Hoagland v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co.

Decision Date28 February 1867
Citation39 Mo. 451
PartiesGEORGE T. HOAGLAND, Respondent, v. THE HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.

The plaintiff moved the court to instruct the jury--

1. If they believe from the evidence that plaintiff shipped the lumber named in his petition under and by virtue of the bill of lading read in evidence, and that by virtue of said bill of lading and said shipment the said lumber was transported over the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroad, and by the officers of said railroad delivered to the defendant under said contract of affreightment or bill of lading, and that the agents of defendant transported said lumber over its road to St. Joseph, and then conveyed the same to the proper depot to be shipped on the steamers of defendant carrying freight on the Missouri river and to Council Bluffs and Omaha City, and there delivered the same for the purpose of shipping the same to its destination, and recognized the contract evidenced by said bill of lading and acted on the same, then defendant was bound by the terms of said bill of lading to transport said lumber to the place named in said bill of lading in a reasonable time; and if the jury further believe defendant failed or refused to so ship or transport said lumber to the destination named in said bill of lading, and at the same time shipped other goods received by said company after the arrival in St. Joseph of plaintiff's lumber, to the exclusion of plaintiff's lumber, then the jury will find for plaintiff on the second count of said petition, and assess his damages at an amount equal to the difference between the price to be paid by plaintiff for the transportation of said lumber and that actually paid by plaintiff to get his lumber to its destination.

2. If the jury further find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff by himself or agent, demanded the lumber sued for from defendant or his agents, having the possession thereof in St. Joseph, before the commencement of this suit, and that they refused to deliver said lumber to plaintiff upon such demand, then the jury will find for the plaintiff upon the first count of said petition, and assess his damages at such sum as the evidence shows he sustained by the detention of said lumber.

To the giving of which instructions the defendant at the time excepted.

The defendant moved the court to instruct the jury as follows:

1. If the jury believe from the evidence that there was no understanding by which the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, of the State of Illinois, was authorized to make through contracts for the transportation of lumber over said Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroad, the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, and up the Missouri river by the steamboats known as the Missouri River Packet Company's boats, to Council Bluffs and Omaha, they will find for defendant, notwithstanding they may believe from the evidence that George C. Hammond and other agents of said Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company may have signed the bills of lading read in evidence.

2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the bills of lading read in evidence were given by George C. Hammond and other agents of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company; that said agent had no authority from the defendant to bind it to transport the lumber sued for beyond the city of St. Joseph, Mo., other than that derived from Capt. Ford; and that said lumber was shipped to St. Joseph, and that said Ford was employed by the defendant to superintend the running of a line of steamboats for defendants from St. Joseph to Omaha, and that he was only authorized to make contracts for the shipping of local freights from St. Joseph to Omaha, they will find for the defendant, notwithstanding they may believe from the evidence that said Ford gave the rates upon lumber from St. Joseph to Council Bluffs and Omaha to Henry Martin, the general freight agent, and Geo. C. Hammond, the assistant general freight agent of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, and that upon such authority they gave the bill of lading read in evidence.

3. If the jury believe from the evidence that William B. Robinson, the general freight agent of the defendant at the time of making the contract sued on prior thereto, and that prior thereto he notified Henry Martin, the general freight agent of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company not to contract for any more lumber to be carried over the defendant's railroad and up the Missouri river to Council Bluffs and Omaha by the steamboats superintended by Capt. Rufus Ford, and that said steamboats were owned and controlled by the defendant, they will find for the defendant, notwithstanding they may believe from the evidence that the assistant general freight agent of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company may have contracted with the plaintiff to carry said lumber in question to Council Bluffs and Omaha by authority of Capt. Ford.

4. If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff's lumber in question came into possession of defendant in the regular course of business and without any notice being given to it at the time by the plaintiff, or the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, that the same was to be carried under a special contract made by said company with plaintiff, then they are instructed that defendant was not bound to carry said lumber according to any special contract, and was only bound to carry the same as it was other freight of the same class received from other railroad companies in the usual course of its business.

5. The jury are instructed that the defendant had a right to retain the plaintiff's lumber in question when plaintiff demanded the same of it at St. Joseph, Mo., until the freight thereon for carriage over defendant's road from Hannibal to St. Joseph, Mo., together with the freight due thereon for the carriage of the same over the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroad, which had been paid by defendant when it received the same from the said railroad company in the regular course of business; and that if they believe from the evidence that plaintiff refused to pay the same to defendant when he demanded said lumber of defendant, then they will find for defendant on the first count of plaintiff's petition.

6. The jury are instructed in this case, that there was no more of a special contract made so as to bind defendant than is generally and usually made in all cases by implication when the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company received freight for transportation over defendant's road.

7. The jury are instructed that the authority given to the agents of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company by Capt. Rufus Ford, in June, 1863, at Chicago, Ills., was not sufficient to authorize said agents to bind this defendant by a contract with plaintiff to transport the lumber in question from Chicago to Council Bluffs and Omaha, on the Missouri river above St. Joseph, unless defendant ratified such contract after it was made.

8. That said Rufus Ford had no authority to authorize the agents of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company to make the through contract in question concerning plaintiff's lumber so as to bind the defendant.

9. That the agents of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company had no authority to bind the defendant to carry out the special contract made by it with plaintiff in regard to the transportation of the lumber in question.

10. If the jury believe from the evidence that the lumber in question came into the possession of defendant as a common carrier of freight in the usual course of business, and that said lumber was marked for Council Bluffs and Omaha, and that it carried the same from the eastern to the western terminus of its road, then such carrying by defendant was not such a ratification of the contract made by the agents of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company of Illinois, as evidenced by the bill of lading read in evidence, so as to bind the defendant to carry said lumber beyond St. Joseph, they will find for the defendant on the second count of plaintiff's petition.

11. The jury are instructed in this case, that if they shall believe from the evidence there was no special contract made by defendant with plaintiff to transport the lumber sued for, and that a delay happened in the transportation in consequence of an unusual press of...

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