Hlubek v. Pelecky, 04-0255.

• Citation: 701 N.W.2d 93
• Decision Date: 22 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-0255.,04-0255.
• Parties: Mark J. HLUBEK, Appellant, v. Glen PELECKY and Thomas Wirtz, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

701 N.W.2d 93

Mark J. HLUBEK, Appellant, v. Glen PELECKY and Thomas Wirtz, Appellees.

No. 04-0255.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 22, 2005.

M. Leanne Tyler of M. Leanne Tyler & Associates, P.C., Davenport, for appellant.

Cameron A. Davidson and Troy A. Howell of Lane & Waterman LLP, Davenport, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

Mark J. Hlubek was employed as a drivers' education instructor for the Mississippi Bend Area Education Association (AEA) until his employer allegedly pressured him into resigning. Hlubek sued these defendants, administrators of AEA, on theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with a contract, and interference with potential business relationships. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In January 1999 Nicole Preston, a sophomore at North Scott Community High School (North Scott) complained to school officials that Hlubek, her drivers' education teacher, had sexually harassed her. Even though Hlubek was employed by AEA and was not under the direct supervision of North Scott, North Scott administrators investigated the complaint to determine if there was any sexual abuse involved. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 281-102.9(2) (requiring school officials to investigate possible sexual abuse). They concluded there was none. North Scott forwarded a copy of its report to AEA and suggested that AEA officials conduct their own investigation.

The defendants, Glen Pelecky (AEA's chief administrator) and Thomas Wirtz (AEA's director of administrative services), investigated the complaint. Wirtz interviewed twelve students, including Nicole Preston. According to Wirtz, other incidents of potentially inappropriate conduct by Hlubek were brought to light in these interviews. Wirtz then met with Hlubek to inform him of the students' allegations and to get his response. Hlubek denied the allegations and said that many of the statements were taken out of context. Wirtz drafted a written report and submitted it to Pelecky, who also personally interviewed Hlubek. Following the investigation, Pelecky began termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 279. Hlubek requested a hearing before the AEA board of directors. See Iowa Code § 279.15 (1999). However, before a hearing could be held, Hlubek resigned. He claims he did so only because Pelecky threatened to not only terminate him but to also seek revocation of his teaching certificate if he did not resign.

Shortly thereafter, Hlubek was charged by the state with criminal assault, based on Nicole Preston's allegations, but he was ultimately acquitted. After his acquittal he began substituting for the Clinton school district. He was initially offered a job as an art teacher, but after Clinton school officials conducted a background check, they rescinded the offer.

In March of 2000 Hlubek interviewed for a teaching position at the Maquoketa Community School District. During the interview, Hlubek disclosed his acquittal on the criminal assault charge. After the interview, the Maquoketa superintendent called defendant Pelecky to inquire about Hlubek's performance while employed at AEA. Pelecky did not go into specific details but did say that AEA was "dissatisfied" with Hlubek's performance and decided not to renew his contract. Shortly after that phone conversation, Hlubek received a letter from the Maquoketa school district informing him that, based on a background check and his criminal record, he would not be hired.

In March 2001 Hlubek sued Pelecky and Wirtz, raising several claims. He claimed the defendants acted unreasonably and with bad faith in investigating the allegations made by Nicole Preston. He claimed this amounted to intentional interference with his AEA contract. Second, he claimed that the defendants had interfered with his potential Maquoketa contract by knowingly making false statements to the Maquoketa superintendent. Third, Hlubek claimed that Pelecky and Wirtz interfered with potential business relationships—primarily the potential employment opportunities he had with Clinton and Maquoketa—by knowingly providing false information.

The district court dismissed all of Hlubek's claims on summary judgment. The court concluded that the defendants qualified for statutory immunity under Iowa Code sections 91B.2, 280.27, and 613.21 (2001). In the alternative, the court concluded that, even if the statutory immunity provisions did not apply, Hlubek failed to present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims.

II. Disposition.

A. Standard of review. We review summary judgments for correction of errors at law, and we will affirm them only when the entire record establishes no genuine issue of material fact. Carr v. Bankers Trust Co., 546 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Iowa 1996). The moving party has the burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact. Fischer v. UNIPAC Serv. Corp., 519 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Iowa 1994). The evidence bearing on this question is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Gott, 387 N.W.2d 342, 343 (Iowa 1986). However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5); Hoefer v. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 338-39 (Iowa 1991). Speculation is not sufficient to generate a genuine issue of fact. Walls v. Jacob North Printing Co., 618 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Iowa 2000); cf. Smith v. Shagnasty's, Inc., 688 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 2004)

.

B. Statutory immunity. Although the district court alternatively based its summary judgment on both statutory immunity and the plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case on his claims, we limit our discussion to the statutory-immunity issues. Three statutes are involved: Iowa Code sections 280.27 and 613.21 provide immunity for school employees in the performance of their duties, and Iowa Code section 91B.2 provides immunity for former or current employers who provide information to prospective employers.

1. School employee immunity under Iowa Code sections 280.27 and 613.21. Iowa Code section 280.27 provides:

Reporting violence—immunity. An employee of a school district, an accredited nonpublic school, or an area education agency who participates in good faith and acts reasonably in the making of a report to, or investigation by, an appropriate person or agency regarding violence, threats of violence, or other inappropriate activity against a school employee or student in a school building, on school grounds, or at a school-sponsored function shall be immune from civil or criminal liability relating to such action, as well as for participating in any administrative or judicial proceeding resulting from or relating to the report or investigation.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 613.21 provides:

Immunity from civil suit. An employee of an accredited public school district, accredited nonpublic school, or area education agency shall be immune from civil suit for reasonable acts undertaken in good faith relating to participation in the making of a report and any resulting investigation or administrative or judicial proceedings regarding violence, threats of violence, or other inappropriate activity against a school employee or student, pursuant to the provisions of section 280.27.

(Emphasis added.)

Absolute immunity ordinarily is available to certain government officials such as legislators, judges, and prosecutors acting in their official capacities, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 685 (1980), while qualified immunity applies to a wide range of other public officials. Id. The plaintiff notes, correctly, that sections 280.27 and 613.21 create only qualified—not absolute—immunity. Further, the statutes incorporate words such as "good faith" and "reasonable" that, according to him, do not readily lend themselves to disposition by summary judgment. The defendants respond that statutory immunity, like common-law immunity, provides more than protection from liability; it provides protection from even having to go to trial in some circumstances. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1985)

(qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation").

We have not previously considered the immunity provisions of sections 280.27 or 613.21; however, we have considered the common-law immunity of other public employees. In Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1996), the issue was whether a plaintiff's tort claim against two employees of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources could survive a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In that case, defendant Mertz had cited plaintiff for violating Iowa's hunting laws. The plaintiff was acquitted of that charge, but was later cited for another hunting violation by defendant Batterson, also a DNR employee. Dickerson was again acquitted. Dickerson, 547 N.W.2d at 210-11.

Dickerson sued officers Mertz and Batterson for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. He also claimed denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed. As to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, we held the defendants were shielded by qualified immunity. Id. at 215. We said:

If asserted by the government officer, the issue of qualified immunity is readily determinable prior to trial and the standard of proof is one of objective reasonableness. . . .

Id. We quoted a Supreme Court case regarding qualified immunity and the philosophy underlying it:

"[T]he qualified immunity defense `shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil

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