Hoffman v. Flores
| Decision Date | 06 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-610-J-37JBT |
| Parties | KELVIN R. HOFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. MELODY FLORES, etc.; et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Plaintiff, represented by counsel, is proceeding on an Amended Complaint (Doc. #15) (hereinafter Amended Complaint), filed on December 3, 2010.1 Defendants' December 17, 2010, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #16) (hereinafter Motion to Dismiss) and Defendant Flores' May 23, 2011, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #22) (hereinafter Flores' Motion to Dismiss) are pending before the Court. Plaintiff responded to these motions on February 12, 2011 (Doc. #19) (hereinafter Response) and on June 27, 2011 (Doc. #25) (hereinafter Response/Flores).2 See Order (Doc. #9).
Plaintiff names Melody Flores, the warden at Baker Correctional Institution; Sam A. Bassett, a correctional officer at BCI; Walter A. McNeil, the former Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections; and the Florida Department of Corrections (hereinafter FDOC) as the Defendants. As relief, Plaintiff seeks "an award of damages."
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether theyplausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
The liberal pleading standard set forth by Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P, requiring only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]", will be the standard employed by the Court, along with construing the Amended Complaint "so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff presents the following factual allegations. Plaintiff was confined at Baker Correctional Institution (hereinafter BCI). Amended Complaint at 1. He suffered from urinary incontinence and dysfunction of bladder control, which was known to Defendant Bassett. Id. at 2. This impairment and dysfunction substantially impaired Plaintiff's ability to urinate voluntarily and at will. Id.
On September 28, 2009, Defendant Bassett demanded a urine sample from Plaintiff, removed Plaintiff from his cell and placed him in a shower area. Id. at 3. Plaintiff explained his urination problems and was unable to produce a sample. Id. Plaintiff requested that Defendant Bassett verify Plaintiff's physical impairment by contacting the medical staff. Id. Defendant Bassett did not contact the medical staff. Id. Furthermore, he continued to demand Plaintiff produce a urine sample. Id.
Plaintiff attempted to comply with Bassett's orders, fearing the receipt of a disciplinary report for failure to comply with a direct order to produce a urine sample. Id. In response to Defendant Bassett's demands, Plaintiff strained and forced himself to urinate, resulting in blood passing from his penis. Id. Defendant Bassett authored and submitted a disciplinary report against Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff's failure to comply with his demands to produce a urine sample. Id. Plaintiff was not entitled to participate in a work-release program, because he had a disciplinary violation, which meant that he was unable to earn wages while he was incarcerated. Id. Additionally, as a result of the disciplinary report, he was segregated from the general prison population and deprived of additional liberties from September 28, 2009, through November 19, 2009. Id. at 4.
On November 20, 2009, Defendant Flores became aware of the incident. Id. at 6. As warden of the institution, she had the ability to approve Plaintiff for work release. She failed to take any remedial action. Id. Although Plaintiff was otherwise eligible for work-release, except for the disciplinary measure, Defendant Flores did not approve Plaintiff for work-release. Id. at 6. Plaintiff was prevented from earning any wages while incarcerated. Id.
In Count I, Plaintiff raises a civil rights claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Bassett. Plaintiff claims to have exhausted all administrative remedies. He asserts that Defendant Bassett knew that he had a physical impairment, and Bassett knew, or should have known, that the impairment and dysfunction substantially impaired Plaintiff's ability to urinate voluntarily and at will. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Basset's actions in demanding a urine sample from Plaintiff constituted deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff contends this caused physical harm: the passing of blood through his urinary tract. He claims it caused emotional harm, as he suffered humiliation and degradation. Plaintiff also asserts that he lost wages as a result of the disciplinary report and being removed from consideration for work-release. Finally, he contends that he was placed in segregation and deprived of additional liberties from September 28, 2009, through November 19, 2009.
In sum, Plaintiff claims Defendant Bassett's actions caused Plaintiff to suffer injury, endure emotional distress, and lose privileges and wages. Plaintiff seeks an award of unspecified damages against Defendant Bassett.
In Count II, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to the intentional infliction of emotional distress by Defendant Bassett. Plaintiff asserts that Bassett's actions were so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, that they went beyond the bounds of decency. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bassett is subject to personal liability under § 768.28, Florida Statutes, as he acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiff's rights and safety. As a result of Bassett's actions, Plaintiff claims he suffered emotional distress and humiliation. Plaintiff is seeking unspecified damages against Defendant Bassett.
In Count III, a claim pursuant to the Florida Torts Claims Act, Plaintiff names Defendants FDOC and McNeil as the governmental entity and the head of such entity, under § 768.28. Plaintiff asserts that Bassett was negligent and owed a duty to Plaintiff to carry out his duties in a manner which accommodated Plaintiff's physical impairment. Plaintiff claims Bassett failed to do so, resulting in Plaintiff suffering from injury, enduring emotional distress, and losing privileges and wages. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages against Defendants FDOC and McNeil.
In Count IV, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Flores violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts that he has exhausted all administrative remedies. Plaintiff claims Flores' refusal to take corrective action and to refuse to allow him to havethe opportunity to earn wages through the work-release program constituted deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's physical impairment. Plaintiff claims he suffered the harm of lost wages, and demands an award of damages against Defendant Flores.
In Count V, Plaintiff raises a Florida Torts Claims Act claim against Defendants McNeil and FDOC. Plaintiff asserts that Flores was negligent in failing to take corrective action, she owed a duty to Plaintiff to carry out her duties in a manner which accommodated Plaintiff's physical impairment, and as a direct and proximate result of her negligent action, Plaintiff suffered emotional distress, lost privileges, and lost wages. Defendants FDOC and McNeil are named as the governmental entity and the head of the entity. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages against Defendants McNeil and FDOC.
In Count VI, Plaintiff's American With Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA) claim against FDOC, Plaintiff asserts that his difficulties with urination constitute a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12131. He claims he is a qualified individual with a disability, and the disability was known by FDOC and its employees. Plaintiff contends that the failure of the employees of the FDOC to accommodate his disability has resulted in his suffering an injury, being denied the rights and privileges of a general prison population inmate, and being deprived of the opportunity to earn wages in the work-release program. He contends that by being placedin solitary or disciplinary confinement, he was excluded from services, programs and activities offered to the general prison population. He was also excluded from the work-release program. He alleges that by subjecting him to a disciplinary report and by failing to take corrective action once the disciplinary report was issued, he suffered from the exclusion from services, programs, and activities, including work-release. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages against FDOC.
In the Motions to Dismiss, Defendants Bassett, McNeil, FDOC and Flores assert that Plaintiff Hoffman has raised various claims in his Amended...
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