Hoage v. Murch Bros. Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 5010.,5010.
• Citation: 50 F.2d 983,60 App. DC 218
• Parties: HOAGE, Deputy Com'r, United States Employees' Compensation Commission, et al. v. MURCH BROS. CONST. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

60 App. DC 218, 50 F.2d 983 (1931)

HOAGE, Deputy Com'r, United States Employees' Compensation Commission, et al. v. MURCH BROS. CONST. CO. et al.

No. 5010.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued May 5, 1931.

Decided June 1, 1931.

W. B. Wright and Leo A. Rover, both of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Edwin A. Swingle and Ernest A. Swingle, both of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.

GRONER, Associate Justice.

On December 3, 1928, Turner Sutton, a resident of the District of Columbia, while employed as a laborer by Murch Bros. Construction Company, one of appellees, received injuries from which he died. Thereafter a claim for compensation under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act was filed with the Compensation Commission by Sadie Turner Sutton, as his surviving common-law wife. A hearing was had; the injury, death, and notice were admitted, as well as the relationship of employer and employee and that the services then being performed by deceased were incidental to his employment. At the conclusion, the commissioner found as a fact "that Sadie Turner Sutton and deceased had lived together in good faith for a period of about three years as husband and wife, and had held themselves out to the public as husband and wife, and were generally known as such, and that at the time of deceased's death, she was his surviving wife living with him and dependent upon him for her support." The award is contested by the employer and the insurance carrier on the ground, first, that the evidence did not sustain the commissioner's findings; and, secondly, that, if it did, the relationship of common-law marriage does not exist in the District of Columbia. The lower court allowed a permanent injunction on the ground that the finding that appellant had entered into a common-law marriage in the District of Columbia did not entitle her to compensation because no such marriage is legal under the laws of the District.

We think that the findings of fact of the deputy commissioner were supported by substantial evidence, and that, in such circumstances, such findings cannot be disturbed by this court. Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal (C. C. A.) 41 F.(2d) 593.

We come, therefore, to consider whether or not a common-law marriage is valid in the District of Columbia. At common law, no formal ceremony was essential to a valid marriage. Chancellor Kent states the doctrine thus: "No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required; and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is required by natural or public law. The Roman lawyers strongly inculcated the doctrine, that the very foundation and essence of the contract consisted in consent freely given, by parties competent to contract. Nihil proderit signasse tabulas, si mentem matrimonii non fuisse constabit. Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus facit. This is the language equally of the common and canon law, and of common reason. If the contract be made per verba de praesenti, and remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba de futuro, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage in the absence of all civil regulations to the contrary, and which the parties (being competent as to age and consent) cannot dissolve, and it is equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiæ."

In England so-called common-law marriages were forbidden after 1753, and, by act of Parliament, it was provided that all subsequent marriages not celebrated according to the formalities therein prescribed should be invalid. Act 26 George II, c. 33. But, so far as we can determine, this act was never adopted in any of the states of the United States. However, in the case of Reg. v. Millis, 10 Cl. & Fin., 534, it was declared that by the law of England, as it existed at the time of the passage of the Marriage Act (Act 26 George II), a contract of marriage per verba de præsenti was a contract indissoluble between the parties themselves, affording to either of the contracting parties, by application to the spiritual court, the power of compelling the solemnization of an actual marriage, but neither in the American colonies nor in the states of the United States has there ever been any ecclesiastical tribunal with power to enforce the solemnization of marriages between parties contracting per verba de præsenti, and so in this country it has been generally held that a marriage according to the common law is valid and binding, in the absence of a statute prohibiting or declaring void a marriage not solemnized in accordance with its provisions, and also it has been held, by the greater weight of authority, that statutory provisions as to solemnizing marriages, not containing words of nullity, are directory merely, and do not affect the validity of common-law marriages. Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76, 78, 24 L. Ed. 826. But in the state of Maryland it was decided otherwise in Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, and it is quite true we held in DeForest v. U. S., 11 App. D. C. 458, that, by the Act of February 27, 1801 (2 Stat. 103), the laws of the state of Maryland as of that date were continued in force in the District of Columbia, and we need not stop to inquire whether, by the change in chapter 3, tit. 1, of the Code of 1929, in which all reference to the laws of Maryland is omitted, this is no longer true. The fact remains that Congress has enacted a complete set of divorce and marriage laws for the District of Columbia, and it is to these laws, rather than to those preserved out of the past relationship with the state of Maryland, that we must look...