Hoffman v. Arcelormittal Pristine Res. Inc, 11cv0322

• Decision Date: 10 May 2011
• Docket Number: 11cv0322
• Parties: PAULA K. HOFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. ARCELORMITTAL PRISTINE RESOURCES, INC. and BETHELEHEM-CUBA IRON MINES, its successors and assigns, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

PAULA K. HOFFMAN, Plaintiff, v.ARCELORMITTAL PRISTINE RESOURCES, INC. and BETHELEHEM-CUBA IRON MINES, its successors and assigns, Defendants.

11cv0322

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: May 10, 2011

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Memorandum Opinion

I.Introduction

Before this Court in this declaratory judgment action are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.Doc. Nos. 12 and 13.Plaintiff, Paula K. Hoffman("Hoffman"), who filed an action in Washington County, Pennsylvania, which was properly removed to this Court, seeks a declaration that she is the rightful owner of all oil and gas (mineral rights) located beneath the 97 acre property that she(and her now deceased husband) acquired in North Bethlehem Township, Washington County, Pennsylvania in 1971.Defendants, Arcelormittal Pristine Resources, Inc.("Arcelormittal") and Bethelehem-Cuba Iron Mines ("BCIM") argue in the converse that under the plain language of numerous recorded deeds, that they have been the rightful and legal owners of all interests in oil and gas for a period of approximately 83 years.

After careful consideration of the parties dueling motions for summary judgment, and supporting documentation, and for the reasons that follow, the Court will grant defendants'motion for summary judgment, and will deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.¹To rule in Plaintiff's favor would be tantamount to an eradication of countless oil and gas estates and leases recorded in the history of this Commonwealth, and would profoundly change the landscape of property law as it has developed over hundreds of years.

II.Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is appropriate "'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Woodside v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130(3d Cir.2001), quotingFoehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 477(3d Cir.2001)(citations omitted).In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must "view the evidence... through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" to determine "whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of the evidence required by the governing law or that he did not."Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247(3d Cir.2002), quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254(1986).

When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's burden can be "discharged by 'showing' that is, pointing out to the District Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325(1986).If the moving party has carried this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party who cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586(1986);Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230(3d Cir.1993).Thus the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but instead must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,"Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion.Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460(3d Cir.1989)(citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 325(1986)).The non-moving party must respond "by pointing to sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact concerning every element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. Of Sterling, Inc., 142 F. 3d 639, 643 n. 3(3d Cir.1998), quotingFuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n. 1(3d Cir.1994).

"In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255(1986)."Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247(3d Cir.2004.)See alsoDoe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 446(3d Cir.2001)(court must view facts in the light most favorable, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts, in favor of the nonmoving party).

III.Material Facts

There are no genuine issues of material fact, only issues about the appropriate inferences and legal consequences of the undisputed material facts, and unless noted, the following facts are not disputed.

On or about July 21, 1924, Union Coal and Coke Company conveyed certain property, including the subject parcel, to BCIM by Deed dated same (hereinafter the "1924 Deed").The 1924 Deed was recorded at the Washington County Record of Deeds Office on September 23, 1924.Then, by Deed dated July 24, 1928("1928 Deed"), BCIM conveyed to Mary Kukovich, who is Plaintiff's immediate predecessor-in-title, certain rights in and to the parcel as outlined at paragraph 15 of the Complaint.

While defendants contend that the 1928 Deed, which is recounted in the Complaint at paragraph 16, excepted and reserved to ArcelorMittal Pristine (predecessor in title) all rights to the oil and gas within and underlying the parcel, plaintiff argues to the contrary.The Reservation Clause in the 1928 Deed states as follows:

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING, ALSO, to the Company, its successors and assigns, all gas and oil within and underlying said premises, with the right to enter thereon at any and all times for the purpose of drilling for and extracting the same, with the right to enter thereon at any and all time for the purpose of drilling for and extracting the same, with the right to erect and construct thereon and removing therefrom such derricks, drills, pipelines and other structures... as may be deemed by the company, its successors and assigns, to be either necessary or convenient in such drilling or extraction or in the transporting of any oil or gas recovered therefrom....

On May 6, 2003, Bethelehem's successor-in-interest conveyed by Deed ("2003 Deed") to ArcelorMittal Pristine all of BCIM's interest in the Parcel.Complaintat ¶ 4. Doc.No. 13-4.BCIM's interest in the Parcel was owned by a subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Corporation at the time of its bankruptcy, after which the interest was conveyed to Pristine Resources, Inc., thename of which was later changed to ArcelorMittal Pristine ResourcesInc. Doc. Nos. 1-1 and 134.²Under the heading "Partial Source of Title," the 1924 Deed is identified as the means by which BCIM acquired the Parcel from Union Coal and Coke Company. Doc.No. 13-4at 12.

By Deed dated July 31, 1971("1971 Deed"), plaintiff acquired her interest in the subject land, which Deed was recorded in the Washington County Recorder of Deeds Office at Deed Book Volume 1343, Page 903 and has been attached to the Complaint.Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶ 11.The 1971 Deed reflects a conveyance of the subject land from Mary Kukovich to George L. Hoffman(husband) and plaintiff, Paula K. Hoffman(wife).

Critically, the 1971 Deed (which is attached to Plaintiff's complaint) included the following limitation: "EXCEPTING AND RESERVING coal, oil and gas, and other minerals and mining and drilling rights, etc. as conveyed in prior instruments of record in the chain of title."Doc. No. 1-1at 11.

Notwithstanding the immediately hereinabove language in the 1971 Deed, on November 29, 1971plaintiff and her deceased husband entered into a lease with John T. Stoliker of Richmond, Michigan for the development of the oil and gas underlying the subject land.Said lease is also recorded in the Washington County Recorder of Deeds at Volume 1355Page 398 and a copy thereof is attached to plaintiff's complaint.Doc. No. 1-1, Exhibit 6, at 27.

Despite the language in the 1971 Deed, on August 25, 1981, plaintiff and her deceased husband again entered into a lease with Ashtola Production Company for the development of the oil and gas underlying the subject land.Said lease is also recorded at the Washington County Recorder of Deeds Office in Deed Book 2042Page 189, and a copy thereof is attached as an Exhibit to plaintiff's complaint.Doc. No. 1-1, Exhibit 5, at 24.

Finally, on April 1, 2006, plaintiff and her deceased husband leased the subject lands for the development of natural oil and gas with Atlas America, Inc.This lease is recorded at the Washington County Recorder of Deeds Office at Instrument number 200612898, and is attached as an Exhibit to Plaintiff's complaint.Doc. No. 1-1, Exhibit 4, at 29.Pursuant to this lease, the subject land has been surveyed and explored for the development of natural gas and oil.

On February 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas and an action to quiet title based upon her theory of adverse possession.Doc. No. 1-1.On March 30, 2011, defendants filed a timely notice of removal based upon diversity of citizenship.On March 18, 2011, the Court held a status conference and pursuant to the Scheduling Order entered same date, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on April 15, 2011.Also pending before this Court is Plaintiff's motion to dismiss on the basis that defendant Arcelormittal supposedly "lacks standing" to challenge title because defendant Arcelormittal has not demonstrated to plaintiff that it owns any interest or has any legitimate claim to any interest in Plaintiff's property.Doc. No. 20.

IV.Discussion

A.The 1928 Deed is Clear and Unambiguous

In...