Hodge v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 08 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-00440-JMC-JDA
• Parties: Shelley Lee Hodge, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Shelley Lee Hodge, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-00440-JMC-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

July 8, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).¹ Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI").² For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning October 4, 2011. [R. 192-200.] The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 54-71, 76-97.] Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and on September 5, 2013, ALJ Eric Eklund conducted a video hearing on Plaintiff's claims, with Plaintiff appearing in Greenville, South Carolina and the ALJ presiding from Lawrence, Massachusetts. [R. 16-53.]

On September 25, 2013, the ALJ issued his decision finding Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act") from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013, with her disability ending May 2, 2013. [R. 108-24.] At Step 1³, the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on December 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 4, 2011, the date the claimant became disabled. [R. 112, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that, from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013, the period during which Plaintiff was under a disability, the Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Depression; Anxiety; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. [R. 112, Finding 3.]

At Step 3, the ALJ determined that, from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.[R. 112-13, Finding 4.] The ALJ specifically considered Listings 12.04 and 12.06 with respect to Plaintiff's mental impairment. [Id.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC") from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, from October 4, 2011 through May 1, 2013, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant is limited to simple, unskilled work; the claimant can only work in low-stress jobs defined as only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in the work setting; the claimant can have no interaction with the public; only occasional interaction with coworkers and no tandem tasks; due to mental impairments, the claimant is unable to engage in sustained work activity for a full 8-hour workday on a regular and consistent basis and would miss more than 3 days of work per month and be off task up to 30% of the workday.

[R. 113-16, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a licensed practical nurse, office nurse, school nurse, and a retail sales clerk. [R. 116, Finding 6.] In light of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that, from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff could have performed. [R.117, Finding 10.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was under a disability, as defined by the Act, from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013. [R. 117, Finding 11.]

With respect to the time period after May 1, 2013, the ALJ determined that, at Step 2, Plaintiff had not developed any new impairment or impairments since May 2, 2013, andher current severe impairments were the same as those present from October 4, 2011, through May 1, 2013. [R. 118, Finding 13.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined that, beginning May 2, 2013, the Plaintiff had not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 118, Finding 14.] The ALJ found that Plaintiff experienced medical improvement as of May 2, 2013, the date her disability ended, and that the medical improvement that occurred was related to Plaintiff's ability to work because there had been an increase in Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. [R. 118, Findings 15 &16.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC") beginning May 2, 2013:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, beginning May 2, 2013, the claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant is limited to simple, unskilled work; the claimant can only work in low-stress jobs defined as only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in the work setting; the claimant can have no interaction with the public; only occasional interaction with coworkers and no tandem tasks.

[R. 119, Finding 17.]

Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was still unable to perform her past relevant work. [R. 123, Finding 18.] Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, residual functional capacity, and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff could have performed beginning May 2, 2013. [R. 123,Finding 22.] Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's disability ended on May 2, 2013. [R. 124, Finding 23.]

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, which denied review on December 4, 2014. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff commenced an action for judicial review in this Court on January 29, 2015. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains multiple legal errors warranting the reversal and remand of the case. [See Doc. 9.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ

1. failed to consider all of the available evidence when determining that Plaintiff was not disabled after May 1, 2013 [id. at 12-13];

2. erred by refusing to assign any weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians after May 1, 2013, and his evaluation of the medical opinion evidence was not supported by substantial evidence [id. at 14-15; Doc. 11 at 3-4]; and

3. failed to make a proper credibility determination for the time period after May 1, 2013, as required by SSR 97-7p [Doc. 9 at 15-16].

The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence of record that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act after May 1, 2013. [See Doc. 10.] Specifically, the Commissioner contends the ALJ

1. properly considered all of the available evidence when determining that Plaintiff was not disabled after May 1, 2013 [id. at 9-12];

2. properly weighed the opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist Dr. Menendez-Caldwell [id. at 12-15]; and,

3. properly assessed Plaintiff's credibility in accordance with the regulations [id. at 16-18].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by...