Hixson v. Oblon

• Decision Date: 10 August 2022
• Docket Number: 3:22-cv-00184-RJC-DSC
• Parties: RICHARD HIXSON Plaintiff, v. HON. DAVID A. OBLON, JUDGE, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Va. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

RICHARD HIXSON Plaintiff, v. HON. DAVID A. OBLON, JUDGE, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Va. Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-00184-RJC-DSC

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division

August 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

David S. Cayer United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

The Motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is now ripe for the Court's consideration.

Having fully considered the arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part as discussed below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Accepting the factual allegations in the Complaint as true Plaintiff's wife filed for divorce in Fairfax County Virginia, on September 21, 2021. Shortly thereafter, she filed a pendente lite motion.

On December 17, 2021, the Fairfax County Circuit Court entered an Order for Pendente Lite Relief. The Order provided spousal support for Plaintiff's wife.

On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff named Defendant Oblon, the Circuit Court Judge who entered the Order, as the sole Defendant.

He alleges that Oblon violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue. When an action that has been removed lacks a proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction, it must be remanded. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998); Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). The requirements are so absolute that “[n]o party need assert [a lack of subject matter jurisdiction]. No party can waive the defect, or consent to jurisdiction. No court can ignore the defect; rather a court, noticing the defect, must raise the matter on its own.” Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (internal citations omitted). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt”) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).

The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Energy Dev. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 833, 835 (S.D.W.Va. 2004). Any doubts about removal must be resolved in favor of remand. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, [courts] must strictly construe removal jurisdiction. If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary”) (citations omitted); Griffin v. Holmes, 843 F.Supp. 81, 84 (E.D. N.C. 1993); Storr Office Supply v. Radar Business Systems, 832 F.Supp. 154, 156 (E.D. N.C. 1993).

The Court is mindful of the latitude extended to the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (courts should “[c]onstru[e] [a pro se] petitioner's inartful pleading liberally”). However, courts cannot act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or develop claims which the plaintiff failed to raise clearly on the face of his complaint. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that district courts are not expected to assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff). See also Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for determining whether a complaint meets this plausibility standard. First, the court identifies allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (allegation that government officials adopted challenged policy "because of" its adverse effects on protected group was conclusory and not assumed to be true). Although the pleading requirements stated in "Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mark [] a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79.

Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief "will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief,'" and therefore should be dismissed. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

The sufficiency of the factual allegations aside, "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). Indeed, where "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, a claim must be dismissed." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 328; see also Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed.Appx. 278, 293 (4th Cir. 2013)). The court must not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Anand v. Owen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Should Be Denied.

Generally, domestic relations matters fall under the authority of the state courts, because “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Perez v. Cuccinelli, 949 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2016)). Consequently “[f]ederal courts will not hear divorce and custody cases even if they arise in diversity because of ‘the virtually exclusive primacy ... of the States in the regulation of domestic relations.'” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 767 (2013) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 714 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). Therefore, domestic relations actions are excepted from federal courts and remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. See Ankebrandt, 504 U.S. at 693. The Supreme Court has construed this exception narrowly and found that it only applies in cases that involve “issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).

The Fourth Circuit has held that the domestic relations exception does not apply to cases arising under federal question jurisdiction. Reale v. Wake Cnty. Hum. Servs., 480 Fed.Appx. 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Thus, the domestic relations exception ‘is applied only as a judicially implied limitation on the diversity jurisdiction; it has no generally recognized application as a limitation on federal question jurisdiction.'”).^[1] In Reale v. Wake Cnty. Hum. Servs., the Fourth Circuit held that an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state defendants invoked federal question jurisdiction, and the domestic relations did not apply. See Id.

In Stephens v. Shah, this Court found that the domestic relations exception applied in a child custody case....