Hoa v. Riley

• Decision Date: 26 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. C–12–2078 EMC,C–12–2078 EMC
• Citation: 78 F.Supp.3d 1138
• Parties: Paul Hoa, Plaintiff, v. Richard Riley, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

78 F.Supp.3d 1138

Paul Hoa, Plaintiff

v.Richard Riley, et al., Defendants.

No. C–12–2078 EMC

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed January 26, 2015

Gene Hitoshi Shioda, James Alexander Kim, Jason Yau Lie, Law Office of Gene H. Shioda, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

John F. Geary, Raymond J. Fullerton, Jr., Robert Wayne Henkels, Geary Shea O'Donnell Grattan and Mitchell PC, Santa Rosa, CA, Edward Rheem Fluet, Office of the Attorney General, Maneesh Sharma, California State Attorney General's Office, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING CROSS-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 146)

EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge

David F. Lopez, T. Gregory Stagnito, Bridge Transport, and Stag Leasing Inc. (collectively “Cross–Defendants”) have moved to dismiss Richard Riley, Raymond Matteucci, David Moore, Ronald Chan, Tammy Foss, Thomas Alioto, and George Moon's (collectively “Cross–Claimants”) cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. Cross–Claimants sought equitable indemnity and contribution from Cross–Defendants in the event they are held liable to Plaintiff Paul Hoa for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cross–Defendants argue that there is no federal right to indemnification or contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus Cross–Claimants have failed to state a claim under federal law. Cross–Defendants further contend that Cross–Claimants cannot bring claims for equitable indemnity or contribution under state law. The Court GRANTS Cross–Defendants' motion to dismiss, because Cross–Claimants may not seek indemnity and contribution under Section 1983, and any such rights under state law would be inconsistent with the goals of Section 1983.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of resolving the present motion, the Court assumes certain facts in the Complaint, which are incorporated by reference into the Cross–Complaint, to be true. See Docket No. 138 at ¶ 5. On July 27, 2011, a truck carrying food supplies to San Quentin State Prison (“Prison”) and driven by Cross–Defendant Lopez, injured the Plaintiff, Paul Hoa, a prisoner who assisted commercial vehicles coming into the Prison as part of the Prison work program. The truck trapped and crushed Mr. Hoa as it backed up a loading ramp. The Cross–Claimants are employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and, for the most part, either directly or indirectly supervised Plaintiff's work, work area, and/or working conditions. Docket No. 109 (“TAC”) at ¶¶ 32–47.

Plaintiff sued Cross–Defendants, alleging claims relating to their ownership or operation of the truck involved in the incident. Cross–Defendant Lopez was an employee of Cross–Defendant Stagnito and drove the trailer truck that backed into the Plaintiff. TAC at ¶ 48. Cross–Defendant Stagnito is an individual doing business under the name Bridge Transport. Id. at ¶ 49. Mr. Hoa named Cross–Defendants Stag Leasing and Bridge Transport based on Mr. Hoa's belief that they are shell corporations of Cross–Defendant Stagnito. Id. at ¶ 52.

Plaintiff sued the Cross–Claimants (the prison supervisors), alleging that they are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deliberate indifference and (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff's claims against the Cross–Claimants arise from the alleged unsafe procedures, failure to train, and hazardous work area in the warehouse, along with related violations of the CDCR's Department's Operating Manual. As to the Cross–Defendants (the truck owners or operators) Plaintiff has alleged state tort claims of (1) negligence, (2) negligent supervision, and (3) negligent training. Plaintiff has alleged that Cross–Claimants and Cross–Defendants are jointly and severally liable for his injuries. TAC at ¶ 54.

In June of 2014, Cross–Claimants filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnification, contribution, and declaratory relief against Cross–Defendants. Docket No. 138. Cross–Claimants' declaratory relief claim seeks a judicial declaration that Cross–Defendants are obligated to indemnify Cross–Claimants or contribute to a judgment against Cross–Claimants. Cross–Claimants argue that, if they are ultimately found liable, their liability only arose by reason of Cross–Defendants' active and primary negligence. Docket No. 138 at ¶¶ 9, 13.

The State Compensation Insurance Fund served a notice of lien (“Notice of Lien”) on the parties in this action on October 31, 2012, which reflected that just under $900,000 in workers' compensation benefits had been provided to Mr. Hoa as of the date of the Notice of Lien.¹ After the hearing on the instant motion, the State Compensation Insurance Fund filed an updated Notice of Lien, which is a part of the case file. The updated Notice of Lien shows that, as of September 18, 2014, the State Compensation Insurance Fund provided approximately $2.1 million in workers' compensation benefits to Plaintiff. Docket No. 154.

Cross–Defendants filed this motion to dismiss on August 4, 2014, arguing that, as a matter of law, (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit claims for indemnification and/or contribution and (2) any state law claims for indemnification or contribution are precluded by the California Workers Compensation Act. See Docket No. 146. Cross–Defendants further raised, and the Court received supplemental briefing on, the issue of whether federal law precludes the cross-claims.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a pleading based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. See Parks Sch. Of Bus . v . Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). “A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). In considering such a motion, a court must take all allegations of material fact and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2009). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations ... it must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A right to contribution among joint tortfeasors did not exist at common law. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL–CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 86, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981). Most states have allowed a right to contribution either by statute or judicial decision. Id. However, “federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.” Id. at 95, 101 S.Ct. 1571. A federal right to contribution can therefore arise in only two ways: “first, through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear implication; or, second, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal common law of contribution.” Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981). The latter route is limited: there is no federal general common law, and the instances where courts have fashioned federal common law “are few and restricted.” Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963) ). Federal common law arises in two categories: (1) where a federal rule of decision is “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” and (2) where Congress has empowered courts to develop substantive law. Id. (citations omitted).

Although Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries addressed the right to contribution, indemnity and contribution are closely related; in a sense, “indemnity is only an extreme form of contribution.” Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1951). Thus, the analytical framework for determining the right of contribution has been extended to the right of indemnity. Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Nev. (Las Vegas), 934 F.2d 209, 212 n. 3 (9th Cir.1991).

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that ‘[t]here is no federal right to indemnification provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 845 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996)overruled on other grounds Acri v. Varian Ass'ns, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.1997). Allen arose from a Section 1983 lawsuit that Rodney King filed against the City of Los Angeles and city police officers regarding certain officers' use of unreasonable force. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by holding that there was no right to indemnification under Section 1983. Allen cited with approval Banks v. City of Emeryville, 109 F.R.D. 535 (N.D.Cal.1985). Banks involved similar claims to the claims at issue here. In Banks, the plaintiffs' decedent burned to death while in the custody of the city jail. 109 F.R.D. at 537. Ms. Banks's body was found on a mattress that had disintegrated in the fire. Plaintiffs brought an action against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The...