Hobson v. Dominguez, CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-429-TLS

• Decision Date: 24 September 2012
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-429-TLS
• Parties: DOROTHY HOBSON, as personal representative and administrator for the Estate of Kenneth Hobson, Plaintiff, v. ROY DOMINGUEZ, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

DOROTHY HOBSON, as personal representative and administrator for the Estate of Kenneth Hobson, Plaintiff,

v.ROY DOMINGUEZ, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, et al., Defendants.

CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-429-TLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

September 24, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two filings. On October 28, 2011, the Court granted the Plaintiff Dorothy Hobson's request to file a Second Amended Complaint. (See Order, ECF No. 67.) The Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 68] on October 28, 2011. The Court had previously granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant William Pierce, M.D. (see Opinion & Order, ECF No. 55), but that dismissal was without prejudice (see Order, ECF No. 57). The Second Amended Complaint included supplemental allegations against Defendant Pierce. Therefore, on January 5, 2012, Defendant Pierce filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 107] along with a Brief in Support [ECF No. 108]. The Plaintiff filed a Response [ECF No. 111] on January 19, and Defendant Pierce filed a Reply [ECF No. 112] on January 30. Additionally, Defendants Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living, Dr. Kovilparambil Anthony, Dr. Mario Robbins, Michelle Harris, and Patti Kerr (the Edgewater Defendants) filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's State Law Claims [ECF No. 109] on January 17, along with a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 110]. The Plaintiff filed a Response [ECF No. 121] onFebruary 14, and the Edgewater Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 123] on February 27.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2009, Kenneth Hobson was arrested, charged with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, and taken to the Lake County Jail, where he was held for sixteen days. Mr. Hobson had various mental and physical health issues. According to the Plaintiff, he suffered from a fear of authority figures and a fear of drinking non-bottled water. The former led to his refusal to sign booking paperwork and concomitant incarceration. The latter led to his refusal to drink water while incarcerated. On November 2, 2009, an officer found Mr. Hobson dead in his jail cell. Apparently, Mr. Hobson died of dehydration, and he had been dead for hours when his body was found. His mother, the Plaintiff, as personal representative and administrator for Mr. Hobson's estate, instituted this action against the sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, the former warden of the Lake County Jail, and more than a dozen other Defendants.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 68], she named the following Defendants: Roy Dominguez, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Lake County, Indiana; Bennie Freeman, individually and in his official capacity as former warden of the Lake County Jail; Christopher McQuillin, individually and in his official capacity as director of the jail's medical operations; jail deputy warden Jennifer Malanshek; jail deputy warden CraigPonton; jail lieutenant Yvonne Haley; jail sergeant Joi McDaniel; jail officers Cathy Krieg, Daryl Brown, Jerron Biddings, Terry Caverly, Camille Clark, Mark Collins, Georgette Gonzalez, Rita Key, William Lumsdon, Renita Merriweather, David Murchek, Ashley Powell, Donita Smith, and Deborah Stack; Manuel Barragan; Denise Gross; Dr. Mario Robbins; Dr. William Pierce; Dr. Kovilparambil Anthony; Patti Kerr; Daryl Frey; Michelle Harris; Med-Staff, Inc.; Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living; John Buncich, in his official capacity as sheriff of Lake County Jail; and unknown employees and supervisors of Lake County Jail, Med-Staff, Inc., and Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living.

The Seconded Amended Complaint sets forth ten counts.¹ In the following counts, the Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Count I, against all Defendants, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by actions and omissions that were objectively unreasonable; Count II, against Defendants Dominguez, Freeman, and McQuillin, alleging violations of constitutional rights by subjecting the Plaintiff to grossly inhumane and dangerous conditions of confinement; Count III, against all Defendants, alleging violations of constitutional rights by deliberate indifference to Mr. Hobson's serious risk of physical harm and death in the Jail; Count IV, against the Defendants who were employees of the Jail, alleging excessive and unlawful detention. In the following counts, the Plaintiff assertsclaims under state law: Count V, against all Defendants, alleging wrongful death; Count VI, against all Defendants, asserting a survival action; Count VII, against the Defendants who were employees of the Jail, alleging false imprisonment; Count VIII, against all Defendants, alleging negligence; Count IX, against all Defendants,² alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count X, against the Defendants which are governmental entities under Indiana Code § 34-13-4-1 and the public employees of such entities, asserting indemnification. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living is "an independent contractor retained by Lake County at the time of Mr. Hobson's death to provide mental health evaluation, care and treatment to all Jail detainees." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 40, ECF No. 68.) It further alleges that "Defendants Dr. William Pierce, Dr. Kovilparambil Anthony, and Dr. Mario Robbins were contracted to work as physicians at the Jail, and to monitor and treat the physical and/or mental conditions of the Jail's detainees, during relevant times . . . [T]hese Defendants were responsible for evaluating and treating Kenneth Hobson while he was detained in the Jail." (Id. ¶ 41.) Defendants Kerr and Harris are described as "Lake County Jail contract staff." (Id. ¶ 43.) The Second Amended Complaint additionally alleges that Defendants Pierce, Anthony, Robbins, Kerr, and Harris "had the responsibility for evaluating, monitoring and treating Mr. Hobson while he was detained at the Jail." (Id. ¶ 17.)

On June 30, 2011, the Court granted Defendant Pierce's first Motion to Dismiss because the Plaintiff had failed to plead facts showing Defendant Pierce's personal involvement withdepriving the Plaintiff of any constitutional rights under federal law, and because the Plaintiff agreed she was not pursuing state law claims against Defendant Pierce. (Opinion & Order 4-5, ECF No. 55.) The Court stated that the pleadings "fail[ed] to provide a factual basis alleging that Dr. Pierce personally acted with deliberate indifference or was otherwise personally involved in any way with the care of Mr. Hobson." (Id. 5.) Because the Plaintiff had "fail[ed] to plead facts suggesting that a right to relief [wa]s anything more than speculative" (id. 6), the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss the claims against Defendant Pierce without prejudice (see Order, ECF No. 57).

The Second Amended Complaint contains specific allegations against Defendant Pierce and the Edgewater Defendants. It states that Defendant Robbins, "one of the people responsible for looking after Mr. Hobson[,] . . . discovered that Mr. Hobson was not communicating with staff . . . [but] did nothing." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) It further states that Mr. Hobson's family "directly warned" Defendant Kerr and Defendant Pierce. (Id. ¶ 12.) Finally, it adds the following specific allegations against Defendant Pierce:

As to Dr. William Pierce, Jail staff connected Plaintiff by phone with Dr. Pierce approximately two days afer Kenneth Hobson arrived at the Jail. During that phone conversation, Ms. Hobson explained in detail to Dr. Pierce that her son would not drink water that was not bottled. She explained to him that as a result, the one previous time that her son had been in jail, a court had seen fit to order the jail to provide bottled water to Mr. Hobson. Ms. Hobson told Dr. Pierce that she feared that her son would die in the Jail if not treated appropriately. Dr. Pierce assured Ms. Hobson that he had seen her son, and that he was okay, although he was alone in a cell and did not want to talk to anyone.

(Id. ¶ 13.)

The Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 107] filed by Defendant Pierce and the Motion forPartial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 109] filed by the Edgewater Defendants are both fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the motions before the Court involve both Rule 12 and Rule 56, the Court will discuss both standards.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The court presumes all well-pleaded allegations to be true, views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepts as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations. Whirlpool Fin. Corp., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has articulated the following standard regarding factual allegations that are required to survive dismissal:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks, ellipsis, citations, and footnote omitted). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the...