Hodges v. Rainey

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Citation341 S.C. 79,533 S.E.2d 578
Docket NumberNo. 25149.,25149.
PartiesJim HODGES, Governor of the State of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. John S. RAINEY, former Member and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the South Carolina Public Service Authority, Respondent.
Decision Date12 June 2000

Chief Legal Counsel Jim O. Stuckey, II, of the Office of the Governor, of Columbia, and Susan Taylor Wall, of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs, Pollard & Robinson, LLP, of Charleston, for petitioner.

William C. Hubbard, Dwight F. Drake and C. Mitchell Brown, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., of Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

Governor Jim Hodges ("Governor Hodges") initiated this action in the original jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Rule 229, SCACR to clarify his authority to remove members of the Board of Directors of the South Carolina Public Service Authority ("Santee Cooper") pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 1-3-240(B) (Supp.1998).

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1993, the South Carolina General Assembly adopted the Restructuring Act, which provided for a substantial reorganization of South Carolina state government. A key provision of the Restructuring Act was the grant to the Governor of broad discretionary authority to appoint and remove executive branch officials. These provisions allow the Governor the flexibility to assemble his or her management team. To this end, included in that act was section 1-3-240(B), which allows the Governor to remove any appointed state officer at his or her discretion, notwithstanding that the officer's term has not yet expired or that a substantial amount of time remains in the officer's term. When Governor Hodges was elected in 1999, he chose not to issue a broad executive order removing all state officers appointed by past governors. Instead, he requested the resignation of certain members of state boards and commissions. Governor Hodges requested that John S. Rainey ("Rainey") resign his position as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Santee Cooper. When Rainey refused, Governor Hodges issued Executive Order 99-62 removing Rainey from the Board. On December 8, 1999, Rainey sent a letter to Governor Hodges in which he refused to relinquish his office on the grounds that the 1993 Restructuring Act granting the Governor discretionary power to remove state officers from their positions did not apply to him.

The sole issue before this Court is as follows:

Whether the Governor of South Carolina has the authority to remove a member of the Board of Directors of Santee Cooper upon the issuance of an executive order pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 1-3-240(B) (Supp.1998)?
LAW/ANALYSIS

Governor Hodges argues that this Court should declare that the members of the Board of Directors of Santee Cooper are subject to the Governor's discretionary removal power under the provisions of the 1993 Restructuring Act and, thus, the executive order removing Rainey is effective. We agree.

I. Statutory Construction

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. State Budget and Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993). Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. In re Vincent J., 333 S.C. 233, 509 S.E.2d 261 (1998) (citations omitted). Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. Id. at 233, 509 S.E.2d at 262 (citing Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995)). "What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992).

The language of section 1-3-240(B) and (C) is unambiguous and evidences the General Assembly's intent to grant the Governor of South Carolina the power to remove appointed state officers at his or her discretion. Specifically, section 1-3-240(B) provides for the general power to remove as follows:

(B) Any person appointed to a state office by a Governor, either with or without the advice and consent of the Senate, other than those officers enumerated in subsection (C), may be removed from office by the Governor at his discretion by an Executive Order removing the officer.

Immediately following is section 1-3-240(C) which provides for an enumerated list of agencies where the Governor's power of removal is limited:

(C) Persons appointed to the following offices of the State may be removed by the Governor for malfeasance, misfeasance, incompetency, absenteeism, conflicts of interest, misconduct, persistent neglect of duty in office, or incapacity:
(1) Workers' Compensation Commission;
(2) Commission of the Department of Revenue;
(3) Ethics Commission;
(4) Election Commission;
(5) Professional and Occupational Licensing Board;
(6) Juvenile Parole Board;
(7) Probation, Parole and Pardon Board;
(8) Director of the Department of Safety;
(9) Board of the Department of Health and Environmental Control, excepting the Chairman;
(10) Chief of State Law Enforcement Division.

This Court has upheld the Restructuring Act and has applied the above set forth sections 1-3-240(B) and (C) to other directors of state boards and commissions. See, e.g., Rose v. Beasley, 327 S.C. 197, 489 S.E.2d 625 (1997)

(affirming Governor Beasley's removal of Boykin Rose from the office of Director of Department of Public Safety under section 1-3-240(C)).

The canon of construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" or "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" holds that "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary 602 (7th ed. 1999). Section 1-3-240(C) does not specifically exempt the Santee Cooper Board of Directors from its operation, as it does ten other boards. The fact that the Santee Cooper Board of Directors was not included in the list of exclusions implies that the General Assembly intended for section 1-3-240(B) to apply to the Board. "The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of a statute indicates that the statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded. Exceptions strengthen the force of the general law and enumeration weakens it as to things not expressed." Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 at 227 (5th ed. 1992) (citations omitted).

The text of the Restructuring Act is certain—the Act grants the Governor the right to remove appointed state officers at his or her discretion, while specifically exempting ten boards and commissions. If the legislature's intent is clearly apparent from the statutory language, a court may not embark upon a search for it outside the statute. Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548 (1956). When the language of a statute is clear and explicit, a court cannot rewrite the statute and inject matters into it which are not in the legislature's language, and there is no need to resort to statutory interpretation or legislative intent to determine its meaning. Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).

While it is true that the purpose of an enactment will prevail over the literal import of the statute, this does not mean that this Court can completely rewrite a plain statute. According to this Court in South Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Breeland:

A choice of language in a act will not be construed with literality when to do so will defeat the lawmakers' manifest intention, and a court will reject the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute when, to accept the ordinary meaning, will lead to a result so plainly absurd that it can not possibly have been intended by the legislature.

208 S.C. 469, 480, 38 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1946) (citations omitted). For example, this Court has interpreted statutes in accord with legislative intent despite contrary literal meaning in cases where there has been an oversight by the legislature that is clearly in conflict with the overall intent of the statute, such as when the legislature uses "or" instead of "and" or "county" instead of "city."1 However, this Court should not completely disregard the text of an unambiguous statute based on an alleged conflict with an earlier statute. In the instant case, the ordinary meaning of section 1-3-240(B) will not lead to absurd results unintended by the legislature, so the plain language of the statute should not be disregarded.

II. Implied Repeal

Rainey argues that section 1-3-240(B) is in conflict with Santee Cooper's enabling legislation that allows for the removal of board members for cause, S.C.Code Ann. § 58-31-20 (Supp.1998)2. According to Rainey, section 1-3-240(B) should not be read according to its literal meaning because the legislature did not intend for section 1-3-240(B) to "impliedly repeal" Santee Cooper's 1934 enabling legislation. Rainey maintains that because the two statutes are in inherent conflict, this Court should not apply section 1-3-240(B) to Santee Cooper, even though its Board of Directors were not specifically listed in the section 1-3-240(C) exclusions. We disagree.

The law does not favor the implied repeal of statute. Butler v. Unisun Ins., 323 S.C. 402, 475 S.E.2d 758 (1996). Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be reconciled, if possible, so as to render both operative. Id. "It is presumed that the Legislature is familiar with prior legislation, and that if it intends to repeal existing laws it would ... expressly do so; hence, if by any fair or liberal construction two acts may be made to harmonize, no court is justified in deciding that the later repealed the first."...

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