Hodges v. State

Decision Date18 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 43A03–1507–CR–843.,43A03–1507–CR–843.
Citation54 N.E.3d 1055
Parties Lonny HODGES, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Richard J. Thonert, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

CRONE

, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] While on probation for other crimes, Lonny Hodges was charged with class C felony possessing chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and class D felony possession of methamphetamine. The evidence supporting these charges was discovered during a warrantless search of a garage on Hodges's property. Hodges filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless and suspicionless search violated his constitutional rights pursuant to both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court certified its decision at Hodges's request, and we accepted jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal. Finding no constitutional violation, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Hodges was convicted of certain unrelated crimes and, as part of his sentences, began serving probation on December 31, 2013. On that date, Hodges met with his probation officer, Rene Osborn, and reviewed the terms and conditions of his probation with her. He signed an acknowledgement of the conditions of his probation which provides in relevant part: “You waive your right against search and seizure, and shall permit a Probation Officer, or any law enforcement officer acting on a Probation Officer's behalf, to search your person, residence, motor vehicle, or any location where your personal property may be found, to insure compliance with probation.” Appellant's App. at 12.2 Just above Hodges's signature, the document reads:

I have read the foregoing Order of Court Specifying Conditions of Probation and Additional Conditions of Probation and have had them explained to me and by my signature, acknowledge receiving a copy of this document and agree to comply with the conditions of probation set forth above. I understand I have a right to request the Court for modification of any of my conditions if I can show just cause therefor.

Id. at 13.

[3] Prior to Hodges's probationary period, around late springtime 2013, Indiana State Police Senior Trooper Brandon McBrier conducted a traffic stop of an individual named Michael Meade. Meade identified himself as Hodges's brother-in-law and informed Trooper McBrier that Hodges had been manufacturing methamphetamine in a garage located on Hodges's property in Mentone. Meade described the location of Hodges's property to Trooper McBrier and described the property as consisting of a trailer with a detached garage. That summer, Trooper McBrier spoke to Sergeant Matt Rapp of the Kosciusko County Drug Task Force, who confirmed that the Task Force was aware of information that indicated that Hodges was manufacturing methamphetamine. Then, during the fall of 2013, Trooper McBrier conducted a traffic stop of a female driver who told him that Hodges was a methamphetamine “cook.” Tr. at 32

.

[4] Sometime in February 2014, Trooper McBrier ran a computer search of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine purchases and discovered that between 2007 and February 2014, Hodges made approximately sixty-six purchases. Hodges's wife made sixty-three purchases during the same time period. Trooper McBrier believed that the consistent pattern of purchases was indicative of individuals who are buying the drug to manufacture methamphetamine.

[5] Trooper McBrier subsequently learned that Hodges was on probation, so he spoke to Hodges's probation officer, Osborn, about the information that he had gathered about Hodges. Osborn decided that she wanted to visit Hodges at his home to check his compliance with the probation conditions. She asked Trooper McBrier to accompany her due to his experience with the hazardous chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, and they decided that the home visit would occur on February 27, 2014. However, when Hodges appeared a day early for his probation appointment on February 26, Osborn decided to conduct the home visit with Hodges right after the appointment, and she contacted Trooper McBrier. Osborn required Hodges to submit to a drug test, and then she, Trooper McBrier, and Hodges proceeded to the address in Mentone that Hodges had provided to probation as his home address. Appellant's App. at 11.

[6] When they arrived at Hodges's property, Hodges informed Osborn and Trooper McBrier that his home had burned down and that only the detached garage was left. He stated that he was actually living in his in-laws' home, which was approximately 100 yards away from the garage. Trooper McBrier noticed that snow had been removed from the drive into the garage. Osborn told Hodges that she wanted to search the garage, and Hodges opened the door. Trooper McBrier and Osborn entered the garage and searched it. They found a twelve-gauge shotgun and several clumps of a white crystal-like substance, as well as numerous chemicals, precursors, and other items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Osborn later took Hodges to his in-laws' residence and searched his bedroom and a vehicle, but found nothing noteworthy.

[7] On March 7, 2014, the State charged Hodges with class C felony possessing chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and class D felony possession of methamphetamine. Hodges filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his garage, arguing that the warrantless and suspicionless search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

. Following a hearing, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions thereon denying the motion to suppress. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “When reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, we view conflicting factual evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling but we will also consider substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Wertz v. State, 41 N.E.3d 276, 279 (Ind.Ct.App.2015)

, trans. denied. However, the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.

[9] “Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article [1], Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require in general that searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2010)

(footnotes omitted), cert. denied (2011).3 “And both this jurisdiction and the federal courts have recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. “When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search.” Sugg v. State, 991 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.2013)

, trans. denied. With regard to the Fourth Amendment, our supreme court in Schlechty recognized that “a warrantless search may be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion to believe that the probationer has engaged in criminal activity and that a search condition is one of the terms of probation.” 926 N.E.2d at 6 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) ).

[10] In the current case, Hodges asserts that the warrantless search of his garage was unconstitutional because it was not based upon reasonable suspicion that he had violated his probation or was engaged in criminal activity and also because the search condition contained in the rules of his probation is invalid. The State maintains that the search complied with constitutional dictates and that the need for reasonable suspicion was obviated because Hodges waived his rights as to search and seizure and agreed, by virtue of the terms and conditions of his probation, to warrantless and suspicionless searches of his property. Although Hodges's motion to suppress alleged that the search violated both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11

, he appears to have abandoned his Fourth Amendment challenge on appeal and asserts only that the search violated Article 1, Section 11. Thus, we address the arguments presented under our state constitution.

The search of the garage did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

.

Section 1—Reasonable suspicion is not required for probation searches conducted pursuant to a valid search condition.

[11] We first address Hodges's claim that the search of his garage was unconstitutional because it was not based upon reasonable suspicion. In State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775 (Ind.2015)

, a Fourth Amendment case, our supreme court very broadly held that “Indiana probationers and community corrections participants who have consented or been clearly informed that the conditions of their probation or community corrections program unambiguously authorize warrantless and suspicionless searches, may thereafter be subject to such searches during the period of their probationary or community corrections status.” Id. at 779. The Vanderkolk court specifically distinguished its prior decision in Schlechty, also a Fourth Amendment probation search case, stating that although we noted that reasonable suspicion existed” in Schlechty, we did not hold that reasonable suspicion was an essential prerequisite to a search of a probationer whose conditions of probation contained a valid search condition.” Id. The crux of the Vanderkolk holding is that a probation search need not be supported by reasonable suspicion and may be predicated solely upon a valid search condition contained in the conditions of probation. Thus,...

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4 cases
  • Fultz v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 29 Enero 2021
    ...favorable to the ruling but we will also consider substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.'" Hodges v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1055, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (quoting Wertz v. State, 41 N.E.3d 276, 279 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied). We determine whether the record conta......
  • Neibert v. Perdomo
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 18 Mayo 2016
  • State v. Ellis
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 2021
    ...informed Hodges that he was waiving his rights against searches without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 309, 311 (citing 54 N.E.3d 1055, 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ). In following Hodges , the panel here rejected the reasoning and outcome in Jarman v. State , where another Court of Appeals pane......
  • State v. Ellis
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 10 Agosto 2020
    ...probationary or community corrections status . Id. at 779 (emphasis added).[14] After Vanderkolk , our Court decided Hodges v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), which we find persuasive. In Hodges , the defendant signed the following acknowledgement of the terms of his probation: ......

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