Hobson v. Youell, Record No. 2439.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1941
• Docket Number: Record No. 2439.
• Citation: 177 Va. 906
• Parties: ROBERT HOBSON v. RICE M. YOUELL, SUPERINTENDENT OF VIRGINIA STATE PENITENTIARY.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 906

177 Va. 906

ROBERT HOBSON v. RICE M. YOUELL, SUPERINTENDENT OF VIRGINIA STATE PENITENTIARY.

Record No. 2439.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Wythebille.

June 9, 1941.

Present, All the Justices.

1. HOMICIDE — Indictment — Form Prescribed by Code, Section 4865, Sufficient to Support Conviction of First Degree Murder. — The short form of indictment prescribed by section 4865 of the Code of 1936 is sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first degree.

2. HOMICIDE — Indictment — Form Prescribed by Code, Section 4865, Sufficient to Support Conviction of First Degree Murder — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner attacked the validity of the judgment under which he was convicted, on the ground that the court had no power to convict him of murder in the first degree on his plea of guilty, as the elements of first degree murder were not specifically alleged in the indictment, which followed the form prescribed by section 4865 of the Code of 1936.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of the petitioner.

3. CRIMINAL LAW — Plea of Guilty — Equivalent to Conviction — Effect as Regards Penalty. — A plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the highest order, the effect of which is to authorize the imposition of the sentence prescribed by law on a verdict of guilty of the crime sufficiently charged in the indictment or information.

4. CRIMINAL LAW — Plea of Guilty — Admission of Offense Charged in Indictment — Evidence in Mitigation. — The effect of the plea of guilty, generally speaking, is a record admission of whatever is well charged in the indictment or information. It admits all the criminating facts alleged and the statutory elements of the offense charged. Such a plea is applicable to all and to each of the counts of the indictment; and therefore if there are good and bad counts in the indictment, the plea of guilty will be referred to that one which is good. While generally no evidence of guilt is required in order to proceed to judgment, for accused has himself supplied the necessary proof, yet in a proper case evidence may be heard as to the aggravation or mitigation of the offense.

5. HOMICIDE — Degree of Offense — Presumptions — Burden of Proviing Degree — Principles Applied in Analyzing and Weighing Evidence. — The principles that when the Commonwealth has proven the commission of a homicide and pointed out the accused as a criminal agent, the presumption is that such an accused is guilty of murder in the second degree, and that in order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth, and to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the burden of proof is on the accused, are to be applied in analyzing and weighing evidence.

6. HOMICIDE — Degree of Offense — Proof — Effect of Plea of Guilty. — A plea of guilty eliminates the necessity for proof, in so far as fixing the degree of the crime is concerned.

7. HOMICIDE — Degree of Offense — Effect of Plea of Guilty under Short Form of Indictment — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner attacked the validity of the judgment under which he was convicted, on the ground that his plea of guilty limited the power of the court to impose the punishment prescribed for murder in the second degree, contending that his plea of guilty was to second degree murder only, and that after the Commonwealth had proven the commission of a homicide and pointed out the accused as the criminal agent, the presumption was that such an accused was guilty of murder in the second degree, and in order to elevate the offense to murder in the first degree, the burden was on the Commonwealth. The indictment followed the short form prescribed by section 4865 of the Code of 1936.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of the petitioner, since, considering the indictment and plea, accused had pleaded guilty to the highest degree of the offense which the indictment charged and of which he could be convicted under its averments.

8. HOMICIDE — Punishment — Fixing by Agreement Permissible under Code, Section 4919 — Abuse of Practice. — The practice, developed in a number of trial courts, whereby upon the arraignment of the accused and his plea of guilty, one of the attorneys, in the presence of the other, states to the court the essential facts constituting the crime charged and the punishment agreed upon, whereupon the court accepts such recommendation and, without examining the witnesses, fixes the punishment accordingly, is permissible under section 4919 of the Code of 1936 in view of the change made by the revisors of 1919, but such practice may be abused and should not be extended.

9. JURY — Plea of Guilty — Error for Jury to Fix Punishment. — It is reversible error for the trial court to impanel a jury to determine the extent of the punishment in a case in which the prisoner has pleaded guilty to an indictment charging a capital offense.

10. JURY — Plea of Guilty — Court to Fix Degree of Guilt and Punishment. — On a plea of guilty, the accused and the Commonwealth are entitled to the independent judgment of the court upon the degree of his guilt and the punishment to be inflicted, uninfluenced by the judgment or advice of a jury or bystanders.

11. HOMICIDE — Sufficiency of Judgment — Degree of Offense Indicated by Punishment Assessed — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner attacked the validity of the judgment under which he was convicted, on the ground that the judgment was fatally defective because the degree of murder was not expressly stated therein. The petitioner was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of petitioner, since there was no confusion as to the degree of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted, as shown in the judgment. Fifty years' confinement in the penitentiary clearly indicated that the court ascertained the petitioner to be guilty of murder in the first degree.

12. HOMICIDE — Verdict — Specification of Degree of Offense by Punishment Assessed. — Even where the jury are required to specify the degree of guilt in their verdict, a verdict which does not expressly find the degree may nevertheless be valid if the assessment of punishment clearly indicates such degree.

13. HABEAS CORPUS — Grounds for Relief — Failure of Verdict to State Degree of Guilt. — A writ of habeas corpus may not be invoked for failure of a verdict to state the degree of guilt, where the accused has been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that the imposition of such sentence upon such verdict might have been cause for reversal upon appeal.

14. HABEAS CORPUS — Grounds for Relief — Mere Errors of Court of Competent Jurisdiction. — Mere errors in the proceedings of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus. In such case the remedy, if any, is by writ of error or appeal.

15. HABEAS CORPUS — Grounds for Relief — Where Proceedings Are Void. — It is only where the proceedings, under which the party complaining is detained in custody, are void that the party will be discharged on habeas corpus.

16. HABEAS CORPUS — Nature of Writ — Not a Writ of Error. — The writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error.

17. HABEAS CORPUS — Scope of Remedy — Sufficiency of Cause — Imprisonment under Judgment of Court of Competent Jurisdiction. — The writ of habeas corpus brings up the body of the prisoner with the cause of his commitment, and the court can inquire into the sufficiency of that cause; but if he be detained in prison by virtue of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, that judgment is in itself sufficient cause. An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity and it is not a nullity if the court or magistrate rendering it had jurisdiction to render it.

18. HABEAS CORPUS — Grounds for Relief — Void Judgment — Collateral Attack — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner attacked the validity of the judgment under which he was convicted, on the ground that the judgment was void because no evidence was introduced. The trial court had jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner of the offense charged and the order specifically recited that on the plea of guilty the court proceeded "to hear and determine the measure of his punishment."

Held: That the statement in the order was conclusive on its face and was not open to collateral attack.

19. HABEAS CORPUS — Office of Writ — Testing Sufficiency of Evidence. — Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction cannot be considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Original petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The opinion states the case.

Edward T. Haynes, for the petitioner.

Abram P. Staples, Attorney-General, and Walter E. Rogers, Special Assistant, for the respondent.

HUDGINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Petitioner, Robert Hobson, filed in this court an original petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus and alleging that, on his plea of guilty to an indictment for murder, he was convicted by the Circuit Court of Halifax county and sentenced to fifty years in the penitentiary.^* He attacks the validity of the judgment on four grounds, to-wit: (1) That on his plea of guilty the court had no power to convict him of murder in the first degree; (2) that his plea of guilty limited the power of the court to impose the punishment prescribed for murder in the second degree; (3) that the judgment is fatally defective because it does not expressly state that the court ascertained he was guilty of murder in the first degree; and (4)...