Hodge v. Matrix Grp., Inc.
Decision Date | 06 January 2022 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA0746 |
Citation | 507 P.3d 1010,2022 COA 4 |
Parties | George HODGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATRIX GROUP, INC., and Waterpark II & III, LLC, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Corey A. Holton, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Campbell, Wagner, Frazier & Dvorchak, LLC, Michael O. Frazier, Kirstin M. Dvorchak, Joel A. Richardson, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
¶ 1 Defendants, Matrix Group, Inc., and Waterpark II & III, LLC (collectively, Waterpark), appeal the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff, George Hodge, in the amount of $752,500. Waterpark argues that the district court reversibly erred by permitting Hodge to offer evidence of the lost profits of his solely owned S corporation, Hodge Services, Inc., to support his claim of lost earning capacity following a slip-and-fall accident. Because Hodge is the sole shareholder of Hodge Services and the corporation's profits are attributable to Hodge's own skill and effort rather than invested capital and the labor of others, we conclude, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, that the jury could properly consider the corporation's lost profits in determining Hodge's loss of earning capacity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
¶ 2 Hodge, a fire and products liability investigator, is the sole owner and CEO of Hodge Services, a small forensic expert witness company. His major clients are insurance companies and law firms that hire him to investigate fire and products liability claims. The company's office is in Hodge's home, and its only other employee is a secretary.
¶ 3 Hodge Services leased a storage unit from Waterpark. In February 2018, while visiting the storage unit, Hodge slipped and fell on ice. The fall caused a complete retinal detachment
and loss of useful vision in his right eye.
¶ 4 Hodge brought a personal injury lawsuit against Waterpark, alleging negligence and violations of the Premises Liability Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2021. As part of his economic damages, Hodge claimed a loss of earning capacity. The revenue from Hodge Services was Hodge's only source of income. When the company was doing well, Hodge paid himself a salary of $1,000 per week and occasional dividends from corporate profits; during slow periods, he did not take a salary. He testified that the eye injury dramatically reduced his ability to earn money because "99 percent of [his work] is looking at items to see what failed and why."
¶ 5 During the litigation, Waterpark designated Hodge Services as a nonparty at fault pursuant to section 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. 2021. In the designation, Waterpark asserted that (1) Hodge Services was the tenant of the storage unit and had signed a lease agreement in effect at the time of Hodge's fall; (2) the lease provided that "Tenant shall keep immediate entry areas in front and back of the Premises free and clear of ice and snow"; (3) Waterpark believed Hodge's fall occurred in such "immediate entry areas"; and (4) Hodge Services was therefore "legally responsible for the condition of the subject premises, and was a cause of [Hodge's] alleged injuries and damages."
¶ 6 Before trial, Waterpark filed a motion in limine to bar Hodge from offering evidence of Hodge Services’ lost profits to support his claim of lost earning capacity. Because Hodge Services is incorporated, Waterpark argued, "the [c]ompany's profits are not Hodge's as a matter of law ... and therefore, are improper for the jury's consideration." Rather, Hodge should be "limited to pursuing his personal wage loss."
¶ 9 The jury found that Hodge was 40% at fault, Hodge Services was 25% at fault, and Waterpark was 35% at fault. The jury further found that Hodge had suffered $1,150,000 in economic damages, including loss of earning capacity. Ultimately, the court entered judgment against Waterpark and awarded Hodge a total of $752,500.
¶ 10 Waterpark contends that the district court reversibly erred by admitting evidence of Hodge Services’ lost profits because (1) the corporation's profits do not belong to Hodge; (2) admitting the evidence "led to an inconsistent verdict"; and (3) the evidence should have been barred as a discovery sanction. We examine each contention in turn.
¶ 11 Hodge first argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Hodge Services’ lost profits because Hodge may not claim damages that belong to his corporation. We disagree.
¶ 12 We review a district court's determination of the admissibility of evidence, including expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion. Bocian v. Owners Ins. Co. , 2020 COA 98, ¶ 63, 482 P.3d 502. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law. Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C. , 72 P.3d 454, 458 (Colo. App. 2003). To the extent a court's ruling encompasses purely legal issues, we review that aspect of its ruling de novo. Corsentino v. Cordova , 4 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 13 "The principle of making the injured party whole underlies all negligence cases." Cope v. Vermeer Sales & Serv. of Colo., Inc. , 650 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. App. 1982). As a general rule, a party is entitled to recover for damages that naturally and probably result from the negligence of another. Id. A trial court may instruct the jury on an injured party's impairment of earning capacity if such an instruction is appropriate in light of the evidence in the case. Jones v. Cruzan , 33 P.3d 1262, 1264 (Colo. App. 2001). Impairment of earning capacity is determined by comparing what the injured party was capable of earning before the accident with what the injured party is capable of earning thereafter. Hildyard v. W. Fasteners, Inc. , 33 Colo. App. 396, 405, 522 P.2d 596, 601 (1974).
¶ 14 Generally, when a duly formed corporation is harmed by some action of a third party, "the right to seek redress for that wrong belongs to the corporation," A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Cohen , 654 P.2d 857, 860 (Colo. App. 1982), and "a stockholder is precluded from asserting a personal right of action against [the] third party whose actions have caused damage to the corporation," Nicholson v. Ash , 800 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Colo. App. 1990). Accordingly, a plaintiff in a personal injury action may not recover, as a distinct element of damages, a corporation's loss of "business profits" — that is, "the net earnings of a business [that] arise from the elements of invested capital and employed labor." Ford Motor Co. v. Conrardy , 29 Colo. App. 577, 582-83, 488 P.2d 219, 222 (1971).
Id. at 584, 488 P.2d at 222-23 ; see Trujillo v. Wilson , 117 Colo. 430, 433-34, 189 P.2d 147, 149-50 (1948) ( ); Schell v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. , 693 P.2d 382, 385 (Colo. App. 1984) ( ); Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Rubenstein , 5 Colo. App. 121, 122, 125, 38 P. 76, 76-77 (1894) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial