Hlista v. Altevogt

• Decision Date: 25 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 307,307
• Citation: 239 Md. 43,210 A.2d 153
• Parties: Robert HLISTA v. William H. ALTEVOGT et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 43

239 Md. 43

210 A.2d 153

Robert HLISTA v. William H. ALTEVOGT et al.

No. 307.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 25, 1965.

Nelson R. Kerr, Jr., Towson (Nelson R. Kerr and Kerr & Kerr, Towson, on the brief), for appellant.

Preston A. Pairo, Jr., Baltimore (Leonard S. Jacobson, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Before PRESCOTT, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER and BARNES, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Chief Judge.

This appeal has some unusual aspects and reaches us in a peculiar posture. The plaintiff-appellant sought below to recover certain real property which he had deeded some years before (no question of laches is raised) to his niece and nephew, who were the children of his sister, one Albina Altevogt. In this deed, the appellant reserved unto himself a life interest, without power of disposition.

The facts were not developed on several important issues and a very large portion of the record extract is consumed by colloquy between the court and counsel and the court and witnesses. The chancellor concluded that plaintiff's testimony disclosed that he did not come itno equity with 'clean hands'; hence he left the parties as he found them, without the defendants offering any proof, and without the chancellor making other findings of facts. From an order dismissing his bill and ordering him to pay the costs, plaintiff appealed.

Several questions are presented and argued in appellant's brief, but, if we answer all of them, it will necessitate, because of the incomplete state of the proof, our answering what amount to hypothetical questions. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves, on this appeal, to a holding that the evidence, as adduced up to the time of the chancellor's order, did not justify an application of the dectrine of unclean hands against the appellant, and a ruling on the admissibility of certain tetimony; and we shall remand, under Maryland Rule 871 a, for further proceedings.

The appellant, a 72 year old Austrian immigrant at the time of the trial below, obtained a small parcel of land (some 8.4 acres), in Baltimore County from his parents in 1942. ¹ The parents, apparently, reserved the right to live in three rooms in the dwelling located thereon. In 1942, the house burned down. Not very long thereafter, the appellant obtained a small adjoining parcel of land, and built his father and mother a house on this newly acquired parcel 'right there near the branch where the water would be and where we can get electric * * *.'

In 1943, Oscar Ruf, who had married appellant's sister, Anna, arrived in Baltimore County from his former residence in California, and moved into the house occupied by appellant's parents. From this time on, appellant had trouble: his pigs (of which he had some 200 to 300 and which comprised his livelihood) were poisoned; his cattle were short; his right of way was obstructed; and he was haled into Magistrates' Courts on a number of occasions. Appellant attributed all of his difficulties to Oscar Ruf, and claimed that by 'undue influence' exercised by Ruf upon his parents, appellant was threatened by law suits and disputes over his right to use a roadway.

During this time of harassment, one of his sisters, Albina Altevogt, kept importuning appellant to deed the property to her two children, who, together with their respective spouses, are the appellees herein. ² Appellant makes no claim that either the niece or the nephew made any misrepresentations to him in order to obtain the deed; his negotiations relative thereto were with their mother. According to appellant, this sister represented to him that he would lose the property as the result of being sued by Ruf, who had threatened to sue him, but if he would 'sign it over to her children,' he would get it back after the suit. Finally in 1945, at a time when he was sick in mind and body (he was suffering from a protracted illness) and scared ('I lost my house; I lost my cattle, it was shot and I had been promised to take the piece of land away so I just went and signed it over.'), he signed the deed, without consideration, to his niece and nephew, because he trusted them and their mother. He did not know 'much' about the 'effects' of a deed, but he trusted them, and his sister had assured him that he 'would get it [the property] back.'

No attempt was made to show that Ruf ever had a just claim against appellant, and Ruf died without instituting any proceeding against him. And no attempt was made to show that appellant rendered himself 'judgment proof' by his transfer to his niece and nephew. On the contrary, the testimony showed that he had personal property of considerable worth, and he always had cash on hand, as evidenced by his subsequent loans to his niece and nephew. In 1946, at Ruf's instigation (according to appellant), appellant's parents filed suit against him and the appellees herein as his assignees. As a result of this suit, appellant was directed by the court to erect another residence on the subject property 'on [the] original site [of the burned residence] or site agreeable to complainants * * *,' or the deed from his mother and father to him would be rescinded. With this order, the appellant fully complied, without any contribution from the appellees. Appellant testified that thereafter the appellees, on many occasions, promised to execute a deed releasing their interests in the property to him, but they never would do so.

The appellees filed a short and rather incomplete answer to appellant's bill of complaint. They claimed they had 'no personal knowledge' of the facts alleged in five paragraphs thereof, and 'emphatically' denied the allegations of the other two. Some of the allegations contained in the latter were of such a nature that it is difficult to see how a denial thereof was proper; for examples, the allegations that appellant had deeded the property to the appellees and that appellees had 'failed, neglected and refused' to reconvey the same to him. See Maryland Rule 372. In any event, the answer was sufficient to disclose that even though the niece and nephew had little, if anything, to do with the appellant's execution of the deed, both intended to stand firmly upon the deed as executed, and they thereby ratified and confirmed the actions and conduct of their mother and Ora Altevogt exerted in their behalf.

CLEAN HANDS.

The Maryland decisions which have dealt with the maxim, 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands,' as well as those which have consideral its cognate maxims, have very generally been in conformity with the hodlings in other jurisdictions and the statements of the leading text-writers upon the subject. The maxim is based upon public policy and, in a general sense, may be said to mean that courts of equity will not lend their aid to anyone seeking their active interposition, who has been guilty of fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks assistance. Schaeffer v. Sterling, 176 Md. 553, 6 A.2d 254; Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 43 A.2d 193; Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505 (C.A.4). There is, of course, no reason for applying the maxim unless the facts actually disclose unclean hands, Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908, Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372, and a reading of what was said above indicates, as is the fact, that equity courts, in applying the maxim, do not require litigants to have led faultless lives in their dealings on all matters, but confine themselves to the effect that the alleged fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable conduct has upon the request for relief then under consideration. Brown v. Brown, 199 Md. 585, 87 A.2d 626; Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 142 A.2d 798.

The maxim is subject to certain limitations or qualifications, but it will not be necessary to attempt to mention all of them here. It has been stated 'that if the alleged wrongful conduct of a complainant appears not to have injured the defendant, the maxim cannot be successfully invoked.' Thomas v. Klemm, supra. See also First National Bank of Catonsville v. Carter, 132 Md. 218, 103 A. 463. However, in Messick v. Smith, 193 Md. 659, 69 A.2d 478, 72 A.2d 249, it was pointed out that the above statement is too broad, and the true rule is that when a...