Hoffman v. Gallia Cnty. Sheriff's Office, No. 17CA2
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM. |
Citation | 2017 Ohio 9192,103 N.E.3d 1 |
Parties | Nicholas G. HOFFMAN, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. GALLIA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants–Appellants. |
Decision Date | 12 December 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 17CA2 |
103 N.E.3d 1
2017 Ohio 9192
Nicholas G. HOFFMAN, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
GALLIA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
No. 17CA2
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Gallia County.
DATE JOURNALIZED: December 12, 2017
Mark Landes and Aaron M. Glasgow, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.
Jeffrey L. Finley, Gallipolis, Ohio, for Appellees.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
PER CURIAM.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Gallia County Common Pleas Court decision that denied summary judgment to Gallia County Sheriff Joseph R. Browning, Gallia County Sheriff's Deputy Randall G. Johnson, the Gallia County Sheriff's Department, and the Gallia County Commissioners, defendants below and appellants herein.1 The trial court determined that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether appellants are immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744 for the injuries suffered by Nicholas G. Hoffman and Tonnette D. Hoffman, plaintiffs below
and appellees herein. Appellants assign the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS REGARDING WHETHER APPELLANT JOHNSON ACTED IN A ‘WANTON AND WILLFUL MANNER’ UNDER R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a)."
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS REGARDING WHETHER APPELLANT JOHNSON ACTED WITH MALICIOUS PURPOSE, IN BAD FAITH OR IN A WANTON OR RECKLESS MANNER UNDER R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)."
I
BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} This appeal arises out of a May 29, 2010 automobile collision involving Gallia County Sheriff's Deputy Randall Johnson and Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Nicholas G. Hoffman. Before the accident occurred, both Deputy Johnson and Trooper Hoffman were responding to a call for help from Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Keith Fellure. Trooper Fellure indicated that he had located a vehicle involved in a "rolling domestic" on Left Fork Road and requested assistance with the three individuals found with the vehicle.
{¶ 3} While Deputy Johnson and Trooper Hoffman were en route to assist Trooper Fellure, both reached speeds over 100 miles per hour. Trooper Hoffman's vehicle was in front of Deputy Johnson's vehicle, but at some point, Deputy Johnson lost sight of Trooper Hoffman's vehicle. As Deputy Johnson topped a hill and rounded a slight curve, he saw Trooper Hoffman's vehicle backing up in his lane of travel in order to turn left onto Left Fork Road. Deputy Johnson applied his brakes and swerved to the left of the center line in an attempt to avoid a collision, but was unable to stop his vehicle before colliding with Trooper Hoffman's vehicle. A subsequent crash investigation indicated that Deputy Johnson's vehicle was traveling around 65 to 74 miles per hour at the point of impact.
{¶ 4} Appellees subsequently filed a complaint and alleged that Deputy Johnson negligently, willfully, wantonly, and recklessly caused appellees' injuries. Appellants denied liability and additionally claimed that they are statutorily immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744.
A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
{¶ 5} Both parties filed summary judgment motions. Appellees asserted that no genuine issues of material fact remain concerning appellants' liability for appellees' injuries and regarding appellants' statutory immunity. Appellees alleged that based upon the evidence in the record, reasonable minds could only conclude that Deputy Johnson operated his vehicle in a willful, wanton, and reckless manner when he responded to Trooper Fellure's call for assistance. Appellees claimed that Deputy Johnson's conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless for the following reasons: (1) he was traveling between 101–106 mph on a two-lane roadway with a 55 mph speed limit; (2) his speed was grossly excessive given the road contours; (3) he did not slow down as he approached the intersection of Jackson Pike and Left Fork Road; (3) he did not know the location of Left Fork Road; (4) he did not have sufficient training regarding high-speed emergency vehicle handling; (5) he drove left-of-center;
(6) he did not exhibit due regard for safety; (7) he was unaware of a departmental policy concerning officer conduct when responding to an emergency call; and (8) after the accident, the sheriff ordered Deputy Johnson to complete an emergency vehicle course. Appellees argued, therefore, that appellants are not statutorily immune from liability.
{¶ 6} Appellants also asserted that no genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether they are statutorily immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) and 2744.03(A)(6)(a). In contrast to appellees' argument, however, appellants claimed that reasonable minds could only conclude that Deputy Johnson's conduct was not willful, wanton, or reckless.2 They argued that Johnson's operation of his vehicle did not constitute willful, wanton, or reckless conduct for the following reasons: (1) Deputy Johnson activated his lights and sirens; (2) Deputy Johnson was responding to a fellow officer's call for help; (3) Deputy Johnson was traveling in his own lane; (4) Trooper Hoffman reversed his vehicle in Deputy Johnson's lane of travel; (5) the roadway was dry and it was clear day; (6) traffic was light; (7) there were no intersections with traffic control devices along the route; (8) Deputy Johnson applied his brakes and attempted to swerve to avoid Trooper Hoffman's cruiser; and (9) Deputy Johnson did not violate the sheriff's office emergency run response policy. Appellants further argued that despite Deputy Johnson's speed, none of the evidence shows that Johnson's decision to exceed the speed limit posed an obvious risk to others or presented a high likelihood that injury would result. They additionally contended that even if Deputy Johnson's training was not as extensive as Trooper Hoffman's, he did not lack any training or know that he would be unable to control a vehicle traveling over 100 miles per hour.
B
SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
{¶ 7} The parties primarily relied upon the deposition testimony to support their summary judgment motions. Appellants additionally presented a copy of the sheriff's emergency-run policy.
1
Sheriff's Emergency-run Policy
{¶ 8} The policy states: "During emergency runs, employees must always give due regard to all other vehicles using the roadways. * * * * [T]he law does not relieve the vehicle operator from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property upon the highway."3 The policy further provides that "[e]mployees' driving actions must be very cautious–slowing at all intersections and sometimes even stopping."
2
Deputy Johnson
{¶ 9} Deputy Johnson stated that before the accident occurred, he heard a dispatch regarding a motor-vehicle-domestic-violence
situation. The dispatch indicated that the suspect vehicle was traveling towards Jackson Pike. Deputy Johnson headed westbound on Jackson Pike, behind an Ohio State Highway Patrol cruiser. Deputy Johnson related that he and the patrol cruiser were "going in and out of traffic at a high rate of speed," but he slowed down due to heavy traffic and eventually lost sight of the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Johnson met Trooper Hoffman in a parking lot. They discussed the suspect vehicle. Deputy Johnson then heard Trooper Fellure state over the radio that he had tracked the suspect vehicle to Left Fork Road. Deputy Johnson indicated that neither he nor Trooper Hoffman knew the precise location of Left Fork Road, but both knew its general location. Both Deputy Johnson and Trooper Hoffman left the parking lot and headed eastbound on Jackson Pike, towards Left Fork Road. Deputy Johnson stated that, at some point, he lost sight of Trooper Hoffman's vehicle. While en route to Trooper Fellure's location, Deputy Johnson heard Trooper Fellure radio that he located the suspect vehicle and it had crashed. Trooper Fellure indicated that there were multiple suspects and asked for assistance. Deputy Johnson stated that once Trooper Fellure requested assistance, he accelerated and activated his lights and sirens. Deputy Johnson continued on a straight stretch of road before topping a hill.
{¶ 10} As Deputy Johnson topped the hill and rounded a "little" curve, he saw Trooper Hoffman's vehicle backing up in Deputy Johnson's lane of travel and trying to turn left onto Left Fork Road. Deputy Johnson hit the brakes and tried to swerve to avoid Trooper Hoffman's vehicle, but was unable to do so. Deputy Johnson was unaware of how fast he was traveling, but in his written statement made shortly after the accident, he estimated that as he topped the hill, he was going approximately 70 mph. At the time of his deposition three years later, he could not state how fast he was going.
{¶ 11} Deputy Johnson stated that he is familiar with Jackson Pike, the road upon which the accident occurred. He indicated that he drives by the accident scene every day when he travels to work. Deputy Johnson related that he is familiar with the hill and the curve–the point where he noticed Trooper Hoffman's vehicle. He stated that while he did not know how...
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Johnson v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 109432
...conduct does not demonstrate a disposition to perversity."); Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 47 ("If reasonable minds could only conclude that the employee's conduct demonstrates, at most, negligence, then summary judgment is appropriate."......
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Conley v. Wapakoneta City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2-21-18
...at most, negligence, then summary judgment is appropriate." Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office , 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 47. Here, Conley concedes that Allison's actions were not willful misconduct but argues that his actions were wanton and reckless. We disagree.{¶5......
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Graf v. City of Nelsonville, Case No. 18CA28
...harm greater than that necessary to establish negligence." Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 4th Dist. No. 17CA2, 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, 2017 WL 6541029, ¶ 39, quoting Hackathorn v. Preisse, 104 Ohio App.3d 768, 772, 663 N.E.2d 384 (9th Dist.1995). {¶ 54} In the case at bar, a......
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Bowersock v. Addlesburger, Case No. 19CA13
...Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992) (same); accord Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1 (4th Dist.), ¶ 38. However, whether a political subdivision employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless m......
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Johnson v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 109432
...conduct does not demonstrate a disposition to perversity."); Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 47 ("If reasonable minds could only conclude that the employee's conduct demonstrates, at most, negligence, then summary judgment is appropriate."......
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Conley v. Wapakoneta City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2-21-18
...at most, negligence, then summary judgment is appropriate." Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office , 4th Dist., 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 47. Here, Conley concedes that Allison's actions were not willful misconduct but argues that his actions were wanton and reckless. We disagree.{¶5......
-
Graf v. City of Nelsonville, Case No. 18CA28
...harm greater than that necessary to establish negligence." Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 4th Dist. No. 17CA2, 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1, 2017 WL 6541029, ¶ 39, quoting Hackathorn v. Preisse, 104 Ohio App.3d 768, 772, 663 N.E.2d 384 (9th Dist.1995). {¶ 54} In the case at bar, a......
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Bowersock v. Addlesburger, Case No. 19CA13
...Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992) (same); accord Hoffman v. Gallia Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2017-Ohio-9192, 103 N.E.3d 1 (4th Dist.), ¶ 38. However, whether a political subdivision employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless m......