Hobson v. Youell

• Decision Date: 09 June 1941
• Citation: 15 S.E.2d 76
• Parties: HOBSON. v. YOUELL, Superintendent of State Penitentiary.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

15 S.E.2d 76

HOBSON.

v.YOUELL, Superintendent of State Penitentiary.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 9, 1941.

HOLT, J., dissenting.

Original habeas corpus proceedings by Robert Hobson, petitioner, against Rice M. Youell, Superintendent of Virginia State Penitentiary, to review a judgment convicting petitioner of murder in the first de gree and sentencing petitioner to fifty years in the penitentiary.

Petition denied.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

Edward T. Haynes, of Richmond, for petitioner.

Abram P. Staples, Atty. Gen., and Walter E. Rogers, of Richmond, for respondent.

HUDGINS, Justice.

Petitioner, Robert Hobson, filed in this court an original petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus and alleging that, on his plea of guilty to an indictment for murder, he was convicted by the Circuit Court of Halifax County and sentenced to fifty years in the penitentiary.^* He attacks the validity of the judgment on four grounds, to-wit: (1) That on his plea of guilty the court had no power to convict him of murder in the first degree; (2) that his plea of guilty limited the power of the court to impose the punishment prescribed for murder in the second degree; (3) that the judgment is fatally defective because it does not expressly state that the court ascertained he was guilty of murder in the first degree; and (4) that the judgment is void because no evidence was introduced for the Commonwealth or the accused.

Petitioner's contentions will be discussed in the order stated.

1. The substance of the first contention is that no elements of first degree murder are specifically alleged in the indictment.

The form of the indictment is that prescribed by Michie's Code, section 4865, which was adopted in 1930 (Acts of 1930, c. 238, p. 626) on the recommendation of the Judicial Council and the Virginia Bar Association (41 Va. Bar Assn. Min. 116). Even before this short form of indictment for murder became the statutory law, this court had previously declared that an indictment charging murder in the second degree only was sufficient to support a verdict and judgment for murder in the first degree. Judge Keith, speaking for the court in Kibler v. Com., 94 Va. 804, 809, 26 S.E. 858, 859, said:

"While upon the subject of the indictment, however, a point made by counsel for the prisoner, and relied upon in arrest of judgment, may with propriety be disposed of.

"It is the common-law indictment for murder. It does not charge specially the ingredients of murder in the first degree, as distinguished from murder in the second degree, and the contention is that such an indictment will not support a verdict of murder in the first degree. This question was presented to the general court in the case of Commonwealth v. Miller, reported in 1 Va. Cas. [at page] 310 , and that court unanimously decided 'that the indictment is not defective in not charging specially such facts as would show the offense to have been murder in the first degree.' To the same effect, see Wicks v. Com., 2 Va.Cas. 387 , and Livingston v. Com., 14 Grat. [592] 596.

"In the case of Thompson v. Com., 20 Grat. [724] 730, the court says: 'It is not necessary, in consequence of the statute defining the different degrees of murder, and subjecting them to different punishments, to alter the form of indictments for murder in any respect, nor to charge specially such facts as would show the offense to be murder in the first degree.' "

Notwithstanding the clear, emphatic language of this court, the sufficiency of the short form of the indictment to support a conviction of murder in the first degree has been repeatedly questioned and just as repeatedly and emphatically answered in the affirmative by this court. See Hurd v. Com, 159 Va. 880, 165 S.E. 536; Bausell v. Com., 165 Va. 669, 181 S.E. 453; Pamp-lin v. Com, 167 Va. 470, 188 S.E. 147; Maxwell v. Com, 167 Va. 490, 187 S.E. 506; Huffman v. Com, 168 Va. 668, 190 S.E. 265. See Bell v. Com, 170 Va. 597, 195 S.E. 675.

"If, therefore, any proposition of law can be considered as settled by decision, and no longer open to debate, " as said by Judge Keith, then the proposition that the short statutory form of indictment for murder includes the charge of murder in the first degree is now the established law in this Commonwealth. If an accused desires more detailed information of the charge made against him than that stated in the indictment, the procedure to obtain the same is outlined in the Pine case, Pine v. Com, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652, and the Hurd case, supra.

The force and effect of a plea of guilty is well established. In 14 Am. Jur. 952, it is stated that: "A plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the highest order, the effect of which is to authorize the imposition of the sentence prescribed by law on a verdict of guilty of the crime sufficiently charged in the indictment or information."

To the same effect, see 22 C.J. S, Criminal Law, § 424, p. 656: "The effect of the plea of guilty, generally speaking, is a record admission of whatever is well charged in the indictment or information. It admits all the criminating facts alleged and the statutory elements of the offense charged. Such a plea is applicable to all and to each of the counts of the indictment; and therefore if there are good and bad counts in the indictment, the plea of guilty will be referred to that one which is good. While generally no evidence of guilt is required in order to proceed to judgment, for accused has himself supplied the necessary proof, yet in a proper case evidence may be heard as to the aggravation or mitigation of the offense."

2. In support of petitioner's second contention--namely, that the confession of guilt was to second degree murder only--he relies on the principle that, when the Commonwealth has proven the commission of a homicide and pointed out the accused as the criminal agent, the presumption is that such an accused is guilty of murder in the second degree. In order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth, and to reduce the offense to manslaughter the burden of proof is on the accused. These principles are to be applied in analyzing and weighing evidence. A plea of guilty eliminates the ne-cessity for proof, in so far as fixing the degree of the crime is concerned.

Considering the indictment and the plea, the accused has pleaded guilty to the highest degree of the offense which the indictment charges and of which he can be convicted under its averments. Green v. Com, 12 Allen, Mass, 155; Territory v. Miller, 4 Dak. 173, 29 N.W. 7; People v. Kaiser, 206 N.Y. 46, 99 S.E. 195; Nathaniel Green v. United States, 40 App. D. C. 426, 46 L.R.A., N.S., 1117.

3. The petitioner's third contention is that the judgment is fatally defective because the degree of murder is not expressly stated therein.

This point was not stressed in the oral argument or in the brief. The contention is inconsistent with the other arguments made in the brief. The gravamen of petitioner's complaint is that he was found guilty of murder in the first degree when he should not have been found guilty of a higher crime than murder in the second degree.

The pertinent part of the judgments reads: "Here the court * * * proceeded to hear and determine the measure of his punishment on his plea of guilty of killing and murdering Gladys Chandler doth fix his punishment at a term of (50) fifty years imprisonment in the State penitentiary of Virginia, and it being demanded of the said Robert Hobson if anything for himself he had or knew to say why the court should not now pronounce sentence and judgment on him and nothing being offered or alleged in delay thereof, it is considered by the court that Robert Hobson be confined in the State penitentiary of Virginia for a term of (50) fifty years * * *."

Code, sec. 4394, prescribes the punishment for murder in the first degree to be death, or confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term not less than twenty years.

Code, sec. 4395, provides that punishment for murder in the second degree shall be by confinement in the penitentiary not less than five nor more than twenty years.

Code, sec. 4919, is as follows: "If a person indicted for murder be found by the jury guilty thereof, they shall in their verdict fix the degree thereof and ascertain the extent of the punishment to be inflicted within the bounds prescribed by sections forty-three hundred and ninety-four and forty-three hundred and ninety-five. If the accused confess the indictment to be true, the court shall ascertain the extent of the punishment within the same bounds, and give sentence accordingly."

The last sentence in the above section, prior to the change made by the Code re-visors of 1919, read: "If the accused confess the indictment to be true, the court shall examine the witnesses and determine the degree of the crime, and give sentence accordingly." Code of 1887, sec. 4041. The omission of the mandate, requiring the court to examine the witnesses and to determine the degree of crime, is significant. It seems that a practice has developed in a number of trial courts, whereby the Commonwealth and the accused, through their attorneys, agree on the extent of the punishment to be imposed, subject to the approval of the court. On the arraignment of the accused and his plea of guilty, one of the attorneys, in the presence of the other, states to the court the essential facts constituting the crime charged and the punishment agreed upon. In a great number of such cases the court will accept the recommendation of the Commonwealth and, without examination of the witnesses, fix the punishment accordingly.

While this practice is permissible under the change in the statute, it is a practice that may be abused and should not be extended. In Dixon v. Com, 161 Va. 1098...