Hobbs v. Lindsey, 29759
| Citation | 162 N.E.2d 85,240 Ind. 74 |
| Decision Date | 29 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 29759,29759 |
| Parties | Arnold G. HOBBS, Appellant, v. Russell O. LINDSEY, Sheriff, Noble County, Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ralph W. Probst, Kendallville, for appellant.
Louis G. Ketcham, Pros. Atty., Noble County, Albion, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the Noble Circuit Court, wherein the appellant was denied a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant petitioner had been charged with 21 separate indictments for alleged embezzlement from the Noble County Credit Union. The court had set his bond at a total amount of $171,400, a sum which petitioner asserted was both excessive and prohibitive to him. He asked relief by way of habeas corpus in that his bail be reduced to an amount more consistent with both the nature of the offenses and his financial ability. At the conclusion of appellant's evidence the state filed a motion to find for the defendant, which motion was sustained. The error assigned on appeal is the overruling of appellant's motion for new trial, one of the grounds therein being the sustaining of the motion to find for the defendant.
A decision in this case is doubly difficult because of the fact that the brief of the appellant casts little light on the very fundamental issues at hand, and we are not favored with any brief from the appellee. However, it is apparent that the basic issue involved here is whether or not the appellant, under the facts presented, was denied his constitutional right to be let to bail and a corresponding right that the amount of such bail shall not be excessive.
Article 1, §§ 16 and 17 of the Constitution of Indiana, provide:
(§ 16)
(§ 17)
In addition to the basic issue involved, appellant contends that instead of being charged under several separate indictments he should have been charged under only one indictment with separate counts of embezzlement based on the different dates and amounts. Further appellant asserts that, although charged by separate indictments, the court should have consolidated these indictments as separate counts, under a single cause of action. By so limiting the number of indictments, it is argued, the amount of bail would necessarily have to be reduced and brought within the reach of appellant. However, the appellant is not correct in assuming that there should have been but one indictment charging separate counts of embezzlement for different dates and amounts. Each taking of various amounts at different times constituted a separate and independent crime which need not be charged in a single indictment, but which were each separately indictable. State v. Reichert, 1948, 226 Ind. 171, 78 N.E.2d 785; Glover v. State, 1887, 109 Ind. 391, 10 N.E. 282; Weinzorpflin v. State, 1844, 7 Blackf. 186. Thus it was proper to charge the appellant under multiple indictments. However, the fact that the appellant was properly charged in the above manner does not resolve the issue of excessiveness of bail. Bail in the amount of $171,400 could well be considered just as excessive on 21 indictments as it could on a single charge, if other elements of unreasonableness are present. In resolving this question, appellee, at the outset, argues that the fixing of bail is a matter of judicial discretion and cites numerous cases in support of this fact. Gregory v. State ex rel. Gudgel, 1883, 94 Ind. 384, 48 Am.Rep. 162; State v. Winninger, 1881, 81 Ind. 51. However, this fact does not serve to deny this court the right and duty to review the action of the trial court where it is asserted that an abuse of discretion has resulted in the denial of the constitutional rights of an accused to be let to bail, which bail shall not be excessive.
A decision upon the question of excessiveness must be based upon two basic and related considerations: (1) The object of bail itself, and (2) the financial ability of the accused to provide the required amount of bail.
The object of bail very definitely is not to effect punishment in advance of conviction. It is equally true that, 'excessive bail is not to be required for the purpose of preventing the prisoner from being admitted to bail.' People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 1930, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8, 9, 72 A.L.R. 798. So to fix bail amounts to denial of the right altogether. 'In reaching a determination of the amount of the bail, heed must be given the constitutional injunction against 'excessive bail'.' People v. Gigante, 1957, 9 Misc.2d 881, 173 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972.
The object of bail prior to trial is to insure 'the presence of the accused when required without the hardship of incarceration before guilt has been proved and while the presumption of innocence is to be given effect.' United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 2 Cir., 1946, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004. Also, Green v. Petit, 1944, 222 Ind. 467, 54 N.E.2d 281; Ex parte Lonardo, 1949, 86 Ohio App. 289, 89 N.E.2d 502; People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 1943, 265 App.Div. 474, 39 N.Y.S.2d 526. The right to freedom by bail pending trial is an adjunct to that revered Anglo-Saxon aphorism which holds an accused to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Stack v. Boyle, 1951, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3; United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, supra.
The right to freedom by bail pending trial is of especial significance to the accused who must prepare his defense in the interim.
What then is excessive bail as the term is applied to the objectives for which the right of bail was established? Mindful that the principal purpose of bail is the assurance of the accused party's presence in court, it has been correctly stated that 'bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' * * *.' Stack v. Boyle, supra (342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3. 96 L.Ed. 3).
Apart from the fact of the accused's financial position, the primary fact to be considered in determining an amount which would assure the accused's presence in court is the possible penalty which might be imposed by reason of the offense charged. These factors are repeatedly enumerated in the reported cases. See 72 A.L.R. 801.
In the instant case the trial court by rule made pursuant to the statute [§ 9-1014, Burns' 1956...
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Fry v. State
...Anglo–Saxon aphorism which holds an accused to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 79, 162 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1959). “Unless that right is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, will lose it......
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Mudd v. Busse
...The Supreme Court of Indiana has zealously guarded the constitutional rights of the accused in a bail context. In Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1959), the court recognized "the right and duty to review the action of the trial court where it is asserted that an abuse of d......
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Wilcox v. State, 49A02-0008-CR-537.
...of incarceration before guilt has been proved and while the presumption of innocence is to be given effect.'" Hobbs v. Lindsey, 162 N.E.2d 85, 88, 240 Ind. 74 (1959) (quoting United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004 (2nd Cir.1946)). Although the right to bail in most......
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Shank v. State
...that '(t)he object of bail very definitely is not to effect punishment in advance of conviction.' Hobbs v. Lindsey, Sheriff, etc. (1959), 240 Ind. 74, at 78, 162 N.E.2d 85, 88. The same is true of pre-sentence incarceration. Therefore, Tate v. Short, supra, is not here applicable. There is ......