Hodges v. State, 95-15
| Decision Date | 26 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-15,95-15 |
| Citation | 904 P.2d 334 |
| Parties | William Ray HODGES, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Juline Christofferson and Richard Zucco, Jackson, for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Cassandra Stump Ando, Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program, for Appellee.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.
Appellant William Hodges appeals from his conviction for reckless endangering under WYO.STAT. § 6-2-504(a) (1983).
We affirm.
Appellant presents four issues for our review:
I. Was there sufficient evidence to proceed beyond the State's case in chief, or to sustain the guilty verdict, where the State failed to produce any evidence that Appellant engaged in reckless conduct, and that the conduct complained of placed another in danger of death or serious bodily injury?
II. Did the Trial Court err in admitting testimony concerning the display of a rope by a third party subsequent to the events with which [A]ppellant was charged, and a 1980 incident in which the bicycle on which Wendell Brown was riding was roped by individuals other than the Appellant?
III. Did the Trial Court err in failing to give Appellant's requested jury instructions concerning W.S. 31-5-206 and W.S. 31-5-227 concerning passing on the right and driving on mountain highways?
IV. Did the Trial Court commit a series of errors, which standing alone may be considered harmless error, the cumulative effect of which results in such prejudice that it deprived the Appellant of a fair trial?
On September 5, 1993, Lawrence Wendell Brown, an avid bicyclist, was riding his bicycle over Teton Pass near the Wyoming-Idaho border. As Brown neared the crest of the pass, he heard a horn honk behind him. He moved to a parking area on the right side of the road, and a green pickup, which was traveling in the same direction as Brown was traveling, passed him. Appellant was driving the pickup, and a passenger was riding with him.
Brown continued to ride down the other side of Teton Pass. As he gained speed, Brown approached the green pickup which Further down the road, Brown's speed increased to approximately forty to forty-five miles per hour, and he attempted to pass the pickup for a second time. Again, the pickup moved to the far right side of the road, prohibiting Brown from passing it. Brown braked and continued to ride behind the pickup. As he rode behind the pickup, Brown noticed that the passenger had a rope. Shortly thereafter, the pickup moved to the left side of its traffic lane, and the passenger waved from the window, signaling Brown to pass. Brown refused to pass the pickup because he saw that the passenger was hanging the rope, which had been shaped into a lariat loop, out the window. Brown was especially concerned about the situation because his bicycle had been roped in 1980, and he had been pulled behind a vehicle. Brown was able to avoid an accident in 1980 by employing his extensive cycling experience.
was traveling slower than the twenty miles per hour he was traveling on his bicycle. Brown proceeded to pass the pickup on the far right side of the road, riding between the white fog line and the edge of the pavement. As he neared the pickup, the pickup moved into the area between the fog line and the edge of the road, preventing Brown from passing it. Brown braked to avoid colliding with the pickup and resumed riding behind it.
Brown continued to follow Appellant's pickup until they reached the bottom of the pass. When he got home, Brown telephoned the police and reported the incident, providing them with a partial description of the pickup's license plate number. The police identified Appellant as being the driver of the pickup, and, after they had interviewed him, they charged him with reckless endangering under § 6-2-504(a).
A jury trial was held on September 26 and 27, 1994. At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal. After the trial court denied his motion, Appellant presented his case to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Appellant renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied Appellant's motion, entered a judgment on the verdict, and sentenced Appellant. Appellant appealed to this Court.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied both of his motions for a judgment of acquittal.
W.R.Cr.P. 29 pertains to motions for a judgment of acquittal. That rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) At close of evidence.--Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right.
....
(c) After discharge of jury.--If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 10 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned, the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal within 10 days after such motion is filed, and if not so entered shall be deemed denied, unless within such 10 days the determination shall be continued by order of the court, but a continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 30 days from the date the verdict is returned.
Both Appellant and the State argue that we must review the trial court's denial of the motion which Appellant presented at the end of the State's case by applying the plain error standard of review as was articulated in Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo.1993) In this case, by contrast, Appellant renewed his motion after the jury had returned its verdict. In order to recognize a defendant's efforts to renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal, while still giving effect to the waiver principle, the federal courts have fashioned a simple rule:
. In that case, this Court held: "[F]ollowing the denial of a motion for acquittal, the introduction of evidence by a defendant[ ] results in a waiver of the motion, and an appellate court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence except for plain error." 850 P.2d at 604. That case, however, involved a situation where the defendant had failed to renew his motion either at the close of all the evidence or after the verdict had been returned. 850 P.2d at 603-04
[T]he introduction of evidence by defendant after his motion has been denied is a waiver of that motion. Accordingly even if the motion is renewed at the close of all the evidence, it is only the denial of the later motion that may be claimed as error. The conviction will be affirmed, even though the prosecution may have failed to make a prima facie case, if the evidence for the defense supplied the defect, and the whole record is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 463 at 644-45 (2d ed. 1982). Applying this rule to the case at bar, we conclude that Appellant waived the right to claim that the trial court erred by denying his first motion. We will, however, review the trial court's denial of the renewed motion which Appellant made after the jury had returned its verdict by applying our well established standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims.
This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo.1995). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Id.
Appellant was charged with reckless endangering under § 6-2-504(a), which provides: "A person is guilty of reckless endangering if he recklessly engages in conduct which places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury." "Recklessly" is defined as being the following conduct:
A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the harm results. The risk shall be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation[.]
WYO.STAT. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (1985).
We conclude that sufficient evidence supported Appellant's conviction. Each time Brown attempted to pass the pickup, Appellant maneuvered it so that Brown could not pass it. Brown testified that he had to brake to avoid colliding with the pickup when it moved to the front of him. Brown also testified that a variety of obstacles could be encountered on roadways and that Appellant's driving maneuvers made it difficult for him to see and, thereby, avoid such obstacles. The trial evidence established that a cyclist could incur many injuries as a result of a bicycle accident.
Appellant had driven over Teton Pass many times,...
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