Hoffman v. Augusta County

• Decision Date: 17 January 1966
• Parties: Jean Wilson Trimble HOFFMAN v. COUNTY OF AUGUSTA.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 249

146 S.E.2d 249

206 Va. 799

Jean Wilson Trimble HOFFMAN v. COUNTY OF AUGUSTA.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 17, 1966.

Benham M. Black, Staunton (Cochran, Lotz & Black, Staunton, on brief), for plaintiff in error.

No brief filed or argument for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C. J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.

CARRICO, Justice.

On December 27, 1962, Jean Wilson Trimble Hoffman, the petitioner, filed three petitions praying for the correction of allegedly erroneous assessments on three tracts of land owned by her in the county of Augusta. The first petition related to taxes assessed on the land for the year 1960; the second for the year 1961, and the third for the year 1962.

The court entered orders permitting the filing of the petitions. By agreement, the three petitions were consolidated for hearing and were considered as one petition.

The county filed no responses or pleas to the petition but on August 24, 1964, a final decree was entered stating that 'the question of statute of limitations having been previously raised * * * the Court * * * is of the opinion that' the petitions were 'not timely filed.' The decree dismissed the petitions from the docket and to that decree the petitioner was awarded a writ of error.

The petitioner contends that under Code § 58-1145 she had two years from the thirty-first day of December of each of the tax years in question, 1960, 1961 and 1962, within which to file her petitions. She says that since her petitions were filed on December 27, 1962, within the prescribed time in each instance, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the petitions.

We have not been favored with a brief on behalf of the county. For that reason, we are not informed as to what its position is with respect to this matter. Nor do we know, from the record, what argument the county advanced to the trial court to persuade it to dismiss the petitions.

It would appear, however, from the final decree, that the court was of opinion that petitioner should have sought relief within two years from the thirty-first day of December 1959, the year in which the last general reassessment of real estate became effective in the county. Under that view, December 31, 1961, would have been the last day for the filing of the petitions. Since they were not filed until December 27, 1962, the court apparently concluded that they were not timely filed.

If that was the basis upon which the petitions were dismissed, we cannot concur therein. We do not agree that the effective date of the last general reassessment was solely determinative of the time within which the petitioner was entitled to seek relief.

Code, § 58-1145, under which the petitions before us were filed, reads in its pertinent parts, as follows:

'Any person assessed with county or city levies or other local taxes on real estate, aggrieved by any such assessment, may, unless otherwise specially provided by law, within two years from the thirty-first day of December of the year in which any such assessment is made * * * apply for relief to the circuit court of the county or any city court of record of the city wherein such assessment was made. In such proceeding the burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer to show that the property in question is assessed at more than its fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform in its application * * *.'

In City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397 and St. Andrew's Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 630, 125 S.E.2d 864, this court ruled that the word 'assessment,' as used in Code, § 58-1145, had two meanings. It was held that in the first sentence of the Code section, "assessment' * * * can apply only to one thing, that is, the amount of the tax (the money) the individual is supposed to pay.' It was stated that in the second sentence, however, 'the word 'assessment' can only apply to the value of the property, and has nothing to do with the amount of the tax assessed upon the value of the property.' 179 Va., at p. 80, 18 S.E.2d, at p. 402; 203 Va., at pp. 633, 634, 125 S.E.2d 864.

Although the question of a general reassessment was not involved, in each of these previously decided cases the assessment of the tax itself, rather than the fixing of the value of the real estate, was held to determine the question as to whether the application for relief had been timely filed.

The dual role of the word 'assessment' is found in the various statutes relating to the authority of the localities to determine the valuation of real property, and to levy taxes based upon such valuation.

Code, § 58-780 provides for the general reassessment of real estate in certain counties every six...