Hobbs v. Pickaway-Ross Career & Tech. Ctr. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21CA3746 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 921 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JON HOBBS, Appellant-Appellant, v. PICKAWAY-ROSS CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Appellees-Appellees. |
2022-Ohio-921
JON HOBBS, Appellant-Appellant,
v.
PICKAWAY-ROSS CAREER AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Appellees-Appellees.
No. 21CA3746
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Ross
March 21, 2022
Dennis L. Pergram, Manos, Martin & Pergram Co., L.P.A., Delaware, Ohio, for Appellant.
James K. Stucko, Jr., and Derek L. Towster, Scott Scriven, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.s
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
KRISTY S. WILKIN, JUDGE
{¶1} Appellant, Jon Hobbs, appeals the Ross County Court of Common Pleas judgment affirming a decision by appellee, Pickaway-Ross Career and Technology Center Board of Education that terminated appellant's employment as a custodian.
{¶2} Appellant presents four assignments of error for our review. First, appellant asserts the trial court erred by finding a reason for termination that was contrary to the reason stipulated by the parties. Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred by not reversing the termination order because it was not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. Third, appellant maintains that the trial court erred by not reversing the arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable termination by the appellee and applied the incorrect standard of review. Fourth, appellant claims that the trial court erred by not finding that the appellee's termination of his employment was unconstitutional. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we overrule appellant's four assignments of error, and affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶3} Appellant had been employed as a custodian for the appellee starting on June 13, 2016 in accordance with R.C. 3319.081. On August 22, 2018, appellant had an incident with two of appellee's teachers. Appellant sought out and confronted one of the teachers for putting tape on the floor of her classroom. He was angry because the tape got caught in his sweeper. The two teachers co-authored a written statement complaining of appellant's conduct on that date, claiming that he cursed because of the tape, but stopped short of calling the teacher the third letter in the alphabet, which the second teacher interpreted to mean "c _ _t." Appellant authored his own written statement that provided his version of what occurred, claiming that he apologized for sweeping up the tape and did not say anything inappropriate or sexual in nature. Appellee's superintendent met with all three individuals to discuss the incident. Subsequently, the superintendent recommended that appellee terminate appellant's employment. Appellee issued a resolution terminating appellant's employment for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, neglect of duty, misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance at its September 13, 2018
meeting.
{¶4} Appellant appealed the appellee's decision to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506. In his brief before that court, appellant asserted three assignments of error: (1) the appellee terminated his employment without any fact finding, which made a meaningful review of appellee's decision impossible, (2) his due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of the charges against him; there was no transcript of the administrative proceedings, he was not afforded an opportunity to present evidence, or witnesses; and he was not permitted to attend the meeting where the appellee voted to terminate his employment, and (3) the appellee erroneously labeled appellant as a "substitute." However, prior to the court's consideration of appellant's appeal, the parties in pertinent part stipulated to the following:
. Appellant's employment was in accordance with R.C. 3319.081
. "Appellant's termination of employment by Appellee was based solely on an incident involving Appellant and two of Appellee's teachers that occurred on August 22, 2018."
. "The August 22, 2018 incident is described in two written statements." One was co-authored by two of appellee's teachers, and the other was authored by appellant. Both statements were part of the transcript on appeal.
. Appellee's superintendent met individually with both teachers and appellee regarding the incident and the superintendent recommended to the appellee that appellant's employment be terminated.
. Appellee terminated appellant's employment in accordance with R.C. 3319.081 for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, neglect of duty, misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance.
. Both parties agreed to "waive any and all arguments regarding procedural issues and requirements that were not followed or properly provided."
. The parties agreed to "jointly submit the following issue to the Court for a bench decision: 'Whether Appellee's decision to terminate appellant was unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence.'"
. "No additional documents or evidence will be submitted with trial briefs[.]"
{¶5} The court issued a judgment entry that found there was not a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence that appellant was incompetent, inefficient, neglected his duties, or acted with nonfeasance or misfeasance. However, the court further found that there was a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence that appellant acted with malfeasance and was dishonest and on that basis affirmed the appellee's termination of appellant's employment.
{¶6} In addressing appellee's malfeasance determination, the court found that malfeasance means "wrongdoing or misconduct, especially by a public official." The trial court found no evidence that appellant called one of appellee's
teachers a "c_ _t," but stated that "misses the greater point." The court found that there was "a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that appellant: (1) initiated a conversation with a female teacher, (2) expressed his displeasure at her having placed tape on the floor, and (3) indicated that he had cursed her for doing it." The court concluded that if the statement by the teachers is "taken at face value, there is a preponderance of evidence that appellant engaged in wrongdoing or misconduct." Specifically, the court found "[t]he manner in which appellant approached [the teacher], and the context of what he said to her, left [her] shaken, and with the impression - whether accurate or not - that appellant had directed a crude remark to her." Therefore, the court affirmed the appellee's decision to terminate appellant's employment based on malfeasance, which it found was "wrongdoing or misconduct."
{¶7} In addressing appellee's dishonesty determination, the court recognized that it was required to give deference to an administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts. The trial court noted that the written statements by appellant and the teachers recounted the incident "differently." It further found that appellee's superintendent had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of appellant and the teachers while meeting with them regarding the incident, and that the appellee concluded that appellant's account was not truthful in stating what happened during his encounter with the teachers. Therefore, the court also affirmed appellee's termination of appellant based on his dishonesty.
{¶8} Accordingly, the trial court found two of the five reasons cited by appellee for terminating appellant were supported by the evidence, and therefore affirmed appellant's termination. It is this judgment that appellant appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY FINDING A REASON FOR THE TERMINATION THAT WAS CONTRARY TO THE REASON STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT REVERSING THE TERMINATION ORDER BECAUSE THE TERMINATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF RELIABLE, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUCIAIL ERROR BY NOT REVERSING THE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE TERMINATION BY THE APPELLEEAND APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OR REVIEW.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT FINDING THAT THE BOARD'S TERMINATION OF MR. HOBB'S EMPLOYMENT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶9} "R.C. 3319.081 governs the termination of non-teaching employees of a local school board." Durham v. Pike Cty. Joint Vocational Sch., 150 Ohio App.3d 148, 779 N.E.2d 1051, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing Proctor v. Alliance Pub. School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 60 Ohio App.2d 396, 398 N.E.2d 805 (5th Dist. 1978), fn. 2. R.C. 3319.081(C) provides that non-teaching employees may "only be terminated for cause" (e.g., incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance), which means that the employee has a property right in his or her employment, and
therefore must be afforded pre and post termination due process rights. Stewart v. Lockland Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130263, 2013-Ohio-5513, ¶ 8. If an employee is afforded post-termination administrative procedures, the pre-termination procedures need not be elaborate, and "[do] not require a full evidentiary hearing." Id., citing Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-548, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). "[W]here adequate post-termination proceedings are in place to protect the employee's property interest, the pre-term ination process must meet only a barest minimum standard of due process." Green v. Vill. of Buckeye Lake, 5th Dist. Licking No. 01CA106, 2002-Ohio-2543, *4.
{¶10} "Because R.C. 3319.081 does not set forth specific procedures for appeal,...
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