Hodgin v. Jefferson

• Citation: 447 F. Supp. 804
• Decision Date: 13 March 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. N-77-1277.
• Parties: Mary B. HODGIN, on her behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Robert D. JEFFERSON, Richard W. Phoebus, Security Savings and Loan and Robert D. Jefferson, Individually.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

447 F. Supp. 804

Mary B. HODGIN, on her behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Robert D. JEFFERSON, Richard W. Phoebus, Security Savings and Loan and Robert D. Jefferson, Individually.

Civ. A. No. N-77-1277.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 13, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barry J. Dalnekoff and Harold A. MacLaughlin, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

John E. Sandbower, III and Joseph M. Roulhac, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

NORTHROP, Chief Judge.

By her complaint, plaintiff Mary Hodgin has charged her former employer, defendant Security Savings and Loan Association, and several Security officers with discriminating against her and other women on the basis of sex. Plaintiff's complaint is based upon Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), the "Ku Klux Klan" Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970), and several sections of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq. (1970). Jurisdiction is based upon the following statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1343, (civil rights jurisdiction, specifically § 1985); 28 U.S.C. § 2201, (granting jurisdiction in declaratory judgment cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), (jurisdiction for Title VII cases); and although plaintiff has incorrectly denominated jurisdiction as 29 U.S.C. § 217, the Court will correct this to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (granting jurisdiction for suits involving back pay claims under § 206).

Presently before the Court are three defense motions: defendants have moved (1) to dismiss the complaint in all or in part; (2) to strike plaintiff's election of a jury trial; and (3) to dismiss the case as a class action or for partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the briefs filed by both sides, engaged in a thorough study of the applicable law and will now rule on the pending motions. First, a brief summary of the facts, as alleged in the complaint, is in order.

I. The Complaint

Plaintiff began her employment with defendant Security Savings and Loan (Security) on February 26, 1974. During her employment, she performed various administrative and managerial duties as Head Teller for Security. Plaintiff was offered a position as an Assistant Branch Manager, but at a salary lower than Security's stated minimum rate. Despite requests to defendant Jefferson, Assistant Treasurer and Assistant Secretary of Security, her salary was not raised. Plaintiff resigned, and her resignation became effective November 15, 1974. Plaintiff charges that the discriminatory practices of Security in general, and the refusal by Security to pay her the stated minimum rate in particular, caused her constructive termination.

Plaintiff filed charges of sex discrimination against Security with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E. O.C.) on November 7, 1974. Plaintiff received a "right to sue" letter from the E.E.O.C. on May 6, 1977, and she filed this action on August 3, 1977. The complaint alleges a practice by defendants of discriminating against women as a class by offering them less compensation and benefits, and discouraging them from attempting to advance themselves. At the same time, defendants allegedly granted proportionally greater benefits to men and offered men training opportunities not offered to women. This practice of discrimination is alleged to have been in effect on or before February 26, 1974, and has continued to the present time.

II. The Motion to Dismiss

Defendants have moved to dismiss the entire complaint, or in the alternative, to (1) dismiss the § 1985 claim, (2) to dismiss the Fair Labor Standards Act claim, and (3) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent that it asks for liquidated and exemplary damages.

It is clear that when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, (as here), the Court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle plaintiff to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Thus, the Court need only test the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint. Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Court cannot conclude that there are no facts upon which plaintiff could recover. Therefore, the Court will proceed to examine defendants' specific grounds for their motion.

A. The § 1985 Claim

In her complaint plaintiff has charged defendants Jefferson, Phoebus and other unnamed male employees of Security with conspiring to deprive women of their equal rights by advancing similarly skilled men and women at disparate rates; by compensating men and women unequally; by engaging in discriminatory hiring practices, and other unlawful activities. As an overt act of this conspiracy, plaintiff alleges that defendants offered her a salary at a rate lower than the rate paid to a similarly situated male predecessor.

Defendants have moved to dismiss this count, arguing that as a matter of law plaintiff has not stated a cause of action. Specifically, defendants first assert that a conspiracy has not properly been alleged. Defendants maintain that if the male employees of Security indeed discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her sex, they were acting as agents of the corporation. Thus, no conspiracy would be made out since the only actor would be the corporation.

A review of the case law reveals that there is a split of authority on this question. Compare Girard v. 94th & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 2173, 48 L.Ed.2d 798 (1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); with Dupree v. Hertz Corp., 419 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Pa.1976); Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F.Supp. 607 (W.D.Pa.1975). This Court concludes that the better reasoned cases are those that have held that a conspiracy claim can be alleged under these circumstances.

Individuals are not immune from liability under § 1985(3) merely because the same corporation employs them. Since such individuals remain liable for their own actions during non-business hours, it follows that their unauthorized acts in furtherance of a conspiracy may state a claim under § 1985(3). Thus, while authorized acts of the officials would constitute corporate action, (and hence would avoid a conspiracy charge), unauthorized acts would not.

Reading the complaint liberally, it appears plaintiff has charged that defendant Jefferson ignored the stated policies and established rates of Security in denying plaintiff her requested salary. Thus, his alleged actions appear unauthorized by Security. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a conspiracy within § 1985(3) has been sufficiently pled.

Defendants have additionally argued that "the complaint fails to allege the necessary intent on the part of the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of equal rights on the basis of some invidiously discriminatory animus," citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971).

In Griffin, the Supreme Court delineated the requirements for a § 1985(3) claim. One must (1) conspire (2) for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) by an overt act (4) causing injury. In Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted § 1985(3)'s relationship to Title VII. The Fourth Circuit held that private discrimination does not violate the "equal protection of the laws" segment of § 1985(3) since that phrase refers to the fourteenth amendment, which requires state action. Thus, unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that the private discrimination contravenes a privilege or immunity granted by the laws of the United States, he cannot state a claim within § 1985(3).

The Fourth Circuit next considered whether a Title VII claim could be enforced by § 1985(3). Finding that the Title VII procedures constituted the exclusive method by which such claims could be brought, the court held that § 1985(3) is not an available mechanism to enforce rights created by Title VII.

Accordingly, this Court must conclude that plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim must be dismissed unless she has pled a violation of her "privileges and immunities" separate and distinct from her Title VII claim. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., supra at 1334; accord McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court concludes that plaintiff's claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), constitutes such a violation.

As will be discussed below, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of § 206(d). Thus, it is possible for defendants to have conspired to deprive her of her right to equal pay for equal work in violation of § 1985(3). Plaintiff has satisfied this component of a § 1985(3) claim.

The final requirement of Griffin is that the conspiracy be one motivated by "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus . . .." Griffin, supra 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. The issue presented is whether sex discrimination constitutes such an animus within the purview of § 1985(3). The Fourth Circuit has left this issue open. Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972). A number of other circuit courts have also reserved the question. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977); Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975). There is a substantial body of case law supporting either viewpoint. However, the Court believes that the modern trend is towards expanding the scope of class-based conspiracies which fall within the purview of § 1985(3). The argument for such an expansion was ably put forth recently by Judge Gignoux in Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee, 435 F.Supp. 1063 (D.Me.1977). The court there found that...