Hoehn v. Donovan, 82-7494

• Decision Date: 27 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-7494,82-7494
• Citation: 711 F.2d 899
• Parties: Albert J. HOEHN, Petitioner, v. Honorable Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 899

711 F.2d 899

Albert J. HOEHN, Petitioner, v. Honorable Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Respondent.

No. 82-7494.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 12, 1983.

Decided July 27, 1983.

Warren Jensen, Arcata, Cal., for petitioner.

Dennis A. Paquette, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Secretary of Labor.

Before MERRILL, SNEED and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Title II of the Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-250, §§ 201-213, 92 Stat. 163, 172-82 (1978), ¹ provides economic benefits for certain forest industry workers whose jobs are lost because of the 1978 expansion of the Redwood National Park. Petitioner applied for benefits under Title II after being laid off by Gene's Machine Works (GMW), a machine shop that makes and repairs parts for sawmills in the area. Petitioner's application was ultimately denied by the Secretary of Labor (Secretary). ² Our jurisdiction exists under 16 U.S.C. § 79l (h). The petition for review of the Secretary's decision is denied.

I.

ANALYSIS

Title II provides benefits to employees who are laid off by an "affected employer." § 201(11). The Secretary denied petitioner's application on the ground that his employer, GMW, is not an "affected employer" as that term is defined in the Act. Ordinarily, this interpretation of the statute by the agency charged with its administration would be entitled to considerable deference. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). The Redwood Act, however, modifies our standard of review. See Lanning v. Marshall, 650 F.2d 1055, 1057 n. 4 (9th Cir.1981). Section 213(f) directs the Secretary to construe provisions of the Act in the manner most favorable to employees whenever two or more constructions of the language are reasonable. Thus, on petition for review, we must determine whether there are two or more reasonable interpretations, and, if so, whether the Secretary has adopted the interpretation most favorable to employees. Rains v. Donovan, 702 F.2d 182, 183 (9th Cir.1983).

The disputed interpretation here concerns section 201(6) of Title II. That provision states that to be "affected" an employer must be "engaged in the harvest of timber or in related sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing operations...." ³ The Secretary consistently has construed this provision to include only those entities that perform one of the steps directly involved in the process of converting new timber into finished lumber. See Bradford v. Donovan, 695 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir.1982). Thus petitioner's employer, a machine shop that makes and repairs sawmill parts but does not participate directly in lumber production, was held not to be an affected employer.

This is a reasonable interpretation. The question, however, is whether the petitioner's is also reasonable. He advocates a construction of section 201(6) that would embrace all industries providing goods and services to those "engaged in the harvest of timber or in related sawmill, plywood, and other wood processing operations." He contends that since the maintenance of sawmill equipment is a necessary adjunct to sawmill operations then GMW does engage in sawmill operations. We disagree; it only services those who so engage. GMW is one step removed from the processing of timber in the same way as are auto shops that repair logging trucks and utilities that provide power to the mills. Construing the Redwood Act to cover petitioner would extend its benefits beyond the lumber industry itself, and thus beyond the plain meaning of section 201(6). Therefore, petitioner's interpretation is not reasonable.

We have previously affirmed the construction of section 201(6) advanced by the Secretary here. In Bradford v. Donovan, 695 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.1982), we rejected the contention that the transportation of finished lumber is reasonably viewed as "other wood processing operations":

The Railroad was not involved in harvesting raw timber or in the further processing of timber into a marketable lumber product. A construction of the statute as entitling the employees of the Railroad or the buyers to the benefits of the Act would be without any foundation.

Id. at 411. The same is true here. GMW neither operates a sawmill nor performs any other step required to process raw timber into lumber. As such, we hold that a construction of section 201(6) entitling machinists employed by GMW to Redwood Act benefits would be unreasonable. The unusual standard of review created by section 213(f) does not give us the authority to amend section 201(6).

Petitioner argues that laid-off employees of GMW should be eligible for Redwood Act benefits because equipment repair workers employed directly by affected mill and woods employers are eligible. We rejected...