Hoerner v. US Veterans Admin., Civ. No. S 87-2233.
| Decision Date | 22 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. S 87-2233. |
| Parties | Claude A. HOERNER, Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc., Lorie Leigh Pena, Anthony R. Decker, Robert K. Craddock, Jr., Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. UNITED STATES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, Thomas K. Turnage, Administrator of Veterans Affairs. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Cherif Sedky, Karla J. Letsche, Jeffrey B. Maletta, David T. Case, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Barton F. Stichman, Julia A. Trotter, Vietnam Veterans of America Legal Services, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Breckinridge L. Willcox, U.S.Atty., RoAnn Nichols, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., Richard E. Greenberg, Patrick Sorek, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
This is an action filed by a number of veterans, and a veterans' group, contesting certain benefit reduction actions taken by the Veterans Administration, in implementation of the so-called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, P.L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037. The Veterans Administration, like all federal executive and independent agencies, was faced with a 4.3 per cent reduction in programmatic funding (by sequestration), effective March 1, 1986. As one means of implementing this reduction, the Veterans Administration adopted a policy that prorata reduced certain veterans' benefits awarded after February 28, 1986. This had the effect of reducing educational and other veterans' benefits that plaintiffs received after March 1, 1986, even in respect of education pursued, and other benefit entitlements claimed to have arisen, prior to March 1, 1986. The defendants have moved to dismiss, and the plaintiffs have responded. No oral hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 6, D.Md.
Upon review of the complaint and the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
First, to the extent that the plaintiffs seek review of the individual benefit reductions made in their own cases, or to the extent they attack, on non-constitutional grounds, any "decisions of the Veterans Administrator, on any question of law or fact ...," this Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct ordinary judicial review. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1979); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165, 39 L.Ed. 2d 389 (1974).
Although, under the cited statute, as interpreted in Johnson, constitutional challenges to the Administrator's decisional processes are not insulated from judicial review, 415 U.S. at 366-74, 94 S.Ct. at 1165-69, this complaint does not state a constitutional claim that has any degree of viability. Plaintiffs argue an equal protection violation. Because the decision under attack did not implicate any question of suspect or invidious classification, the equal protection test to be applied is simply that of "rational basis." So long as the classification made administratively was a reasonable one, was not arbitrary, had a fair and substantial relation to the objectives of the legislation, and treated persons similarly situated alike, there is no violation of equal protection. Id. at 374-75, 94 S.Ct. at 1169-70; see also Judd v. Packard, 669 F.Supp. 741, 743 (D.Md.1987). There is nothing in the complaint, no matter how broadly construed in plaintiffs' favor, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that demonstrates irrationality in the decision under attack. In choosing to act as it did, the Administration simply decided to set a date after which benefit payments would be reduced. This choice was prima facie rational, especially given that any other approach (which also could have presented a rational alternative) would necessarily have detracted from someone else's benefits, and might have resulted in a total lack of funds for certain future beneficiaries, rather than a pro rata reduction for all. The fact that this Court or any other reviewing body might come to a different rational conclusion than the Administrator did, as well as the fact that an internal review in the Veterans Administration characterized the results of this action as "inequitable," is utterly beside the point under the applicable equal protection analysis. The question is not one of the wisdom of a particular choice, or even the inequity resulting from it; the question is merely whether the decision was rational. The purpose of this attenuated equal protection analysis of legislative and administrative classifications (that do not involve invidious or suspect classifications) is to allow the decision-maker to function within a broad range of discretion. This is especially important when the decision involves allocation of a scarce resource, which federal funding became upon enactment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This complaint provides no ground for judicial review, on an equal protection basis, of the decision challenged by the plaintiffs.
If the complaint is read as stating a claim for a taking of "vested rights without due process," it has no greater merit than if it is read as asserting an equal protection claim. Determining whether administrative procedures are mandated to satisfy the formal procedural due process requisites of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Three factors must be considered: the private interest that is affected by the decision; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures would create. Id. 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. With respect to the case of reduction or withdrawal of individual benefits in individual cases, courts have held that due...
To continue reading
Request your trial