Hoffman v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2023
• Docket Number: 22-CV-397 (KMK)
• Parties: PETER HOFFMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KRAFT HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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PETER HOFFMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KRAFT HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 22-CV-397 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

February 7, 2023

Angele Aaron, Esq. Katherine Lalor, Esq. Spencer Sheehan, Esq. Sheehan & Associates, P.C. Great Neck, NY Counsel for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Shub, Esq. Shub Law Firm LLC Haddonfield, N.J Counsel for Plaintiff.

Dean N. Panos, Esq., Alexander Smith, Esq. Jenner & Block LLP Chicago, IL and Los Angeles, CA Counsel for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Peter Hoffman (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action against Kraft Heinz Foods Company (“Defendant”), alleging that the labeling on Defendant's Mango Peach MiO, a flavored liquid beverage concentrate (the “Product”) is deceptive and misleading. (See generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 15).) Plaintiff brings claims for damages against Defendant for (1) violation of §§ 349 and 350 of the New York General Business Law (“GBL”) N.Y. G.B.L. §§ 349, 350; (2) violations of consumer protection laws of Virginia and Oklahoma; (3) common law breach of express warranty; and (4) common law fraud. (See id. ¶¶ 128-158.) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion To Dismiss the FAC (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 21).) For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from the FAC and are assumed to be true for the purposes of resolving the instant Motion. See Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

Defendant is a multinational food company with its principal place of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (See FAC ¶ 104.) Included in Defendant's product lines is MiO, a “flavored concentrated liquid” that serves as a liquid water enhancer “developed as a convenient alternative to messy beverage powders in adding flavor to water.” (See id. ¶¶ 1, 110.) As relevant to the instant Action, Defendant specifically manufactures a “mango and peach” flavored variety of MiO which Defendant represents on the label as containing “natural flavor with other natural flavor.” (Id. ¶ 1.)

(Image Omitted)

(See id. ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Product's advertisements are false, deceptive, and misleading because of the presence of artificial flavors, namely DL-Malic Acid. (Id. ¶ 72.) The Product's ingredients list “Malic Acid” as the “second most predominant ingredient by weight.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's representation that the Product's flavor is from natural flavors is misleading, because “[b]y identifying the Product as getting its mango and peach taste from natural flavoring, consumers expect only natural flavoring ingredients to contribute to the taste.” (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Plaintiff alleges that because “the ingredient list does not disclose that this malic acid is an artificial flavoring ingredient which provides the Product's mango and peach taste[,]” Plaintiff was misled by the Product's contents. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that, unlike “L-Malic acid” which “occurs naturally in various fruits and is known for providing sweetness and tartness, among other flavors,” D-Malic acid “does not occur naturally.” (Id. ¶¶ 54-56.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that “[l]aboratory analysis concluded the Product contains artificial, DL-Malic Acid instead of natural, L-Malic Acid.” (Id. ¶ 65.)

Plaintiff alleges several reasons as to why Defendant includes DL-Malic Acid in the Product. For example, Plaintiff alleges that it is included: (1) “to make the Product taste tart and fruity, like mango and peach taste naturally,” (id. ¶ 60); (2) “to provide, enhance, simulate, and/or reinforce the sweet, fruity, and tart taste that consumers associate with mango and peach,” (id. ¶ 61); and (3) that it “could function as a flavor enhancer or PH balancer,” (id. ¶ 79). Plaintiff concludes, however, that “because the flavor imparted by malic acid is a core component of mangos and peaches,” malic acid “does not function as a flavor enhancer” but instead “fundamentally alters the original combination of sugar and natural L-Malic Acid core to the flavors of mango and peach, so that the flavors of the Product are no longer [] natural[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 82-83.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the malic acid “is not a PH balancer because there is no need to change or maintain active acidity or basicity.” (Id. ¶ 85.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that federal and state regulations “prohibit false and deceptive identification of the source of a food or beverage's characterizing flavors.” (Id. ¶ 66.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Product's “primary or characterizing flavors are mango and peach.” (Id. ¶ 67 (quotation marks omitted).) The Product lists “Mango Peach” directly above “natural flavor with other natural flavor” which Plaintiff alleges is false and misleading, as it is “required to be accompanied by the word(s) ‘artificial' or ‘artificially flavored[.]'” (Id. ¶¶ 68-73 (quotation marks omitted).)

Between October 2021 and November 2021, Plaintiff purchased the product “on one or more occasions” at various stores, including at ShopRite, 13 City Pl, White Plains, NY 10601, for a “premium price” of “no less than $3.99 per 1.6 OZ or 24 servings, excluding tax and sales[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 94, 113.) Plaintiff alleges that he “purchased the Product because ‘Natural Flavor With Other Natural Flavor' told him that only natural flavors were responsible for the mango and peach taste.” (Id. ¶ 88.) In purchasing the Product, Plaintiff alleges he “believed the Product's peach and mango taste was only from natural flavoring ingredients and not from artificial flavoring ingredients because that is what the representations said and implied.” (Id. ¶ 114.) Plaintiff accordingly “relied on the words, coloring, descriptions, layout, and packaging on the Product, on the labeling,” and on statements made in Defendant's digital, print, and social media marketing. (Id. ¶¶ 115.) Without this, Plaintiff alleges that he “would not have purchased the Product if she knew the representations and omissions were false and misleading or would have paid less for it.” (Id. ¶ 118.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on January 15, 2022. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) On May 31, 2022, Defendant filed a pre-motion letter in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss the original Complaint, (see Dkt. No. 9), but on June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the FAC, (see FAC). On July 5, 2022, Defendant filed another pre-motion letter in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss the FAC. (See Dkt. No. 16.) Following Plaintiff's response to Defendant's pre-motion letter, (see Dkt. No. 17), the Court held a pre-motion conference on July 19, 2022, (see Dkt. (minute entry for July 19, 2022)). Pursuant to the briefing schedule adopted at the conference, Defendant filed the instant Motion on August 9, 2022. (See Not. of Mot.; Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 22); Not. of Request for Judicial Not. in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 23).)^[1]Plaintiff filed his Opposition on September 8, 2022, (see Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 25)), and Defendant filed its Reply on September 22, 2022, (see Def.'s Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. Of Mot. To Dismiss (“Def.'s Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 26)). Defendant also filed two notices of supplemental authority on October 17, 2022 and January 3, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 27, 28.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See Not. of Mot.) The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed,” id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79. (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a...