Hobbins v. Attorney General

• Decision Date: 10 May 1994
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 164963,171056 and 172399
• Citation: 205 Mich.App. 194,518 N.W.2d 487
• Parties: , 62 USLW 2728 Teresa HOBBINS, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Michigan Catholic Conference, Wayne County Prosecutor, Michigan Right to Life, and Certain Members of the Michigan Legislature, Amici Curiae. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack KEVORKIAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack KEVORKIAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 487

518 N.W.2d 487

205 Mich.App. 194, 62 USLW 2728

Teresa HOBBINS, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

and

Michigan Catholic Conference, Wayne County Prosecutor,

Michigan Right to Life, and Certain Members of the

Michigan Legislature, Amici Curiae.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack KEVORKIAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack KEVORKIAN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 164963, 171056 and 172399.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 6, 1994, at Lansing.

Decided May 10, 1994, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication June 30, 1994.

American Civ. Liberties Union Fund of Michigan by Robert A. Sedler, Paul J. Denenfeld, Elizabeth Gleicher, Detroit, and Eugene Feingold, Ann Arbor, for appellee in Docket No. 164963.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., and Deborah Anne Devine and Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the appellant in Docket No. 164963.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the appellant in Docket No. 171056.

Fieger, Fieger & Schwartz, P.C. by Michael A. Schwartz and Geoffrey N. Fieger, Southfield, for appellee in Docket No. 171056.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., and Richard H. Browne, and Errol H. Shifman, Asst. Pros. Attys., for appellant in Docket No. 172399.

Fieger, Fieger & Schwartz, P.C. by Pamela A. Hamway, Geoffrey N. Fieger, and Michael A. Schwartz, Southfield, for appellee in Docket No. 172399.

Bodman, Longley & Dahling by Martha B. Goodloe, Troy, for amici curiae, Mich. Catholic Conference in support of appellant Atty. Gen. in Docket No. 164963.

Curcio & Martell by Elizabeth A. Curcio, East Lansing, for amici curiae, Right to Life of Mich. in support of appellant Atty. Gen. in Docket No. 164963.

Wayne County Prosecutor's Office by John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals in support of appellant Atty. Gen., Detroit, in Docket No. 164963.

Joseph P. Zanglin, Detroit, for certain Mich. state senators and representatives in support of appellant Atty. Gen. in Docket No. 164963.

Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., and Errol H. Shifman, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, in Docket No. 171056. Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and TAYLOR and SHELTON, ^* JJ.

FITZGERALD, Presiding Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of 1992 P.A. 270, as amended by 1993 P.A. 3, ¹ M.C.L. § 752.1021 et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.547(121) et seq. Specifically, in Docket No. 164963, the Attorney General appeals as of right the May 24, 1993, order of Wayne Circuit Judge Cynthia D. Stephens, which declared unconstitutional the criminal provision of the act for violating Const. 1963, art. 4, § 24. Judge Stephens also held that individuals have a constitutional right to commit suicide. In Docket No. 171056, the prosecution appeals as of right the December 13 and 14, 1993, orders of Wayne Circuit Judge Richard C. Kaufman, which held that a ban on assisted suicide is overbroad because, in some instances, a person has a constitutional right to commit suicide. Finding that Donald O'Keefe had a constitutional right to commit suicide, Judge Kaufman dismissed the assisting suicide charge against Dr. Kevorkian stemming from his assistance in O'Keefe's suicide. Judge Kaufman also held that the act did not violate art. 4, § 24. In Docket No. 172399, the prosecution appeals as of right the January 28, 1994, order of Oakland Circuit Judge Jessica Cooper, which also declared unconstitutional the criminal provision of the act for violating art. 4, § 24, and therefore dismissed assisting suicide charges against Dr. Kevorkian.

Teresa Hobbins is a terminally ill person who, along with seven health care professionals and another terminally ill person, ² sought a declaratory judgment that 1992 P.A. 270, as amended by 1993 P.A. 3, M.C.L. § 752.1027; M.S.A. § 28.547(127), is unconstitutional. Dr. Kevorkian is a physician who has been charged with assisting a suicide in violation of M.C.L. § 752.1027; M.S.A. § 28.547(127).

Ms. Hobbins and Dr. Kevorkian first contend that 1992 P.A. 270, as amended by 1993 P.A. 3, is unconstitutional for violating Const. 1963, art. 4, § 24, which states: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The question presented is governed by a standard of review de novo. Mooahesh v. Dep't of Treasury, 195 Mich.App. 551, 562, 492 N.W.2d 246 (1992).

The object of a law is the aim or general purpose of the enactment. Livonia v. Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich. 466, 497, 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985). While the object must be expressed in the title, the body of the law must be examined to determine whether it embraces more than one object. Kent Co., ex rel Bd. of Supervisors of Kent Co. v. Reed, 243 Mich. 120, 122, 219 N.W. 656 (1928).

The purpose of the one-object provision is to avoid bringing into one bill diverse subjects that have no necessary connection. Mooahesh, supra 195 Mich.App. at 564, 492 N.W.2d 246. An act may contain all matters germane to its object, Reed, supra, and any provisions that directly relate to, carry out, and implement the principal object. Livonia, supra 423 Mich. at 499, 378 N.W.2d 402. Legislation, if it has a primary object, is not invalid because it embraces more than one means of attaining its primary object. Local No. 1644, AFSC & ME, AFL-CIO v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 367 Mich. 79, 91, 116 N.W.2d 314 (1962).

The one-object provision is to be construed reasonably and not in so narrow or technical a manner as to frustrate the legislative intent. Kuhn v. Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich. 378, 387-388, 183 N.W.2d 796 (1971). However, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to hold void legislation enacted to evade the procedural requirements that the constitution places on legislation. United States Gypsum Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 363 Mich. 548, 554, 110 N.W.2d 698 (1961).

1992 P.A. 270 is entitled:

AN ACT to create the Michigan commission on death and dying; to prescribe its membership, powers, and duties; to provide for the development of legislative recommendations concerning certain issues related to death and dying; to prohibit certain acts pertaining to the assistance of suicide; to prescribe penalties; and to repeal certain parts of this act on a specific date.

Section 1 of the act provides:

The legislature finds that the voluntary self-termination of human life, with or without assistance, raises serious ethical and public health questions in the state. To study this problem and to develop recommendations for legislation, the Michigan commission on death and dying is created. [M.C.L. § 752.1021; M.S.A. § 28.547(121).]

Sections 2 through 6 of the act establish the membership of the commission and define its role and duties.

Section 7 of the act creates a new crime of "criminal assistance to suicide," which makes it a felony where a person does either of the following:

(a) Provides the physical means by which the other person attempts or commits suicide.

(b) Participates in a physical act by which the other person attempts or commits suicide. [M.C.L. § 752.1027(1)(a), (b); M.S.A. § 28.547(127)(1)(a), (b).]

1992 P.A. 270 had its origin in House Bill 4501. Examination of both the title and content of HB 4501 at various states of the legislative process is necessary to aid in the inquiry whether 1992 P.A. 270 contains more than one object.

As first introduced on March 7, 1991, the sole purpose of HB 4501 was to create a new public act to establish a commission to study certain issues related to death and dying. House Bill 4501 was entitled:

A bill to create the Michigan commission on death and dying; to prescribe its membership, powers, and duties; and to provide for the development of legislative recommendations concerning certain issues related to death and dying.

At the time HB 4501 was introduced, Senate Bill 32 and House Bill 4038 were pending before the House Judiciary Committee. The bills were devoted to amending the Penal Code to "prohibit a person from causing, providing the means of, or acting as a participant in a suicide or attempted suicide."

On November 12, 1992, the House Judiciary Committee approved HB 4501. The title and provisions of HB 4501 were amended after the second reading on November 24, 1992, the day after Dr. Kevorkian provided assistance to another suicide, to include criminal proscriptions similar to those contained in SB 32. The amended version of HB 4501 became 1992 P.A. 270.

The original purpose of HB 4501, as expressed in both the title and body of the bill, was to create a new public act to study certain issues related to death and dying. This bill had no regulatory authority. When HB 4501 was amended to add the substance of SB 32, the additional provisions had another and different objective--to amend the Penal Code to create the crime of criminal assistance to suicide.

The Attorney General posits both objectives are within the act's primary purpose of regulating assisted suicide. However, neither the original title of HB 4501 nor the title of 1992 P.A. 270 as enacted declare such a purpose. ³ A fair reading of 1992 P.A. 270 reveals that, although encompassing a single "subject," ⁴ the legislation has two primary objectives. These objectives were originally the subjects of two distinct bills. One bill (HB 4501) encompassed the study of issues related to voluntary self-termination of life, with or without assistance, and another (SB 32) encompassed only the crime of criminal assistance to suicide. The suggestion that the amendment of HB 4501 to include the substantive provisions of SB 32 resulted in one primary purpose of "regulating assisted suicide" is unpersuasive in...