and the forfeiture action.

Stripped down to its fundamental legal proposition, appellants, in their amended complaint, invoke equity for restitution of property now in possession of respondent in order to prevent him from becoming unjustly enriched at appellants' expense.

Under Idaho law there is but one form of civil action and a complaint is not subject to general demurrer if it states any cause of action entitling plaintiffs to relief at law or in equity. Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 1.

'Under our code, the technicalities of pleadings have been dispensed with and plaintiff need only state his cause of action in ordinary and concise language, without regard to the ancient forms of pleadings, and plaintiff can be sent out of court only when upon his facts he is entitled to no relief either at law or in equity. Stone v. Bradshaw, 64 Idaho 152, 158, 128 P.2d 844, and cases cited.' Paulsen v. Krumsick, 68 Idaho 341, 346, 195 P.2d 363, 366.

'All intendments and inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom and the facts alleged will be construed in favor of the sufficiency of a pleading challenged by general demurrer. Paulsen v. Krumsick, 68 Idaho 341, 195 P.2d 363.' Cooper v. Wesco Builders, Inc., 73 Idaho 383, at page 385, 253 P.2d 226, at page 227.

For the purpose of determining the effect of a pleading, its allegations must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. Paulsen v. Krumsick, supra.

'The essence of a quasi contractual obligation lies in the fact that the defendant has received a benefit which it would be inequitable for him to retain. This was clearly pointed out by Lord Mansfield in the first case recognizing the doctrine of quasi contracts. 'If the defendant,' he said, 'be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund, the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were, upon a contract ('quasi ex contractu' as the Roman law expresses it). * * * This kind of equitable action to recover back money, which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial and therefore much encouraged. * * *' McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, at pages 547-548, 277 P. 554, at page 559.

'* * * It is not necessary in order to create an obligation to make restitution or to compensate, that the party unjustly enriched should have been guilty of any tortious or fraudulent act. The question is: Did he, to the detriment of someone else, obtain something of value to which he was not entitled? See 46 Am.Jur. 99, restitution and Unjust Enrichment.

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'* * *, the terms 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment' are the modern designation for the older doctrine of 'quasi contracts.' See also, 66 C.J. 32, Unjust Enrichment. 'Quasi contracts' are not true contracts but are obligations created by the law when money or property has been placed in one person's possession, under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain it. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Sol Lustbader [Inc.], City Ct., 26 N.Y.S.2d 328; see also, 35 Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., page 621. Thus, the substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter. * * *' Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wash.2d 645, 209 P.2d 457, at pages 459-460.

'Going to the Restatement, Law of Restitution, we find general statements supporting the instant judgment. Sec. 1, 'A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.' Comment c. under the above implies that where a person receives a benefit from another he is liable to pay therefor if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that as between the two it is unjust for him to retain it. * * *' Duffy v. Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273, at page 276, 129 A.L.R. 487.

See also, Lauffer v. Vial, 153 Pa.Super. 342, 33 A.2d 777, at page 779.

The facts alleged in appellants' amended complaint disclose that the benefits acquired by respondent were not gratuitously conferred.

Respondent contends this action is res judicata. An examination of the amended complaint fails to disclose upon its face that such is the case. All of the pleadings and facts in this and the other action are not before us, but we are satisfied that res judicata is not applicable at this time, if at all. Evans v. Davidson, 57 Idaho 548, 67 P.2d 83.

In our opinion the amended complaint states one, and only one, cause of action, i. e., an equitable action for restitution. Madison v. Buhl, 51 Idaho 564, 577, 8 P.2d 271. The simple, but comprehensive, question is whether the circumstances are such that equitably, respondent (defendant) should restore to appellants (plaintiffs) that which he has received. 77 C.J.S., Restitution, page...