Hoeck v. Tiedebohl

• Decision Date: 20 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 7359,KOB-TV and M,7359
• Citation: 74 N.M. 146,391 P.2d 651,1964 NMSC 79
• Parties: Marge HOECK, also known as Marge White ofarjorie R. Hoeck, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harriet TIEDEBOHL and Thomas M. Kromer, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 651

391 P.2d 651

74 N.M. 146

Marge HOECK, also known as Marge White of KOB-TV and Marjorie R. Hoeck, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harriet TIEDEBOHL and Thomas M. Kromer Defendants-Appellants.

No. 7359.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 20, 1964.

William B. Keleher, Keleher & McLeod, Russell Moore, Albuquerque, for appellants.

Virginia Malloy, R. Hugo C. Cotter, William R. Hendley, Albuquerque, for appellee.

COMPTON, Chief Justice.

The defendants appeal from a judgment entered against them in a libel action growing out of their publication of the following article appearing in the February, 1961, issue of a shopping news magazine in Albuquerque, New Mexico:

'Marge Hoeck (Marge White of KOB-TV) off on a six month jaunt * * * true story: persuaded to take a charm course by employees as standard procedure * * * is knitting little things as she and her husband expect an addition to an already half-grown family * * *.'

The plaintiff, Marge Hoeck, has been engaged in television work for KOB-TV. When the quoted article appeared she was neither married nor pregnant, although she had been married twice previously and was the mother of two grown sons. Nor was plaintiff at anytime ever prsuaded or required to take a charm course. She brought this action for libel charging malice and alleging, among other things, that since she was unmarried and not in need of a charm course, the article tended to render her contemptible and ridiculous in the public estimation and to expose her to public hatred, ridicule, scorn, contempt, shame and disgrace. She sought general and exemplary damages but alleged no special or actual damages, nor were any proven. The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action was denied and the cause was tried to a jury. The jury found for the plaintiff and the defendants have appealed.

The sole question to be determined is whether the words in the publication in question are libelous per se. It was on this theory that the action was instituted, the case submitted to the jury and the judgment entered on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, appellee here.

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the term libel per se is applied to words which are actionable because they are opprobrious in and of themselves without anything more. Stewart v. Ging, 64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d 333; Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, Inc., 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206; Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594. In the Del Rico case this court, in examining a publication to ascertain if it was libelous per se, stated:

'* * * In determining this question the article alone must be construed, stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances. To be libelous per se, the writing must be dafamatory on its face and such a meaning must be deduced 'within the four corners thereof.' * * * Furthermore the defamatory meaning must be the only one of which the questioned writing is susceptible. * * *

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'Furthermore, the statements claimed to be libelous, if such per se, must carry but a single meaning, and it an opprobrious or defamatory one. The language said to be libelous should be given its plain and natural meaning and be viewed by the court as other people reading it...