Hoekstra v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2023
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-562
• Parties: ANNETTE SUE HOEKSTRA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

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ANNETTE SUE HOEKSTRA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-562

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

January 11, 2023

JANE M. BECKERING, J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SALLY J. BERENS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.

Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's decision, arguing that it is not supported by substantial evidence.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals, I recommend that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v Sec'y of Health and Human Servs. 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Fact finding is the Commissioner's province, and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In applying this standard, a court must consider the evidence as a whole, while accounting for any evidence that fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard contemplates a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and precludes reversal simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff previously filed applications for DIB and SSI on January 9, 2015. Those claims were denied by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Manh H. Nguyen on June 29, 2017. (PageID.77-88.) Plaintiff filed her instant applications for DIB and SSI on September 24, 2019, alleging that she had been disabled since October 15, 2014, due to asthma, repetitive stress disorder/overuse syndrome - ulnar neuro, migraine headaches, generalized anxiety disorder, hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis in lower back and both knees, and gastroparesis. (PageID.98-99, 191-94, 328-33, 335-44.) Plaintiff subsequently amended her onset date to September 5, 2017. (PageID.167, 487.) Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an ALJ.

On March 3, 2021, ALJ Robert Tjapkes held a hearing and received testimony from Plaintiff and Michelle Ross, an impartial vocational expert (VE). (PageID.40-71.) On April 12, 2021, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because she was not disabled from her amended alleged onset date through the date of the decision. (PageID.167-81.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 14, 2022. (PageID.26-29.) Therefore, the ALJ's ruling became the Commissioner's final decision. See Cook v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432,434 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff timely initiated this civil action for judicial review on June 17, 2022.

ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION

The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).^[1] If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functional capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).

After determining that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 2019, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset date of September 5, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments of arthritis of the bilateral hands; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; gastroesophageal reflux disease and hiatal hernia status post hernia surgeries; deep vein thrombosis of the right lower extremity; bilateral ankle sprains; fibromyalgia; bilateral sensorineural hearing loss; migraines;

5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)). sinusitis, and obesity. (PageID.170.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.172-74.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that she:

can stand and/or walk for four hours during an eight-hour workday. The claimant can occasionally crouch, crawl, kneel, balance, stoop and climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps and stairs. The claimant can frequently reach, handle and finger. She cannot work around hazards such as unprotected heights or unguarded, moving machinery. There can be no use of foot controls with the right lower extremity. The claimant can have occasional exposure to extremes of atmospheric conditions as defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations. She can be exposed to moderate levels of noise as defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations. The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks. She cannot perform any fast paced or production rate work.

(PageID.174.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a medical assistant (PageID.179), at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Based on testimony from the VE, the ALJ found that an individual of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC could perform the jobs of light assembler and folder, approximately 219,000 of which existed in the national economy. (PageID.180.) This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have deemed ‘significant'”). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises two issues in her appeal, which concern the ALJ's evaluation of the prior administrative medical findings by Saadat Abbasi, M.D., and Larry Jackson, M.D., and the medical opinion of Renee Salyer, PA-C. (ECF No. 11 at PageID.2074.) In addition, with regard to the assessment of the prior administrative findings, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have obtained an updated medical opinion to address medical evidence received later in the period under consideration, after Drs. Abbasi and Jackson completed their reviews of the medical record.

I. Medical Opinions

Because Plaintiff filed her application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated the...