Hoefling v. City of Miami

Decision Date13 July 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 11–22358–CIV.
Citation876 F.Supp.2d 1321
PartiesJames Edward HOEFLING, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Ricardo Roque, and Jose Gonzalez, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Edward Hoefling, Jr., Miami, FL, Pro Se.

Warren Bittner, Miami City Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, Ronald Jay Cohen, Ronald J. Cohen, P.A., Miami Lakes, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (D.E. 37)

JOAN A. LENARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants City of Miami, Ricardo Roque, and Jose Gonzalez's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike Demand for Punitive Damages (“Motion,” D.E. 37), filed on January 27, 2012. Plaintiff James Edward Hoefling, Jr. filed his Response to the Motion (“Response,” D.E. 41) on February 17, 2012, to which Defendants filed their Reply on February 27, 2012 (“Reply,” D.E. 42). Upon review of the Motion, Response, Reply, and the record, the Court finds as follows.

I. Background1

This is a case related to the destruction of a vessel called the “METIS 0.” Plaintiff James Edward Hoefling, Jr. (Hoefling) owned the “METIS 0,” lived on the vessel, and stored all of his personal possessions on the vessel. Hoefling alleges that on August 20, 2010, two officers from the City of Miami Police Department's Marine Patrol Detail, Sergeant Jose Gonzalez (Gonzalez), and Officer Ricardo Roque (Roque), searched the “METIS 0” and subsequently ordered that the vessel be destroyed. Based on this order, the vessel and all of Hoefling's personal belongings, with the exception of a generator, were crushed and placed in a dumpster. Hoefling alleges that Gonzalez and Roque knew that Hoefling was the owner of the vessel, lived on the vessel, and that all of his possessions were on the vessel, and that their search and subsequent destruction of the vessel was “willful and intentional” and done “without legal authority.” ( See Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Hoefling also alleges that the officers searched and destroyed his vessel without providing him any “warning or notice” ( see id. ¶ 11); however, this assertion is contradicted by an exhibit attached to the original Complaint 2 (D.E. 1) and an exhibit attached to the Amended Complaint (D.E. 33).3

Plaintiff provided as an exhibit to his original Complaint a document entitled City of Miami Office of Code Enforcement NOTICE,” which was signed by Officer Alejandro Macias and dated May 27, 2010. (Compl., D.E. 1, Ex. 3 (Notice).) This Notice was attached to Plaintiff's vessel and informed Plaintiff that the vessel was unlawfully on the property. ( See id.)

Plaintiff provided as an exhibit to his Amended Complaint three City of Miami Police Department Incident Reports, dated May 27, 2010, August 20, 2010, and September 20, 2010 (Exhibit 3). The narrative from the May 27, 2010 City of Miami Police Department Incident Report shows that Hoefling had notice of the derelict condition of the vessel and provides the following description of the events:

Above listed sailboat with HIN No. FLZK9098D980 is derelict, in that it is left stored and abandoned in a substantially dismantled condition upon public state waters. Listed sailboat has no motor, sails, helm or rudder for propulsion or steering. On May 27, 2010 this officer contacted Mr. James Edward Hoefling Jr on the above listed boat about the condition of his vessel and advised him that it needs to be removed or brought into compliance with the law as per Florida State Statute 823.11.

Vessel is located at coordinates N25 42.962' W080 13.188'

*Note—Mr. Hoefling advised this officer that he is going to install an anchor light on the vessel and that he was going to comply with the law as soon as he is able.

(Am. Compl. Ex. 3 (May 27, 2010 Incident Report).) 45 The August 20, 2010 City of Miami Police Department Incident Report narrative, written by Officer Ricardo Roque, provides the following description of the events:

While conducting a derelict vessel cleanup in Dinner Key Marina the above listed item was found within the vessel scheduled for cleanup (D.V. Case # 100610–174788) and recovered. The vessel was covered in garbage, the above item was seem to possibly have value and then turned into property under the owners name.

(Am. Compl. Ex. 3 (August 20, 2010 Incident Report).) The report indicates that the item recovered from the vessel was a “red inverter.” ( Id.) The September 20, 2010 City of Miami Police Department Incident Report narrative provides the following description of the events:

On Friday August 20, 2010 Officer Ricardo Roque # 27435 observed vessel to still be in its derelict condition and had it removed from state waters and destroyed by a city contractor.

(Am. Compl. Ex. 3 (September 20, 2010 Incident Report).)

Hoefling's Amended Complaint contains four counts against Defendants City of Miami, Gonzalez and Roque: (1) “intentional destruction of Plaintiff's property,” (2) “negligent destruction of Plaintiff's property,” (3) “violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights of procedural due process,” and (4) “violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.” ( See id. ¶¶ 18–32.) The Amended Complaint also contains a “demand for punitive damages” that is [b]ased on Defendants' willful, wanton and egregious conduct” and Defendants' intentional disregard for Plaintiff's property rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” 6 ( Id. ¶ 33.)

On January 27, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint and, in the alternative, moved to strike the demand for punitive damages. (Motion, D.E. 37.) In their Motion, Defendants appear to make the following arguments: (1) the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it is a “shotgun pleading;” (2) Counts 1 and 2 should be dismissed because the general maritime law does not impose a duty of reasonable care upon a law enforcement officer with respect to the enforcement of the law; (3) Count 3 should be dismissed because Plaintiff has a post-deprivation remedy, and accordingly does not have a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) Plaintiff has no claim under the Fifth Amendment because that amendment only applies to the federal government; (5) Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for unreasonable seizure under the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) Gonzalez and Roque are entitled to qualified immunity; and (7) Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages against the City of Miami. ( See Motion 2–15.)

In response, Plaintiff appears to make the following arguments: (1) the Amended Complaint only contains four counts and thirty-three paragraphs and is therefore not a “shotgun pleading;” (2) because the Amended Complaint does not mention “enforcement of the law” the Court cannot consider the issue; (3) Plaintiff has pled this is a matter of admiralty and maritime law within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) Plaintiff has a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because he alleges that the officers acted under the color of state law when they searched and seized his vessel; (5) Gonzalez and Roque are not entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law required that the officers give Plaintiff notice before destroying his possessions,and the officers failed to do so; and (6) Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against Gonzalez and Roque. ( See Response 2–12.) Plaintiff also states that the references in the Amended Complaint to the Fifth Amendment were made “in passing” and that “no cause of action was filed regarding the Fifth Amendment.” ( Id. at 7.)

II. Legal Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Conclusory statements, assertions or labels will not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.2010) (setting forth the plausibility standard). In recent decisions, the Eleventh Circuit further advised that courts may make reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor, but they are not required to draw plaintiff's inference. Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola, 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir.2009) (quotations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has set forth a heightened pleading standard for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stating as follows:

[T]his circuit, along with others, has tightened the application of Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] with respect to § 1983 cases in an effort to weed out nonmeritorious claims, requiring that a § 1983 plaintiff allege with some specificity the facts which make out its claim. Thus, a plaintiff must allege some factual detail as the basis for a § 1983 claim.... [I]n a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.

Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762–63 (11th Cir.2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

III. DiscussionA. Qualified Immunity

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Roque and Gonzalez assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the non-constitutional tort claims (Counts 1 and 2) and the claims based on violations of the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments (Counts 3 and 4).7

1. Constitutional Claims (Counts 3 and 4)

“Because qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand...

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