Hodson v. Great Camp, Knights of the Modern Maccabees

• Decision Date: 03 February 1911
• Docket Number: No. 6,889.,6,889.
• Parties: HODSON v. GREAT CAMP, KNIGHTS OF THE MODERN MACCABEES.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

47 Ind.App. 113

93 N.E. 861

HODSON

v.GREAT CAMP, KNIGHTS OF THE MODERN MACCABEES.

No. 6,889.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Feb. 3, 1911.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Joseph County; Walter A. Funk, Judge.

Action by Anna M. Hodson against the Great Camp, Knights of the Modern Maccabees. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with instructions.

Jos. E. Talbot and Talbot & Talbot, for appellant. J. B. McIlwain, Daniel Pyle, and Anderson, Parker & Crabill, for appellee.

MYERS, C. J.

The appellant appeals from a judgment rendered on a verdict by the jury returned at the direction of the court. The overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial is assigned as error. Under this error we are called upon to review the action of the court in giving to the jury a peremptory instruction to find for the appellee.

The complaint in this action was founded upon a benefit certificate issued by the appellee,certifying that one William K. Hodson had been regularly admitted as a member of the appellee, and entitled to all the rights, benefits, and privileges of such membership; and at his death one assessment on the membership, not exceeding the sum of $2,000, will be paid as a benefit to Annie Mulligan Hodson, his wife. The complaint shows that on February 14, 1904, said William K. Hodson died, and that proofs of death were furnished to the appellee. Appellant is the beneficiary named in said certificate.

Appellee answered in three paragraphs. The first was a general denial. The second and third, in so far as the facts are material to the questions here presented, in substance, aver that the laws of appellee, together with the certificate of membership, formed the basis of the contract for beneficial membership, and that said laws, in force at the time of issuing said certificate, provided, in substance, that no benefit shall be paid under said certificate in case the said member shall come to his death from suicide within five years after his admission to life benefit membership. And in all cases where death results from suicide within five years after the admission to life benefit membership, whether the member is sane or insane at the time of death, the beneficiary of the member shall only be paid the amount of money which the member has paid in the life benefit fund. That said William K. Hodson came to his death from suicide within one year after becoming a member. Appellant replied to said affirmative paragraphs of answer, first, by a general denial, and by two additional paragraphs, each alleging facts tending to show that the deceased's death was accidental.

The certificate was the foundation of the action, and the laws of appellee were made a part of the certificate by reference only. From a careful examination of the evidence in the record before us, it is clear that the only issuable fact about which there was any dispute at the trial was whether the deceased committed suicide. This issue was tendered by the second and third paragraphs of answer. The burden was upon the appellee to establish this issue to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, and this appellee was required to do, not by a prima facie case alone, but by such proof as would withstand and overthrow all of the evidence to the contrary. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Nitterhouse, 11 Ind. App. 155, 38 N. E. 1110;Modern Woodmen of America v. Craiger (Sup.) 92 N. E. 113;Hale v. Life Indemnity, etc., Co., 61 Minn. 516, 63 N. W. 1108, 52 Am. St. Rep. 616. “The statements in the proof of death, either of facts or of opinion, are not conclusive.” Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Nitterhouse, supra.

While the evidence in this case tends strongly to support the theory that the deceased committed suicide, yet there is evidence from which a contrary inference of this fact might be drawn. Therefore, as said in the case of Modern Woodmen of America v. Craiger, supra: “In determining the charge of suicide, the jury may properly consider the facts and circumstances bearing upon that question given in evidence in the light of their common knowledge and experience that mankind instinctively love life and generally shun death, although occasionally men, both sane and insane, take their own lives. The cause of death was directly in issue in this case to be decided not by a presumption of law, but as an inference of fact by the jury, in the same manner as other facts are determined in...