Hobbs v. Mace

• Decision Date: 27 October 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:21-cv-62 (MTT)
• Parties: GENIE HOBBS, Plaintiff, v. JIMMIE LEE MACE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

GENIE HOBBS, Plaintiff,
v.
JIMMIE LEE MACE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-62 (MTT)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

October 27, 2022

ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE

This diversity case results from a collision between a vehicle, in which Plaintiff Genie Hobbs was a passenger, and a motor grader operated by Defendant Jimmie Lee Mace, an employee of Defendant Houston County, Georgia. Docs. 1; 6 ¶¶ 2, 4. Mace and the County now move for summary judgment. Doc. 18. For the following reasons, that motion (Doc. 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are straightforward and undisputed.^[1] While employed by Houston County on February 22, 2019, Mace was operating a motor grader owned by the County on Georgia State Road 7. Doc. 18-1 ¶ 1. The motor grader travelled well below the posted speed limit of 55 MPH. Id. ¶ 4. Consequently, a line of cars formed behind the motor grader; Hobbs was a passenger in one of those vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 5, 11-12.

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Not wanting to “tie up a heap of traffic,” Mace decided to move the motor grader off the road to allow the cars to pass. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 9. At the first opportunity to do so, Mace decided to turn left off the road and into a driveway. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. As Mace was making the turn, Hobbs's vehicle attempted to pass the motor grader on its left. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. The vehicles collided; Mace's motor grader struck the right side of Hobbs's vehicle. Id. ¶ 12. Prior to the incident, the County had entered into a coverage agreement with the Association County Commissioners of Georgia - Interlocal Risk Management Agency (“ACCG-IRMA”), which provides coverage that is “akin to insurance.” Docs. 18-1 ¶ 19; 18-5.

Based on the diversity of the parties, Hobbs filed this action on February 18, 2021 asserting claims against Mace and the County. Doc. 1. Before filing an answer, the defendants moved to dismiss based on various theories of sovereign immunity. Doc. 4. Hobbs opposed the motion. Doc. 5. Rather than wait for the Court to rule on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the parties entered into a stipulation, whereby the defendants withdrew their motion to dismiss, Hobbs dismissed some claims against the County, and the parties agreed the defendants could reassert their defenses by a dispositive motion later in the case. Doc. 6 ¶¶ 4-8. The only remaining claims are (1) Hobbs's negligence and negligence per se claims against Mace; and (2) Hobbs's respondeat superior claim against the County. Id. ¶ 8.

The defendants now move for summary judgment.^[2] Doc. 18. In their motion, the defendants argue that Hobbs's claims against Mace are barred by official immunity, and

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Hobbs's claims against the County are barred by sovereign immunity. Doc. 18-2. Specifically, Mace argues he was performing a discretionary act rather than a ministerial act, and thus is entitled to official immunity. Id. at 3-7. Houston County argues that any waiver of its sovereign immunity applies exclusively to actions brought in state court.^[3]Id. at 7-13.

II. STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant may support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

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made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). “When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim[]' in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.'” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Rather, “the moving party simply may ‘show[ ]-that is, point[ ] out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'” Id. at 1438 (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Alternatively, the movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must rebut the movant's showing “by producing ... relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The non-moving party does not satisfy its burden “if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative' of a disputed fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge .. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Mace is Entitled to Official Immunity

Mace contends Hobbs's claims against him are barred by official immunity. Doc. 18-2 at 3-7. “Individual government employees are shielded by official immunity from damages suits unless the plaintiff can establish that the official negligently performed a ministerial act or performed a discretionary act with malice or an intent to injure.” Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga.App. 563, 574, 716 S.E.2d 611, 621 (2011), aff'd, 291 Ga. 350, 729 S.E.2d 361 (2012) (citing Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 619, 697 S.E.2d 775 (2010)). Here, the parties agree that Mace did not act with malice or intent to injure Hobbs. See Doc. 18-1. Accordingly, “the determination of whether official immunity bars the suit against [Mace] turns on the issue of whether [Mace's] actions were discretionary or ministerial.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 848, 809 S.E.2d 813, 816 (2018).

Mace argues his decision to move the motor grader off the road was discretionary; Hobbs contends it was a ministerial act.^[4] Docs. 18-2 at 3-7; 20 at 2-3. A ministerial act is “commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848, 809 S.E.2d at 816 (internal citation omitted). “A ministerial duty may be established by evidence such as a written policy, an unwritten policy, a supervisor's specific directive, or a statute.” Wyno v. Lowndes Cnty., 305 Ga. 523, 527-28, 824 S.E.2d 297, 302 (2019).

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“A discretionary act, on the other hand, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848, 809 S.E.2d at 816.

Hobbs cites O.C.G.A § 40-6-42(2), Georgia's overtaking and passing statute, for the proposition that Mace had a ministerial duty to avoid colliding with her vehicle. Doc. 20 at 3. That's a novel and unrealistic take on the Georgia traffic code. While O.C.G.A. § 40-6-42(2) regulates improper passing, the statute does not impose an “absolute duty on a [motor grader] driver to avoid a collision.” Rios v. Norsworthy, 266 Ga.App. 469, 470, 597 S.E.2d 421,424 (2004). “[U]nless [Mace] has been commanded-by law or by the policy or directive of [his] employer-to do a particular thing, [he] is still engaged in the performance of discretionary function.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848-49, 809 S.E.2d at 816.

For example, in Glass, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on official immunity grounds because some evidence suggested the work detail supervisor claiming official immunity failed to follow a departmental policy when an inmate's tractor became stuck while cutting grass. 311 Ga.App. at 575, 716 S.E.2d at 621. Under that unwritten policy, “if a tractor became stuck in a ditch while cutting grass, the work detail supervisor was to contact the work camp and request that a service truck be dispatched to pull the tractor out.” Id. at 564, 716 S.E.2d at 614. Rather than request a service truck, the work detail supervisor attempted to free the stuck tractor with another tractor that was already on scene. Id. at 565, 716 S.E.2d at 615. That didn't go well and the inmate was killed by flying debris.

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Id. Because a factual dispute existed “over whether the County had an established departmental policy requiring [the supervisor] to contact the work camp and request a service truck when a tractor became stuck,” the Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 576, 716 S.E.2d at 622.

Unlike in Glass, here it is undisputed that the County had no policies or directives, written or unwritten, that provided Mace with specific instructions on how to maneuver the motor grader to allow traffic to...