Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 72-1028.

Decision Date22 August 1972
Docket NumberNo. 72-1028.,72-1028.
Citation466 F.2d 745
PartiesJames D. HODGSON, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY CLUB TOWER, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Michael H. Levin, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C. (Richard F. Schubert, Sol. of Labor, Carin Ann Clauss, Associate Sol., Donald S. Shire, and Major J. Parmenter, Regional Sol., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

G. Douglas Fox, Tulsa, Okl. (W. Thomas Coffman, of Gable, Gotwals, Hays, Rubin & Fox, Tulsa, Okl., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before BREITENSTEIN, HILL, and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

Claiming that the defendants-appellees are a single enterprise within the meaning of § 3(r) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Secretary sued to enforce the minimum wage, overtime, and record keeping provisions of the Act. The district court denied relief and the Secretary has appealed.

The facts were stipulated. In 1968, defendant-appellee Kin-Ark Company, Inc., a conglomerate, acquired two apartment buildings and a hotel in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, area. The hotel, Camelot Inn Motor Hotel, is owned and operated by Kin-Ark. Defendant-appellee University Club Tower, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kin-Ark, owns and operates University Club Tower, an apartment house. Defendant-appellee Mansion House, Inc., another wholly-owned subsidiary of Kin-Ark, owns and operates Mansion House Apartments. University Club and Mansion are adjacent to each other and are some five miles from Camelot. All three buildings are used for the rental of living space and the furnishing of the usual utilities and services. Camelot is a hotel which serves transients and has about 400 rooms. University Club and Mansion are apartment buildings which serve permanent and semipermanent tenants and have together about 420 apartments. The two apartment houses have a combined annual dollar volume of less than one million dollars, and Camelot has a similar volume in excess thereof. Each of these establishments has at least two employees who are regularly engaged in the production of goods for commerce. The operations are not unified; there is no interchange of employees; and there is no common bookkeeping.

Certain fundamental principles must be recognized. The Act was passed for humanitarian and remedial purposes, A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095; it must be liberally construed "to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction," Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U. S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 264, 3 L.Ed.2d 243; and breadth of coverage is vital to the Act's mission, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017. The purpose of the 1961 amendments, with which we are primarily concerned, was "to strengthen and extend the scope of the Act." Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 10 Cir., 365 F.2d 641, 643. Coverage by the Act, so far as pertinent here, includes enterprises engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s). An enterprise exists when there are (1) related activities (2) performed through unified operation or common control (3) for a common business purpose. 29 U. S.C. § 203(r). See also Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 10 Cir., 365 F.2d 641, 643. The issue is whether liberal construction to attain the Act's objectives brings the activities with which we are concerned within the definition of enterprise.

The question of unified management or common control may be quickly disposed of. The Secretary does not claim unified management. Camelot is owned by Kin-Ark and operated as a division of that company. University Club and Mansion are owned by wholly-owned subsidiaries of Kin-Ark and have common management. The offices of Kin-Ark and of the University Club-Mansion management group are both located in University Club. Ownership by different corporate entities is not determinative. Independent incorporation does not avoid the Act. See S.Rep.No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S.Cong. & Adm.News '66, 3002, 3009, and S. Rep.No.145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U. S.Cong. & Adm.News `61, 1620, 1660. Kin-Ark controls its subsidiaries. Separate management does not destroy common control. The requirement is the power of actual control, not the exercise of that power. Shultz v. Mack Farland & Sons Roofing Co., 5 Cir., 413 F.2d 1296, 1301. The three buildings may be controlled by Kin-Ark as it deems fit. See Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 10 Cir., 365 F.2d 641, 644. We are satisfied that the common-control requirement has been met.

The problems then are whether we have related activities and a common business purpose. These terms are not defined in the Act. The Senate Report on the 1961 amendments says that activities are related "when they are the same or similar" and goes on to include both horizontal and vertical structures. S.Rep.No.145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S.Cong. & Adm.News '61, 1620, 1660. With regard to common business purpose the Senate Report says only that nonprofit eleemosynary and like activities are not covered by common business purpose. Ibid. We have held that "the profit motive, standing alone, does not suffice to satisfy the common-business-purpose requirement." Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 10 Cir., 365 F.2d 641, 644.

The issue then is whether the activities are the same or similar and the business purpose is common. In the connotation in which it is used same means to us identical, and similar means like. Common is more difficult of definition but we believe that as used it means shared in like manner by members of the group. Before we apply the statutory language, another matter should be mentioned.

The 1966 amendments to the Act exempt from the maximum hours provisions of § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207, "any employee employed by an establishment which is a...

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  • Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 75-117-C.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma
    • 19 Mayo 1977
    ...activities (2) performed through unified operation or common control (3) for a common business purpose." Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1972). A. Common Control or Unified Operation. Here, as in University Club Tower, "the question of unified management......
  • Donovan v. I AND J, INC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 26 Mayo 1983
    ...Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512, 516-17, 93 S.Ct. 1138, 1141, 35 L.Ed.2d 463 (1973); see Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir.1972). The coverage of the Act is to be liberally construed "to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressi......
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    • 15 Enero 1998
    ...favor. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959); Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir.1972). The employer must prove applicability of an exemption by "clear and affirmative evidence." Donovan v. United Vi......
  • Wilson v. City of Charlotte, NC
    • United States
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    • 10 Julio 1989
    ...reaches consistent with congressional direction, and breadth of coverage is vital to the Act's mission. Hodgson v. University Tower Club, 466 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1972); see Mitchell v. Lublin McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 260, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959); Powell v. United States ......
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