Hobson v. York Studios

Decision Date18 October 1955
PartiesRose HOBSON and Raymond S. Hobson, Plaintiffs, v. YORK STUDIOS, Inc., Defendant.
CourtNew York City Municipal Court

Bruce McM. Wright, New York City, of counsel (Marion O. Jones, New York City, attorney), for plaintiffs.

Isaac Knox, New York City, for defendant.

WAHL, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Raymond S. Hobson, a Negro, and his wife, a white woman, sue for statutory redress under Section 41 of the Civil Rights Law. They allege that when they applied for a room at the defendant's hotel, they were rejected by reason of their race and the sought public accommodations refused to them on that ground alone.

Section 40 of the Civil Rights Law, speaking of 'public accommodations', insofar as applicable here, reads as follows:

'No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, * * * on account of race, creed, color or national origin'.

The answer of the defendant is, in substance, a general denial and it disclaims any violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights. $The plaintiffs' testimony shows that on May 6, 1953, Mrs. Hobson, a white person, saw a sign on the defendant's hotel stating that a vacancy existed. She went in to seek lodging for herself and her husband. She was alone at the time. The desk clerk, a Mrs. Raleigh, showed Mrs. Hobson Room 62-F, accepted a deposit of $5 and gave Mrs. Hobson a receipt, while reserving the room for both plaintiffs.

The next day, both plaintiffs returned to the defendant's hotel to claim their reservation and pay the balance due. Only Mr. Hobson spoke to the desk clerk, showing the receipt for the reservation. The desk clerk looked at the Hobsons and demanded proof of identification and of the marriage. At that point, an elevator man spoke to the desk clerk, who called him aside, where they had a whispered conversation, after which the desk clerk told Mr. Hobson that the hotel did not want 'white and colored' living together in view of the tendency of another interracial couple, who had resided there previously, to fight all the time. Mr. Hobson stated to the clerk that they were married, gainfully employed, and frequently at night, she as a nurse, and he as a Postal clerk. The desk clerk then returned the plaintiffs' deposit.

The testimony offered by the defendant through Mrs. Raleigh, the desk clerk, did not dispute that Rose Hobson, a white woman, made the reservation for the room, left a deposit and stated that she would return the next day with her husband for the room. Mrs. Raleigh's testimony differs from that of the plaintiffs as to the reason why the room was refused. She says that the Negro plaintiff returned to the hotel alone with the receipt which had been given his wife. She states that when she demanded identification and proof of marriage, Mr. Hobson became abusive and offensive.

I have accepted the testimony of the plaintiffs, seemingly respectable and worthy citizens, and I am convinced that both of them were discriminated against because of their race. The post litem contention that Mr. Hobson was offensive and abusive and that that was the basis of the refusal to give the plaintiffs accommodations is not convincing, nor was it pleaded as a matter of affirmative defense. It is natural that a defendant accused of racial discrimination will seek avoidance of statutory penalties therefor through 'explanations'.

As the Appellate Court of Indiana noted in Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co., 112 Ind.App. 336, 344, 41 N.E.2d 819, 821, 822, while construing a statute in many respects similar to New York's:

'It is apparent that in all cases where a colored person is denied the rights and privileges guaranteed him * * * (the) defendant could deny that the exclusion was because of race or color and could place the reason therefor as dislike. When such a defense is asserted, and no basis for dislike is shown, this court, upon appeal, is not bound by the seeming conflict.'

Judge Fuld, writing for the Court of Appeals, Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584, ovserved that:

'One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive--for we deal with an area in which 'subtleties of conduct * * * play no small part'.' (Citing case.)

See, also, Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, June 1955, 208 Misc. 35, 42, 43, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432, 439, 440.

There is nothing in the record to lend even slight credence to the defendant's explanation for refusing to deal with the plaintiffs, and I have rejected the testimony on this point as unworthy of belief.

Since no corporate officer of the defendant testified, it does not appear that the defendant gave any instructions to its desk clerk not to discriminate racially. If nothing was said to employees about refusing admission to persons of the colored race, then the acts of the desk clerk are chargeable to the corporation. Norman v. City Island Beach Co., Inc., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y.S. 379. Once the accusation is made of a racial rejection by a place of public accommodation, a corporate defendant is bound to come forward with proof that the discrimination which is offensive to the statute has been forbidden by specific instructions to corporate employees. Jackson v. Imburgia, 184 Misc. 1063, 55 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551; Hubert v. Jose, 148 App.Div. 718, 720, 721, 132 N.Y.S. 811, 812. On this point the defendant elected to remain mute.

I now come to an aspect of this case which is not free of difficulty: If the white plaintiff, Rose Hobson, was discriminated against because of her race, may she be given relief under the Civil Rights Law? In the search for an answer to this question, it is idle to urge a strict and inflexible construction of the law simply because it is penal in nature. A liberal intent conceived the statute. The proper office of civil rights legislation is to search out hostility to our public policy and apply the proper remedy. Certain it is that:

'Section 40 of the Civil Rights Law prohibits discrimination against any person by reason of race, color or religion. It is a remedial statute and must be liberally construed.' (Emphasis mine.) Camp-Of-The-Pines v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 397, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475, 483.

The principal case cited in support of strict construction of Section 40 is Cohn v. Goldgraben, 1918, 103 Misc. 500, 170 N.Y.S. 407. It is also often cited for the proposition that the refusal by a place of public accommodation to serve a 'mixed couple,' i. e., Negro and white, does not offend the statute. It should be noticed that Cohn v. Goldgraben, supra, where only the white member of the 'mixed couple' sued, represents a now antiquated view of the law and that, further, the decision appears to have turned upon a refusal by a restaurant to serve a Negro and a white man at the same table. There, the question was one of services, not one of public accommodations, such as a lodging. Hotels and...

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5 cases
  • Buffi v. Ferri
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1969
    ...legislation had a similar broad scope. The only case we have found which broadly construes confining legislation is Hobson v. York Studios, 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162, and in our judgment the Court in that case was legislating rather than ...
  • Local Finance Co. of Rockland v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1968
    ...Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 399--401, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Super.Ct.); Hobson v. York Studios, Inc., 208 Misc. 888, 891--894, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Mun.Ct.); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 126--127, 110 A.2d 383. We think that similar principles of interpretation ......
  • Tyler v. Eastern Discount Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term
    • January 31, 1968
    ...a remedial nature and is designed primarily to safeguard private rights, the statute is not strictly construed (Hobson v. York Studios, Inc., 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162; cf. Michigan Mutual Liability Company v. State of New York, 53 Misc.2d 408, 410, 278 N.Y.S.2d 689, The defendant has......
  • Industrial Linens Supply Co., Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, KCD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 6, 1976
    ...v. Jose, 148 App.Div. 718, 132 N.Y.S. 811 (1912); Jackson v. Imburgia, 184 Misc. 1063, 55 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1945); Hobson v. York Studios, 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955). It is to be noted that the New York statute being implemented in those cases was quasi-criminal in that violation of......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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