Hodge v. Dixon, No. 43997

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Writing for the Court: DEEN; FELTON; PANNELL; PANNELL
• Citation: 167 S.E.2d 377,119 Ga.App. 397
• Parties: T. W. HODGE v. Ruthie W. DIXON et al
• Decision Date: 14 March 1969
• Docket Number: 3,2,Nos. 1,No. 43997

Page 377

167 S.E.2d 377 119 Ga.App. 397 T. W. HODGE
v.
Ruthie W. DIXON et al. No. 43997. Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3. March 14, 1969.

[119 Ga.App. 398] Sharpe, Sharpe, Hartley & Newton, W. Ward Newton, Lyons, for appellant.

No appearance for appellees.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

[119 Ga.App. 397] DEEN, Judge.

Damages traceable to a tortious act, but not its legal or natural consequence, are too remote and contingent to be recoverable (Code § 105-2009) unless the original actor, whose act would not otherwise be the legal or natural cause of the damages, acts knowingly for the purpose of bringing about the injury. Code § 105-2010. Although under the notice provisions of the new Civil Practice Act it is only necessary to set out 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' (Code Ann. § 81A-108(a)) it is still possible for a litigant to plead himself out of court by revealing a state of facts which affirmatively shows that there is no liability on the

Page 378

defendant. Robbins v. Zabrasky, 44 F.Supp. 867(4); A.G. Reeves Steel Const. Co. v. Weiss, 119 F.2d 472, 476(9-12); Franklin v. Jordan, 224 Ga. 727, 164 S.E.2d 718; Jackson v. Brown, 118 Ga.App. 558, 164 S.E.2d 450.

Where subsequent to the original negligent act there occurs another tortious act sufficient of itself to cause the injury complained of, the latter is to be considered as the sole proximate cause unless it is a 'normal reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by negligence.' Higdon v. Ga. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 112 Ga.App. 500, 503, 145 S.E.2d 808. See also Piller v. Hanger Cab Co., 115 Ga.App. 260, 154 S.E.2d 420; Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga.App. 483, 173 S.E. 443; Tucker v. Star Laundry & Cleaners, 100 Ga.App. 175, 110 S.E.2d 416; Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga.App. 398, 154 S.E.2d 803; Benefield v. McDonough Const. Co. of Ga., 106 Ga.App. 194, 126 S.E.2d 704; Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Stratton, 90 Ga.App. 675, 83 S.E.2d [119 Ga.App. 398] 818; Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith Pew Co., 69 Ga.App. 711(3), 26 S.E.2d 545; Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc. v. Scoggins, 86 Ga.App. 109, 71 S.E.2d 89; Ga. Power Co. v. Kinard, 47 Ga.App. 483, 170 S.E. 688; General Motors Corp. v. Jenkins, 114 Ga.App. 873(2), 152 S.E.2d 796; Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390(2), 40 S.E. 300; Horton v. Sanchez, 57 Ga.App. 612, 195 S.E. 873.

In the present case, after a collision between the defendants in this case had occurred, and after the automobile of one of the defendants was disabled, a city police officer arrived at the scene and in the regular course of his duties began to direct traffic so that the street and intersection would not be blocked. While he was doing so he was negligently struck and killed by another motorist not a party to this lawsuit. The proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's husband was, under the statements of this petition, the act of a third party, and not the negligence of the two motorists which caused the collision in the first instance. The foreseeability doctrine, as stated in Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 26 S.E.2d 698 has no application. There the negligence of the defendant in intentionally parking his automobile in a forbidden location which interfered with the visibility of the road by oncoming traffic created a situation constituting a continuing hazard to all persons approaching the intersection. In the present case the damages are too remote and contingent to be recoverable.

The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the claim.

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