Hodgson v. Maison Miramon, Inc., Civ. A. No. 70-3373.
| Decision Date | 05 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 70-3373. |
| Citation | 344 F. Supp. 843 |
| Parties | James D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor v. MAISON MIRAMON, INC. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Murray A. Battles, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.
David E. Cooley, Jr., Fritchie, Cooley & Guth, Slidell, La., for defendants.
Pursuant to statutory authority conferred by 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) and § 217, the Secretary of Labor brought this action to enjoin the defendants, Greenbriar Nursing Home, Inc. and its officers, from violating the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq. (the Act). The Secretary maintains that Greenbriar employs male orderlies and female nurses' aides, who perform substantially the same work, but are paid different wages. It is undisputed that orderlies are paid approximately twenty to thirty cents an hour more than the aides; the Secretary contends that these wage differentials are in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1), in that they are not based upon a factor other than the sex of the defendants' employees, and that, in accordance with the requirements of the Act, the female aides are entitled to the same salaries paid the male orderlies. To remedy the alleged violations, the Secretary seeks by injunction to require compliance by defendant nursing home and its officers with the equal pay provisions of the Act and to require defendants to pay additional wages due female employees which have accrued from September 25, 1969.
In light of the Court's factual determinations and the applicable legal authorities, it is the Court's opinion that defendants have violated the equal pay provisions of the Act. Accordingly, plaintiff's requested injunctions against defendants are granted.
Defendant Greenbriar Nursing Home, Inc. (formerly Maison Miramon, Inc.) is a privately owned nursing home located in Slidell, Louisiana, which, in the main, houses geriatric patients, predominantly women1, requiring custodial care or convalescing from illness or injury. Incorporated in Louisiana, Greenbriar began doing business on September 22, 19692. Defendants Louis G. Miramon, Jr. and Louis F. Huesmann, are officers and shareholders of the defendant corporation, and, in such capacity, actively supervise, manage and direct the business affairs and operations of Greenbriar.3
The home is constructed of two wings, each of which has thirty semi-private bedrooms with connecting baths. There is a central lobby, as well as a large patio area immediately in front of the building. The home also has a large back lobby, dining and kitchen facilities, and laundry and storage rooms.
To accommodate the residents on the Greenbriar premises, the home is staffed twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, on a three-shift basis. A registered or practical nurse is in charge of each shift.
From its inception, the home has employed female nurses' aides and male orderlies to assist in the care of the Greenbriar patients. The aides and orderlies are generally responsible for the personal care and comfort of the Greenbriar patients and are usually assigned to the care of female and male patients, respectively. The basic duties of each include the feeding of patients, brushing and combing of their hair; making beds; changing, turning, and lifting patients; securing and emptying bed pans; and assisting patients in and out of bed. When needed, and as available, the aides and orderlies assist each other.
The number of aides and orderlies on duty at a given time varies according to shift. Although there is generally one orderly on duty at all times, the number of aides working on a shift ranges from two aides on the night shift to four or five aides on the day shift.4 However, there is no salary differential based upon the shift worked by an employee; uniformly, the orderlies receive higher salaries than the aides. At issue is the Secretary's contention that the aides should be paid the same salaries as the orderlies, because they do equal work.
Section 206(d) (1) of 29 U.S.C. provides:
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex; Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
In equal pay disputes, it is well-established that the Secretary bears the burden of proving that male and female employees perform equal work, but receive unequal compensation. If the Secretary sustains this burden, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that some criteria existed for wage discrimination other than the sex of the employees. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (C.A. 3, 1970), cert. den., 398 U.S. 905, 90 S.Ct. 1696, 26 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970); Shultz v. First Victoria National Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (C.A. 5, 1969).
The Act sets out four determinative factors to be used in deciding whether male and female employees must be paid the same wage: equal skill, responsibility, effort, and similarity of working conditions. Defendants concede that the duties of its aides and orderlies require equal skill and responsibility, but maintain that the roles of the aides and orderlies are distinguishable in terms of effort and working conditions, in that the orderlies perform additional duties, not called upon or undertaken by the aides.
In determining whether job duties entail "equal effort", this Court is bound to follow the rather stringent guidelines promulgated by the Fifth Circuit and to set out "thorough and specific" findings of fact based on those guidelines. Speaking for the Court of Appeals, Judge Ainsworth, in Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital, (C.A. 5, 1970), 436 F.2d 719, 725, stated that:
". . . jobs do not entail equal effort, even though they entail most of the same routine duties, if the more highly paid job involves additional tasks which (1) require extra effort, (2) consume a significant amount of the time of all those whose pay differentials are to be justified in terms of them, and (3) are of an economic value commensurate with the pay differential."
A non-jury trial was held primarily to determine whether the work done by the male and female Greenbriar employees involves equal effort and is performed under similar working conditions. The wages paid the Greenbriar employees were not in dispute.5 Numerous witnesses were called by the Secretary and the defendants to explain the nature of the work done by the aides and orderlies.6 The testimony was both repetitious and inconsistent; the statements made by a majority of the witnesses were obtrusively self-serving. The witnesses for the Secretary, and particularly the aides, were anything but reticent. However, from all the evidence presented, it is the opinion of the Court that the Secretary sustained his burden of proving that the work being performed by the aides and orderlies involves the same amount of effort, and is performed under similar working conditions.
It is clear from all the testimony that a substantial portion of the duties of the aides and orderlies at Greenbriar is the taking care of the personal needs of the female and male patients, respectively. However, as stated, the defendants maintain that the orderlies perform tasks—over and above routine patient care—which require additional effort. Accordingly, witnesses for the Secretary stressed the physical difficulties involved in the aides' duties. The aides testified that they, as well as the orderlies, lift patients and move heavy equipment such as oxygen tanks, carry laundry and arrange furniture in the patients' rooms. One aide stated that she cleaned windows, mopped, scrubbed, and waxed floors. All of the aides participate in some mopping activities made necessary by patients' incontinence or faulty operation of bathroom facilities. In fact, most aides explicitly stated that their labors are more demanding than their male counterparts, since they have proportionately more patients to assist than do the orderlies.
The orderlies testifying on behalf of the Secretary generally corroborated the testimony of the aides. Although acknowledging that they perform extensive mopping activity in the dining and kitchen areas, the orderlies stated that the aides perform virtually the same tasks as the orderlies. Also, there was testimony to the effect that the care of female patients is more difficult than the care of male patients, the females being generally less independent and more frequently in need of care.
To support its position that orderlies perform more strenuous duties than the aides, defendants presented the testimony of several male employees and nurses. The male employees testifying for defendants stated that, in addition to spending a great deal of time with the male patients, their activities also include delivering and returning patients to and from the home; returning patients who wander out of the building; moving heavy equipment; putting side rails on beds; assisting in post-mortem care; maintenance; operating floor buffers and mopping floors; changing air conditioning filters; cleaning up the dining...
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