Hobbs v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., 7:18-cv-02129-LSC
| Decision Date | 10 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 7:18-cv-02129-LSC |
| Parties | JANET HOBBS, Plaintiff, v. U.S. XPRESS, INC. and KURT ALLEN UPDEGRAFF, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case arises from a trucking accident in western Alabama that led to a death and to serious personal injuries. The defendants and the plaintiff have both moved for partial summary judgment. Because many disputes of material fact remain and because material factual disputes fall within "the province of the jury," cf. Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 1994), the cross-motions for summary judgment are due to be denied.
In April 2016, Kurt Allen Updegraff ("Updegraff") applied to work at U.S. Xpress, a large Tennessee-based trucking company. His application listed a commercial driver's license and more than three years of trucking experience.2 His application also disclosed a 1995 DUI conviction, a 2009 DUI conviction, two suspensions of his driver's license, and one preventable trucking accident in February 2015. Despite Updegraff's convictions and accident history, U.S. Xpress hired him to haul cargo and drive eighteen-wheel tractor-trailers.
Updegraff worked at U.S. Xpress for roughly thirteen months and had four on-the-job accidents. Two of those came in June 2016. While the record reveals few details about those 2016 accidents, the first happened on June 9, 2016, and the second on June 21, 2016. U.S. Xpress's Safety Review Committee investigated both and found that while the first accident was "preventable," the second was "non-preventable." Updegraff's third accident came on April 24, 2017. The Safety Review Committee characterized this third accident as "preventable." Nothing suggestsU.S. Xpress placed Updegraff on probation or took other corrective action after his first three accidents.
The accident that is the subject of this action occurred in the early morning hours of May 23, 2017. According to several witnesses, Updegraff lost control while traveling south on Interstate 59. He veered from the southbound lane, he crossed the interstate's median, he flipped, and his overturned semi blocked all northbound traffic. Driving northbound at approximately sixty-five miles per hour, Janet Hobbs ("Hobbs") and her husband collided with Updegraff's vehicle. Hobbs suffered a broken neck and other injuries, but thankfully she survived. According to a post-accident report from the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Mr. Hobbs "sustained fatal injuries" and died at the scene.
While the details of the May 23 accident itself are mostly undisputed, the parties dispute what caused Updegraff to lose control and cross Interstate 59's median. Hobbs blames controlled substances. She believes Updegraff took several prescription medications before the accident, reacted to those medications, and thenfell asleep. A good amount of record evidence supports her theory, such as the following:
The defendants disagree with Hobbs and, citing their own expert's testimony, argue controlled substances did not contribute to the May 23 accident. Given the competing evidence and divergent testimony, the crash's cause remains a question of fact.
The parties also dispute whether Updegraff knew he was susceptible to "losing control" and injuring other drivers in May 2017. Some evidence suggests knowledge and awareness. For example, Updegraff allegedly "blacked out" in 2015while driving through Charleston, South Carolina, and he did not disclose several prescription medications during his pre-employment medical examination.
Finally, the parties dispute whether U.S. Xpress knew or should of have known about Updegraff's alleged incompetency and unfitness to drive. To argue it had no reason to question his competency, U.S. Xpress points to its vetting process: It hired Updegraff only after a background check, a medical examination, a road test, and a physical examination. U.S. Xpress believes that, given these procedural safeguards, it had no cause to question Updegraff's fitness. To show U.S. Xpress knew about Updegraff unfitness and incompetency, Hobbs cites a pre-accident conversation between Updegraff and U.S. Xpress's dispatcher. At 8:41 PM on May 22, 2017, Updegraff messaged the dispatcher and complained about breathing issues. This conversation followed:
Updegraff then took his prescription medications—including Xanax and Tramadol—and went to sleep. He awoke early the next morning and sent one final message before continuing his drive:
Updegraff: I'm back in today. But I have major issues going on this morning . . . Sorry guys, I will let you know once I'm caught up. Be safe out there.
Updegraff made it only a few miles before losing control and crossing the interstate's median.
In 2018, Hobbs sued both Updegraff and U.S. Xpress in federal court. After more than two years of discovery and motion practice, the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment are before the Court.
A successful summary judgment movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that he, she, or it deserves judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists, and summary judgment isnot appropriate, if "the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor." Greenberg v. BellSouth Tellecomms, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). At summary judgment, district courts "view all evidence" and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the nonmoving party's favor. Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990). Then we determine "whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986).
Updegraff and U.S. Xpress moved for summary judgment on three counts: Count V (wantonness), Count III (negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, dispatch, and entrustment), and Count IV (wanton hiring, training, supervision, retention, dispatch, and entrustment). The Court will deny summary judgment on all claims.
Updegraff moved for summary judgment on Hobbs's wantonness claims because, according to Updegraff, he lacked the requisite mental culpability for wantonness. Cf. Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So. 2d 999, 1004 (Ala. 1993) (citing Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142, 145 (Ala. 1993) (). Watnonness is "the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result." Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (citing Bozeman v. Cent. Bank of the S., 646 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1994)) (emphasis in original). It's acting with "reckless disregard of the safety of another." Ex Parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 181 So. 3d 325, 333 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Phillips ex. rel. Phillips v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 988 So. 2d 464, 467-68 (Ala. 2015)). Although the "determination [of] whether a defendant's acts constitute wanton conduct depends on the facts in each particular case," Ex Parte Essary, 992 So. 2d at 10, some consistent rules emerge from the case law. First, "it is not essential that the defendant should have entertained a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff." Joseph v. Staggs, 519 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1988) (quoting McNickle v. Stripling, 67So. 2d 832, 833 (1953)). Wantonness is knowledge of the risk and intent to act—not intent to harm. Id. Second, wantonness claims are fact-intensive and, therefore, usually are unfit for summary judgment. See Cash v. Caldwell, 603 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Ala. 1992) ().
With these rules in mind, questions of...
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