Hobbs v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, No. 01-10019
Decision Date | 21 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 01-10019 |
Citation | 276 F.3d 1236 |
Parties | (11th Cir. 2001) NORMAN HOBBS, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, SAMUEL IRVINE, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the for the Middle District of Alabama
Before BIRCH, COX and ALARCON*, Circuit Judges.
Norman Hobbs and Samuel Irvine appeal from the denial of their motion to remand this action to state court. They contend that the district court erred in recharacterizing their state insurance law claim against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("Blue Cross') as "arising under" the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")1 because they lack standing under ERISA to bring an action for the payment of their services as physician assistants.
Hobbs and Irvine also argue that the district court erred in dismissing this action on the merits, and in denying their motion to require Blue Cross to pay costs and attorney's fees2 incurred as the result of the erroneous removal of this action from state court. We reverse the order denying the motion to remand and the dismissal of this action on the merits because we conclude that the district court erred in determining that this action was properly removed from state court as a recharacterized claim under ERISA. We also vacate the order denying costs and attorney's fees with instructions.
Hobbs and Irvine are licensed physician assistants pursuant to Alabama law. On August 26, 1999, they filed an action in the Circuit Court of Alabama seeking compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief against Blue Cross for its failure to comply with Alabama Code § 27-51-1. They filed the complaint individually and as representatives of a class of similarly situated Alabama physicians and physician assistants.
Hobbs and Irvine alleged that Blue Cross refused to include a provision in its health insurance policies for the payment of medical or surgical services provided by licensed physician assistants in violation of Ala. Code § 27-51-1(a). That statute provides in pertinent part:
An insurance policy or contract providing for third-party payment or prepayment of health or medical expenses shall include a provision for the payment to a supervising physician for necessary medical or surgical services that are provided by a licensed physician assistant practicing under the supervision of the physician, and pursuant to the rules, regulations, and parameters for physician assistants, if the policy or contract pays for the same care and treatment provided by a licensed physician or doctor of osteopathy.
Ala. Code § 27-51-1(a).
Hobbs and Irvine are citizens of Alabama. Blue Cross is a not-for-profit corporation having its principal place of business in Birmingham, Alabama. Thus, Hobbs and Irvine's state law claim is not removable under the district court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Blue Cross filed a notice of removal in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama in which it alleged that the court had federal question jurisdiction because the state law claim set forth in the complaint was completely preempted under ERISA. Hobbs and Irvine filed a motion for remand. They argued that their state law claim is not preempted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) because that statute limits its scope to "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," and is not applicable to state laws that apply to all insurance policies and contracts, irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan. Hobbs and Irvine also contended that Ala. Code § 27-51-1 comes within the saving clause contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) which exempts from preemption "any law of any State which regulates insurance." Hobbs and Irvine did not assert before the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider this matter as involving a recharacterized ERISA claim because Blue Cross had failed to demonstrate that Hobbs and Irvine had standing to sue under an ERISA plan.3
The district court denied the motion to remand without discussing whether the state law claim filed by Hobbs and Irvine pursuant to Ala. Code § 27-51-1 could be recharacterized as an artfully pleaded ERISA claim if they did not have standing to prosecute a cause of action under ERISA. See Hobbs v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302-09 (M.D. Ala. 2000). The district court dismissed the action on the merits on the basis that "the plaintiffs' claims [as] stated in the complaint are not cognizable under ERISA."
Hobbs and Irvine argue for the first time in this appeal that their state law claims are not completely preempted because they lack standing to bring an ERISA claim as they are not participants or beneficiaries of an employee health benefit plan. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we must determine in each appeal whether subject matter jurisdiction exists over a pending action whether or not this issue was raised before. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409-10 (11th Cir. 1999) ().
Under the doctrine of complete preemption, a plaintiff must have standing to sue under a relevant ERISA plan before a state law claim can be recharacterized as arising under federal law, subject to federal court jurisdiction. Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 1999).
The only parties that have standing to sue under ERISA are those listed in the civil enforcement provision of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The civil enforcement provision provides, in relevant portion:
a. Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Thus, "ERISA's civil enforcement section permits two categories of individuals to sue for benefits under an ERISA plan-plan beneficiaries and plan participants." Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998).
Under ERISA, a "participant" is "any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). A "beneficiary" is "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8); Engelhardt, 139 F.3d at 1351.
Healthcare providers such as physician assistants generally are not considered "beneficiaries" or "participants" under ERISA. Cf. Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1514 ( ). Blue Cross contends that Hobbs and Irvine have standing under ERISA because they "are seeking benefits as purported assignees of their patients' benefits under ERISA-governed Blue Cross plans." Blue Cross maintains that pursuant to this court's decision in Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1997), Hobbs and Irvine have derivative standing to sue on behalf of their patients. In Cagle, this court held that a healthcare provider had derivative standing to bring an action against an ERISA plan insurance fund where the record showed that the minor patient's father signed a form assigning his right to payment of medical benefits to the healthcare provider. 112 F.3d at 1512-16. This court explained that "if provider-assignees can sue for payment of benefits, an assignment will transfer the burden of bringing suit from plan participants and beneficiaries to 'providers[, who] are better situated and financed to pursue an action for benefits owed for their services.'" Id. at 1515 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
More recently, this court held that "neither 1132(a) nor any other ERISA provision prevents derivative standing based upon an assignment of rights from an entity listed in that subsection." HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 991 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1515). In HCA Health Services, "the patient assigned to the medical center his right to recover 80% of the costs of the surgery from the insurance company." Id. at 985.
Thus, while this court has allowed healthcare providers to use derivative standing to sue under ERISA, it has only done so when the healthcare provider had obtained a written assignment of claims from a patient who had standing to sue under ERISA as a "beneficiary" or "participant." See Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1512-13 ( ); see also HCA Health Servs., 240 F.3d at 986, 989 ( ). Here, Blue Cross failed to demonstrate, in response to the motion to remand, that Hobbs and Irvine obtained an assignment of benefits from their patients. Indeed, Blue Cross admitted at oral argument that it does...
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