Hoffman v. King Resources Co., 73--052

• Decision Date: 13 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73--052,73--052
• Citation: 520 P.2d 1052,33 Colo.App. 310
• Parties: George A. HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KING RESOURCES COMPANY d/b/a Denver Airmotive Company, Defendant-Appellant. . II
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 1052

520 P.2d 1052

33 Colo.App. 310

George A. HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KING RESOURCES COMPANY d/b/a Denver Airmotive Company Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73--052.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Feb. 13, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 5, 1974.

Certiorari Granted April 29, 1974.

Thomas R. Moeller, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Blunk, Johnson & Allspach, Howard G. Allspach, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

ENOCH, Judge.

Defendant King Resources Company, d/b/a Denver Airmotive Company, appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff Hoffman $2,750 for damages to plaintiff's airplane. We reverse.

In August 1969, plaintiff rented from defendant a 'tie-down' space in which to store his private airplane at defendant's outdoor facility at Jefferson County Airport. Under the terms of the lease the owner of a plane was obligated to tie down his own plane. The equipment used to secure the airplane, all of which was furnished by defendant, consisted of a steel cable stretched between two cement anchoring devices embedded in the ground, to which two chains were attached. In order to anchor the plane to the ground, the owner would attach one of these chains to a strut on each wing of his aircraft. The rear wheel was secured with a chain attached to a second cable. The wing strut chains were free to move in either direction along the cables. While tied down at defendant's facility, plaintiff's airplane was flipped onto its back during a windstorm in February 1970, and was extensively damaged.

Plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant was negligent in designing and constructing the tie-down system, and in failing to supply equipment which was strong enough to withstand the frequent high winds at Jefferson County Airport. Defendant denied negligence and asserted affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. These issues were submitted to the jury, which found for plaintiff.

Defendant raises several issues on appeal, but we need discuss only one, since it requires reversal of the case. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant and that therefore defendant's duty to plaintiff was limited to warning plaintiff of known defects which created an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff's property. He further argued that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to show that defendant had breached this duty. The trial court denied this motion, as well as similar motions made at the close of all the evidence and after the return of the jury's verdict. We agree with defendant's contentions.

Although the facts of this case do not present a traditional landlord-tenant relationship in which premises are demised for the occupancy of the tenant, we believe that this is a proper characterization of the legal positions of the parties. Under Colorado law, a landlord is liable for damages to his tenant's property resulting from latent defects if he fails to disclose a condition which creates an unreasonable risk of harm and (a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and (b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and he realizes or has reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk. Baughman v. Cosler, 169 Colo. 534, 459 P.2d 294; Girardot v. Williams, 102 Colo. 456, 80 P.2d 433; Thum v. Rhodes, 12 Colo.App. 245, 55 P. 264.

In viewing the motion for a directed verdict, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. 'A motion for directed verdict can only be granted where the evidence, when so considered, compels the conclusion that the minds of reasonable men could not be in disagreement and that no evidence, or legitimate inference arising therefrom, has been presented upon which a jury's verdict against the moving ...