Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 05 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | NO. Civ.A.1:01-CV-630-TWT.,Civ.A.1:01-CV-630-TWT. |
| Citation | 193 F.Supp.2d 1295 |
| Parties | Linda HOFFMANN-PUGH, Plaintiff, v. Patricia RAMSEY and John Ramsey, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Evan M. Altman, Office of Evan M. Altman, Atlanta, GA, Darnay Hoffman, pro hac vice, Law Offices of Darnay Hoffman, New York, NY, for plaintiff.
James Clifton Rawls, Eric Schroeder, S. Derek Bauer, Powell Goldstein Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, GA, L. Lin Wood, Jr., Office of L. Lin Wood, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.
This is a diversity action for defamation. It is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 9]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
This case arises out of the notorious murder of six year old JonBenet Ramsey on December 26, 1996 in Boulder, Colorado. Defendants are the parents of JonBenet. The murder has been the subject of intense media attention, books, novels, film and television. No one has been charged, indicted or arrested in connection with the crime. The case remains unsolved and the investigation open. The incidents occurring on the date of the crime and the days that followed have also been the subject of several civil actions involving possible suspects and the Defendants.
Plaintiff Linda Hoffmann-Pugh was a housekeeper employed by the Defendants at the time of the murder. She was allegedly investigated by the police as a suspect based upon statements made to police by the Ramseys, but was later cleared. She testified as a prosecution witness before a Boulder, Colorado grand jury investigating the murder. The Defendants made certain statements in a book published in March, 2000, that Plaintiff alleges were deliberately calculated to create the false impression that Plaintiff was the murderer of their daughter. In the book, the Defendants recount the investigation into the murder of their daughter. A killer is not named in the book nor do Defendants claim to know the identity of the killer. The book does, however, identify seven possible leads Defendants contend should be further investigated. Plaintiff is not named as a suspect and she does not fit the profile of the killer which is set forth in the book. John and Patsy Ramsey, The Death of Innocence: The Untold Story of JonBenet's Murder and How its Exploitation Compromised the Pursuit of Truth 165-68, 199-205, 310-11, 361-374 (2000).1
Plaintiff's Complaint asserts causes of action for libel and slander. The allegations include claims that the Defendants made statements in the book, along with unidentified statements "on television and in the printed media," meant to create the impression that Plaintiff murdered JonBenet Ramsey. (Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 28, 29). Plaintiff alleges such statements are false and designed to direct attention away from Defendant Patricia Ramsey, who Plaintiff alleges is the actual murderer. (Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 24).
In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants libeled her in the following passage from their book:
The police ask Patsy these same questions about who might have been angry or acting strangely, and she begins to think about our cleaning lady. Linda Hoffman-Pugh had called Patsy a couple of days before Christmas, very distraught and in tears. Linda said her sister, who was also her landlord, was going to evict her if she didn't come up with the past-due rent. She asked Patsy if she could borrow twenty-five hundred dollars to cover it. Patsy had consoled Linda and agreed to lend her the money. In fact, Patsy had intended to leave the check for Linda on the kitchen counter before leaving for Michigan; Linda would let herself in the house and pick it up while we were gone for the holidays.
Patsy remembers that her mother, Nedra Paugh, had said that Linda remarked to her at one time, "JonBenet is so pretty; aren't you afraid that someone might kidnap her?" Now these comments seem strangely menacing.
Finding the phone number in her digital Rolodex, Patsy tells a police officer where Linda lives in Ft. Lupton, Colorado. Patsy later tells me she was thinking, If it's Linda, it's okay, because she is a good, sweet person. She is just upset. She may need the money, but she won't hurt JonBenet.
The police tell us they will arrange for the Ft. Lupton police to drive by Linda's house to see if they notice anything unusual, but they don't want to alert anyone there that they are being watched.
Death of Innocence, supra, at 19-20 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff's claims and arguments revolve around this passage found in Defendants' book. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts could support the plaintiff's claims for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir.1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986). Under notice pleading, plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id.
Libel and slander are forms of defamation. "A libel is a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." O.C.G.A § 51-5-1. "Slander or oral defamation consists in ... [i]mputing to another a crime punishable by law ... [or][u]ttering any disparaging words productive of special damages which flows naturally therefrom." O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4. Claims for libel and slander must be brought within one year. O.C.G.A § 9-3-33. Georgia law sets out a distinct analytical framework defining the role of judge and jury in defamation cases:
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item ... should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If upon the other hand, it is capable of two meanings, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances surrounding its publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read.
Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 214 Ga. 422, 424, 105 S.E.2d 229 (1958) (quoting Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 149 F. 704, 706 (6th Cir.1907)).
Georgia law recognizes two categories of libel: libel per se and libel per quod. "Libel per se consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality" or injures one in their trade or profession:
Defamatory words which are actionable per se are those which are recognized as injurious on their face—without the aid of extrinsic proof. However, if the defamatory character of their words [does] not appear on their face but only become defamatory by the aid of extrinsic facts, they are not defamatory per se, but per quod, and are said to require innuendo.
Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Ass'n, 231 Ga. App. 685, 688, 500 S.E.2d 1 (1998) (quoting Macon Telegraph Pub. Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga.App. 719-723, 302 S.E.2d 692 (1983)). Thus, in Georgia, "words that are libelous per se do not need innuendo." Id. "Plain and unambiguous words that do not impute a crime cannot be enlarged and extended by innuendo." Farrior v. H.J. Russell & Co., 45 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1362 (N.D.Ga.1999), (citing Christian v. Ransom, 52 Ga.App. 218, 219, 183 S.E. 89 (1935)). Unlike libel per se, actions alleging libel per quod must set forth and prove "special damages," or the action must be dismissed. See Sumner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 200 Ga.App. 729, 730, 409 S.E.2d 212 (1991) ().
"Whether or not words, which are untrue in fact, are actionable depends on whether the covert meaning attributable to them is understood by the reader in the covert sense." Morrison v. Hayes, 176 Ga.App. 128, 129, 335 S.E.2d 596 (1985). "In considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look at what construction would be placed upon it by the average reader." Webster v. Wilkins, 217 Ga.App. 194, 195, 456 S.E.2d 699 (1995) (quoting Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 361, 362, 417 S.E.2d 16 (1992)). Thus, what the Plaintiff understood or the Defendants intended is irrelevant. "[C]ourts will not hunt for a strained construction in order to hold words being used as defamatory," id., and a reader's subjective decision to impute a defamatory meaning is not actionable as libel per se. Zarach, 231 Ga.App. at 688, 500 S.E.2d 1. When the alleged statements "[are] not ambiguous and can reasonably have but one interpretation," the question of whether the statements are defamatory is for the Court. Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 361, 362, 417 S.E.2d 16 ...
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...a person in his trade, office, or profession also constitutes slander per se. Id. § 51–5–4(a)(3); see also Hoffmann–Pugh v. Ramsey, 193 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1299 (N.D.Ga.2002). Although the statute referring to defamation per se speaks to slander and not libel, see O.C.G.A. § 51–5–4, “[t]he defi......