Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corporation

Decision Date29 June 1973
Docket NumberNo. 73-1008.,73-1008.
Citation482 F.2d 529
PartiesJames D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant, v. ELK GARDEN CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Jacob I. Karro, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Labor (Alfred G. Albert, Acting Sol. of Labor, Carin Ann Clauss, Associate Sol., Sandra P. Bloom, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., and Marvin M. Tincher, Regional Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief) for appellant.

John H. Thornton, Jr., Roanoke, Va., (Carr L. Kinder, Jr., and Woods, Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellees.

Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and FIELD, Circuit Judges.

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal questions the entitlement of an employer of agricultural labor to exemption from the minimum wage and recording requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act1 on the ground that its employees are principally engaged in the range production of livestock. The district court granted the exemption. The Secretary appealed, and we reverse.

I

The issue concerns the interpretation and application of an exemption which provides that the payment of minimum wages and the maintenance of records shall not apply with respect to any employee who is "principally engaged in the range production of livestock."2 In resolving this issue we must apply the canon that "exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit." Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960); accord, Schultz v. W.R. Hartin & Son, Inc., 428 F.2d 186, 189 (4th Cir.1970).

The employer asserts that the range production exemption should be available to any cattleman if his employees produce only beef for sale by grazing on native grasses and raise only forage crops for the production of beef. The district court rejected this broad reading of the Act. It ruled that the land on which the cattle were produced must be classified as range to obtain the exemption. Concluding that the employer's land satisfied the statute's requirement in this respect and that the employees were principally engaged in producing livestock, it granted the exemption. Our interpretation of the statute differs from the district court's. It is not enough, we hold, to show merely that the land can be classified as range and that the employees are principally engaged in producing livestock. To secure the exemption the employer must additionally show that the employees' duties make the computation of their working hours extremely difficult. In this case, proof of this essential element of the exemption is absent.

Because the Act does not define range production of livestock, we must look to its legislative history for guidance. Attempts to construe the exemption on the basis of the meaning of each of its words are not particularly helpful. While "production of livestock" may be easily defined, the word "range" is susceptible of a great number of meanings, both simple and technical. Moreover, review of the legislative history discloses that the entire phrase "range production of livestock" was intended to designate a method of raising livestock, not simply the type of land on which the employees work.

The original House bill as reported from committee contained no livestock production exemption. An amendment was offered on the floor to exempt the production of livestock "on any farm or ranch" based on the irregularity of the working hours of the employees and the impracticability of keeping records.3 This broad exemption was not adopted.

When the House bill reached the Senate, it was amended in committee to incorporate an exemption for the range production of livestock, which, it was estimated, would affect about 10,000 employees.4 This amendment was the subject of extensive debate on the Senate floor. The proponents stressed the restrictive nature of the exemption and the difficulty of recording the hours of employees who worked at irregular times far away from headquarters. Senator Fannin, a member of the committee which reported the bill, said:

"The intent of this particular amendment is restrictive. It would not apply only to large ranches; it could also apply to small ranches in the West which have large acreages — perhaps several hundred or several thousand acres and a few head of stock. Perhaps there may be 25 or more acres to 1 head of stock. Thus, the amendment is not intended to apply to feed lots or to any area where the stock involved would be near headquarters. In other words, employees might be away from headquarters for weeks at a time on the range.
"A good illustration would be the Basque sheepherders who are brought to this country from Spain. They are away from headquarters for long periods of time, herding sheep. It is impractical for them to keep time or to control their hours of work. They may be in sleeping bags at night, and they may have to get up in the middle of the night because of predatory animals attacking the sheep; then they would go out to work again. Of course, that is not the common kind of farmwork in this country, such as the work in Kentucky, for example. They could be on vast ranches, but not necessarily so. This could also occur on the small ranches."5

Senator Javits, another committee member, identified that exempt employee as "the cowboy — the range livestock employee as we call him in a rather fancy way."6

The Bill, as amended by the committee, was passed by the Senate and adopted by the conference.7 After passage, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the agency charged with the administration of the Act, issued the Farmer's Guide to the Agricultural Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which discussed the range production exemption.8 The Guide's interpretation is consistent with the legislative history. Emphasizing that the exemption applies only where computation of the employee's working hours would be extremely difficult, the Guide flatly states that the exemption does not apply "to any area where the stock involved would be near headquarters."

In the district court and on appeal, the argument concerning the proper interpretation to be given the statutory exemption largely revolved around the question of whether "range" exists east of the Mississippi River. The Secretary insists that the land on which the employers conduct their operations is pasture, not range. He points out that recognized authorities do not classify any of Virginia's land as range.9 The employer asserts that the land on which it grazes cattle, though formerly wooded, satisfies the description of range mentioned in the Farmer's Guide.10 In addition, the employer emphasizes that the forage is managed similar to range vegetation.

We think that the parties' concentration on the technical definition of range furnishes an unsatisfactory basis for interpreting the statute. The case provides an appropriate instance for the court to follow Judge Learned Hand's instruction about statutory interpretation:

"Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."11

Fortunately, the purpose or object of the statutory exemption is expressly stated in the Senate Report:

"The committee intends to exempt only those employees who are engaged in activities which require a constant attendance on a standby basis, such as herding and similar activities where the computation of hours worked would be extremely difficult."12

We conclude, therefore, that when Congress used the phrase "range production of livestock," it intended to describe a method of raising cattle or sheep in which the computation of the hours worked by employees caring for the stock would be extremely difficult. The fact that the animals are grazed on a range is not in itself controlling. The characteristics of the land become significant only when grazing involves dispersal of the stock over such a large area that the employees must be in constant attendance on a standby basis so far from headquarters that their working hours cannot be readily recorded. In final analysis, as the Senate Report clearly shows, exemption must be determined by the nature of the employees' work, not simply by the nature of the land. A proper interpretation of the statute requires us to examine the terrain on which the cattle are raised only for determining whether its characteristics require employees to work in such a manner that computation of their hours is difficult.

II

The employer, Garvey Ranch Management, Inc. operates three farms — Elk Garden, Cochener, and Big Lonely-Tomahawk — in mountainous areas of western Virginia. All the farms are used to graze breeding cows whose calves are sold after they have been weaned. Elk Garden consists of 3,700 acres, of which 296 are cultivated. It is fenced into 14 tracts, the largest encompassing 300 acres. As of December 1970, it contained 1,057 head of cattle, giving it a stocking ratio of 3.5 acres per head. Cochener, which is fenced into 11 tracts, has 4,212 acres, including 218 under cultivation. It had 835 cattle with a stocking ratio of 5 acres per head. Big Lonely-Tomahawk consists of two tracts 9 miles apart containing 3,300 acres and 4,900 acres. On both tracts, a total of 320 acres are cultivated. There were 901 head of cattle on the combined tracts with a stocking ratio of 9.1 acres per...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Prakash v. American University
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • February 10, 1984
    ...See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295, 79 S.Ct. 756, 759-760, 3 L.Ed.2d 815, 819 (1959); Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corp., 482 F.2d 529, 531 (4th Cir.1973); Usery v. Yates, 565 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.1977); Marshall v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 458 F.Supp. 709, 719 (D.M......
  • Ruiz v. Fernandez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Washington
    • June 7, 2013
    ...regulations and case law to apply when the employee's primary duty is in the range production of livestock. Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corp., 482 F.2d 529, 530–31 (4th Cir.1973);29 C.F.R. § 780.329(a). In addition, the employee's work must require “a constant attendance on a standby basis, such ......
  • Hispanic Affairs Project v. Acosta
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • July 7, 2017
    ...for shepherds by sponsors of the FLSA, as well as case law involving the FLSA exemption. Id. at 27–28 (quoting Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corp., 482 F.2d 529, 531 (4th Cir. 1973) ). In Hodgson, the Fourth Circuit explained that "[t]o secure the [FLSA] exemption the employer must ... show that th......
  • Rau v. Darling's Drug Store, Inc., Civ. A. No. 74-184.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • January 31, 1975
    ...388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960); Brennan v. Bill Kirk's Volkswagen, 497 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corporation, 482 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Parnham, 366 F.Supp. 1014 Plaintiff here contends that the exemption from overtime under the term "bona ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT