Hochstetler v. United States
| Decision Date | 11 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-221L,14-221L |
| Parties | TODD HOCHSTETLER AND KARISSA HOCHSTETLER, For Themselves and As Representatives of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
National Trails System Act; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251; Fifth Amendment Takings Clause; Centerline presumption; language of deed
Steven M. Wald and Michael J. Smith, St. Louis, MO, with whom were Thomas S. Stewart and Elizabeth G. McCulley, Kansas City, MO, and J. Robert Sears, St. Louis, MO, for plaintiff.
Cullen S. Shearburn, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, Washington, DC, with whom was John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources Division, for defendant.
Plaintiffs, Todd and Karissa Hochstetler ("the Hochstetlers"), Jane Christopherson, Hunter Grain Company, David A. Burchill and Rebecca J. Burchill ("the Burchills"), the owners of several tracts of land in Cass County, North Dakota, bring this case pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim that their land is adjacent to and underneath areas of the railroad line that Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company ("BNSF") acquired as easements for railroad purposes, and therefore conversion of the railroad line to a recreational trail through operation of the National Trails System Act ("Trails Act"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2012), constituted a taking of plaintiffs' land without just compensation. Pending are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment on liability. The motions are fully briefed, and oral argument was held on December 14, 2015. We held the matter in abeyance for a period while the parties unsuccessfully pursued settlement. For the reasons stated below, we deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and we grant defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Section 1247(d) of the Trails Act prompts certain federal agencies to encourage the conversion of unused railroad rights-of-way into recreational trails by state and local governments or private entities. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247 (2012). One of these federal agencies, the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"), is tasked with regulating the construction, operation, and abandonment of railroad lines in the United States. Pursuant to its authority, the STB promulgated regulations governing the abandonment or discontinuance of rail lines. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.1-1152.60 (2015). A rail operator seeking abandonment or discontinuance of the use of a rail line pursuant to these regulations must first file an application with the STB. 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (2012).
If a rail operator so chooses, however, it may seek an exemption from filing an abandonment application. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50. Instead of pursuing abandonment, the rail operator is permitted to negotiate with a state, municipality, or private entity to assume responsibility for operating the railroad right-of-way as a recreational trail. The entity, if it is willing to assume financial responsibility, is referred to as an Interim Trail Sponsor and must file a Statement of Willingness to Assume Financial responsibility. Id. § 1152.29. The STB then issues a Notice of Interim Trail Use ("NITU"). Id. This notice results in a stay of the abandonment proceedings and allows the parties 180 days to enter into an interim trail use agreement. Id. Upon the finalization ofan interim trail use agreement, abandonment proceedings are suspended and rail service is discontinued to allow for conversion of the right-of-way into a recreational trail. This process of staying the abandonment process and converting the right-of-way into a recreational trail is known as "railbanking."
BNSF, through its predecessor, Northern Pacific Railroad Company ("Northern Pacific"), acquired a segment of the rail corridor in Cass County, North Dakota between milepost 68.10 in Arthur, North Dakota and milepost 75.50 in Hunter, North Dakota ("the rail line"). On November 2, 2011, BNSF filed an abandonment exemption relating to the railroad line in Cass County, North Dakota. The City of Arthur Park Board and the City of Hunter Park Board ("the Park Boards") subsequently filed a petition with the STB indicating that they were willing to assume financial responsibility under the Trails Act. BNSF responded to the Park Boards' petition, stating that it was ready to begin negotiating an interim trail use agreement. The STB filed an NITU relating to the railroad line on December 19, 2011. On September 30, 2013, BNSF notified the STB that it and the Park Boards had reached a railbanking agreement for the railroad line.
There are five parcels at issue in this case: two belonging to Jane Christopherson, one belonging to the Hochstetlers, one belonging to the Burchills, and one belonging to Hunter Grain Company.1 Plaintiffs claim these parcels lie adjacent to and underneath segments of the rail line in which BNSF held easements for railroad purposes.
A portion of the parties' disagreement centers around the type of property interest acquired by BNSF's predecessor-in-interest. Plaintiffs argue that the rail line adjacent to Jane Christopherson's land (Parcels 2A and 2B) was acquired only through the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875, 43U.S.C. § 934 (2012), and that the rail line adjacent to the parcels belonging to the other three plaintiffs (1, 3 and 4) was acquired as a prescriptive easement by use, i.e., resulting not in a fee but in an easement. Under this view of the facts, the result would have been the railroad's acquisition of easements for railroad purposes adjacent to land which plaintiffs eventually purchased. Plaintiffs then rely on North Dakota's "centerline" presumption,2 under which grants to landowners adjoining easements extend to the center of the easement. Thus, according to plaintiffs, because Jane Christopherson was conveyed land bounded by the rail line, she owns to the center of the rail line. When the railroad use ended, therefore, conversion of the railroad line into a recreational trail exceeded the scope of the easements, thus triggering a taking of plaintiffs' underlying land.
Defendant argues that the centerline presumption is inapplicable here. As to Claims 2A and 2B, it contends that the railroad's predecessor-in-interest, Northern Pacific Railroad, acquired title by fee to the land adjacent to plaintiff Christopherson through the Land Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 365, which gave the railroad a limited fee subject to a reversionary interest in the United States. When the land was no longer used for railroad purposes, it reverted to the United States. Therefore, there could not have been a taking from plaintiff because she never acquired land adjacent to an easement.
As to Claims 1, 3, and 4, defendant has alternative arguments. First, that the railroad right of way was acquired by BNSF through adverse possession, and therefore BNSF held the parcels in fee simple. Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if BNSF merely possessed a prescriptive easement over the rail line proximate to Claims 1, 3, and 4, the claims still fail because plaintiffs' land does not actually adjoin the rail corridor due to the interposition of a highway owned in fee by the state of North Dakota.
As to these parcels, two undisputable facts dictate a result in favor of defendant: BNSF's predecessor-in-interest acquired all of section 35 in fee in1864; and plaintiff's land lies in section 35. That fee interest cannot be divested absent a transfer from the railroad. Consequently, the fact that the railroad's predecessor-in-interest may have acquired an easement for railroad purposes in section 363 through the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875 () is irrelevant. So long as plaintiff Christopherson acquired land adjacent to the fee portion of the rail corridor, she does not benefit from the centerline presumption.4
There is no question that North Dakota State Highway 18 physically separates plaintiffs' land from the rail corridor. Irrespective of whether the railroad acquired an easement, the parties agree that defendant succeeds if the state owns the highway in fee rather than as an easement. This is the case because plaintiffs depend on the centerline presumption, by which, if the presence of the highway is ignored (if it is only an easement), plaintiffs own land adjacent to the railroad. If the rail corridor is an easement as well, plaintiffs own to the centerline of the railroad right of way and reacquire use when the railroad ceases operation. On the other hand, if defendant is correct and the state owns Highway 18 in fee, then plaintiffs' land is not adjacent to the railroad corridor and they do not benefit from the centerline presumption. We do not need to reach the nature of the railroad interest, in other words, ifHighway 18 keeps plaintiffs' land from being adjacent to the railroad.5
North Dakota law provides us with useful presumptions which lead to the conclusion that Highway 18 was conveyed in fee. First, plaintiffs are correct that, as a general rule, in the absence of a statute expressly providing for acquisition by fee or a deed conveying a fee, the right acquired by the public in land for highway purposes is ordinarily an easement. Rutten v. Wood, 57 N.W.2d 112, 113 (N.D. 1953); Lalim v. Williams County, 105 N.W. 2d 339, 345 (N.D. 1960). A competing presumption, however, is that a fee simple is intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended. Lalim, 105 N.W. 2d at 344; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-13 (1943).
Here, defendant presents us with a series of deeds which indicate that North Dakota's interest in Highway 18 was acquired by through the language of fee simple...
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