Hocker v. Heins

• Decision Date: 14 August 1962
• Citation: 231 N.Y.S.2d 481
• Parties: Henry HOCKER v. William HEINS et al.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 481

231 N.Y.S.2d 481

Henry HOCKER v. William HEINS et al.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County.

Aug. 14, 1962.

Bartholomew J. O'Rourke, Central Islip, for plaintiff.

John H. Fisher, Huntington Station, for defendants.

HENRY M. ZALESKI, Justice.

Motion by plaintiff for summary judgment is granted.

The facts essential to a disposition of the motion are undisputed .

There is a question whether plaintiff failed to make certain repairs to the premises but, by reason of the undisputed facts, a resolution of that issue is unnecessary for even if it were in defendants' favor the result would be the same.

The plaintiff as tenant and the defendants as landlords entered into a lease on December 12, 1957. Among other things, the lease gave plaintiff an option to purchase the premises during its term (Par. Eighteenth). Pursuant to that provision, on January 31, 1962, plaintiff notified defendant of his intention to exercise the option . By letter dated February 6, 1962, defendants' counsel wrote to plaintiff stating that the owners 'hereby revoke any option rights that you may have pursuant to the lease.' In that letter counsel also referred plaintiff to a prior letter of September 20, 1961. The letter of September 20, written by counsel, not by the landlords, purported to give plaintiff 'the 90 days required notice to either replace, repair or fix the following: * * *.' There followed an enumeration of certain conditions which allegedly violated the terms of the lease.

The entire problem revolves around the effect to be given to the September 20 letter in the light of the meaning of Paragraph 'Ninth' of the lease. By Paragraph Ninth, under certain conditions, the landlords had the right to terminate the lease. That clause reads that in the event of certain breaches by the tenant 'the landlord may if he chooses, at any time after the landlord has given the tenant written notice of the default or breach of a covenant and has allowed the tenant ninety days (90) to cure and correct the default or breach complained of, and upon giving the said written notice to the tenant, and his failure to correct the breach complained of, the landlord may declare this lease and the term thereof terminated * * * on the date fixed in such notice * * *. All notices required to be given to the tenant may be given by mail addressed to the tenant at the demised premises.' By their answer defendants assert that plaintiff violated the provisions of the lease referring to the obligation to take care of and make repairs to the premises. Relying upon the purported violations, landlords' counsel sent the notice of September 20, 1961 referred to hereinabove. In the Court's opinion that notice did not comply with the lease requirements and consequently did not result in termination of the lease.

Properly read, the provisions of Paragraph Ninth quoted above cast certain burdens on the landlords in the event they wished to terminate the lease for plaintiff's breach thereof. The wording of Paragraph Ninth leaves much to be desired, but its meaning is clear. If default was claimed, the landlords could terminate the lease. First, however, they were required to give tenant notice of the breach and allow him 90 days in which to cure it. Then, 'at any...