Hoffman v. Monroe Public Schools

• Decision Date: 18 March 1980
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 43836,43837
• Citation: 292 N.W.2d 542,96 Mich.App. 256
• Parties: Joan HOFFMAN and Loretta E. Hoffman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MONROE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a body politic, and Jay S. Peters, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. Rosemary MENTEL and Charles J. Mentel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MONROE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a body politic, and Jay S. Peters, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 96 Mich.App. 256, 292 N.W.2d 542
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 542

292 N.W.2d 542

Joan HOFFMAN and Loretta E. Hoffman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MONROE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a body politic, and Jay S. Peters,

jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Rosemary MENTEL and Charles J. Mentel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MONROE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, a body politic, and Jay S. Peters,

jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket Nos. 43836, 43837.

96 Mich.App. 256, 292 N.W.2d 542

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 18, 1980.

Released for Publication May 28, 1980.

[96 MICHAPP 257] Sherwin Schreier, Southfield, for Hoffmans and Mentels.

William J. Braunlich, Jr., Monroe, for Monroe Public School and Peters.

Before KELLY, P. J., and BRONSON and RILEY, JJ.

RILEY, Judge.

This consolidated lawsuit arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in 1969. On March 25, 1976, a jury verdict was returned in favor of plaintiffs Joan and Loretta E. Hoffman and Charles J. Mentel against the defendants and in favor of the defendants against Rosemary Mentel, the driver of the car in which the other three plaintiffs were passengers. The jury was polled individually and affirmed the announced verdict. However, following discharge of the jury, the jurors approached the defendants' attorney and told him that they had not meant to find against defendants. Defendants then moved for and were granted a new trial. This new trial resulted in a verdict being rendered for the defendants on December 29, 1978. Plaintiffs' motion for new trial was denied. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right.

It is generally recognized that jurors may not impeach their verdict by oral testimony or by affidavit, McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); Mattox v. United [96 MICHAPP 258] States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892); Consumers Power Co. v. Allegan State Bank, 388 Mich. 568, 573, 202 N.W.2d 295 (1972); People v. Van Camp, 356 Mich. 593, 601, 97 N.W.2d 726 (1959); People v. Graham, 84 Mich.App. 663, 665, 270 N.W.2d 673 (1978), for, to permit unrestricted attacks would severely undermine the finality attached to judgments. See People v. Rushin, 37 Mich.App. 391, 194 N.W.2d 718 (1971); Santilli v. Pueblo, 184 Colo. 432, 521 P.2d 170 (1974). In addition, if the jury's conclusions could always be questioned, tampering with the jury process would be encouraged and invasion of the private sanctity of the jury room invited. People v. Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97, 105, 20 N.W.2d 824 (1945); Graham, supra, 84 Mich.App. at 665-666, 270 N.W.2d 673; Rushin, supra; People v. Brown, 37 Mich.App. 25, 32, 194 N.W.2d 450 (1971). See generally, Mueller, Juror's Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 Neb.L.Rev. 920 (1978); Ledy and Lefkowitz, Note: Judgment by Your Peers? The Impeachment of Jury Verdicts and the Case of the Insane Juror, 21 N.Y.L.F. 57 (1975); Thorpe, Note: Evidence Erroneous Recordation of Verdict No Impeachment of Verdict by Affidavits of Jurors Allowed, 12 Wayne L.Rev. 888 (1966). In theory then, the finality policy is totally justifiable. However, when these public considerations are balanced against the private concerns of a wronged litigant, for example, when there has been prejudicial outside influences on the jury or a misrecorded verdict, flat application of the nonimpeachment rule may be inequitable. See McDonald, supra. The potential injustice inherent in rigid proscription has caused many jurisdictions to modify their impeachment rules. Under the "Ohio rule" for instance, juror's affidavits will be considered when misconduct is first indicated by competent, independent[96 MICHAPP 259] evidence. See Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54 (1953). In at least 12 states, the "Iowa rule" is followed. Under this standard, affidavits are inadmissible to dispute matters which inhere in the verdict, such as juror thought processes and inter-juror inducements, but are admissible if they pertain to outside or extraneous influences. See Mattox, supra; 57 Neb.L.Rev., supra.

In Michigan, the present law on verdict impeachment is in great disarray. The advisory committee on adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence expressly declined to adopt a state counterpart of FRE 606(b) which would limit inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment; thus, we have no statutory guidelines. Committee Notes to MRE 606. Within the case law, there is language supportive of the "Iowa rule", but this standard has never been expressly adopted. See Graham, supra; People v. Moreland, 12 Mich.App. 483, 163 N.W.2d 257 (1968). There are two Supreme Court cases that dealt with this issue within the second half of this century, but neither formulated any consistent doctrine. See Metz v. City of Bridgman, 371 Mich. 586, 124 N.W.2d 741 (1963); Routhier v. Detroit, 338 Mich. 449, 61 N.W.2d 593 (1953). Finally, one panel of this Court attempted to clarify the motivations and standards underlying verdict finality but, evidently, was stymied by the earlier inconsistent and confusing rulings. See Rushin, supra.

In Routhier, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's recalling of the jury the day after discharge. The Court stated that the judge properly set aside the verdict based on a juror's affidavit that he had never agreed to the recorded verdict. In Metz, supra, the jury was polled and discharged. The Supreme Court upheld the trial [96 MICHAPP 260] court's denial of a new trial despite a juror's affidavit that he had only reluctantly agreed to the verdict. The Court "distinguished" Routhier by saying that in Metz there was a unanimous verdict (no matter for what reason) while in Routhier there apparently was not. This was in spite of the fact that in both cases a unanimous verdict was announced in the record.

Confronted with this divergent case law, the Court of Appeals panel in Rushin, supra, chose to limit its post-discharge jury problem decision to criminal cases. Although this distinction was declared to be based on the double-jeopardy clause, most of the policy and reasoning put forth by the panel throughout the opinion applies equally to both civil and criminal cases.

It is clear that in jurisdictions applying the "Iowa rule", the claimed error in the instant case could not be investigated through juror affidavits. Looking behind a verdict to determine if the finding is contrary to the jury's intent is directly contrary to the rule prohibiting examination of jury mental processes. Mitchell v. Burleson, 466 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.Civ.App.1971). In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Amodt, 29 Wis.2d 441, 139 N.W.2d 6 (1966), eight jurors claimed that the verdict was incorrect. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that this was not a proper subject for post-discharge investigation. The Colorado Supreme Court has held similarly. Santilli, supra.

A clear dividing line between allowing and disallowing verdict correction has been the discharge of the jury, often precursed by individual polling. Jury comment regarding errors inherent in the verdict will not be received after the jury is so released. Van Wart v. Van Wart, 501 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.1973); Ford Motor Credit Co., supra. [96 MICHAPP 261] Michigan courts have recognized jury discharge, frequently coupled with polling, as the final expression or act of the jury. Metz, supra; In re Sorter's Estate, 314 Mich. 488, 493, 22 N.W.2d 767 (1946); Beaubien v. Detroit United R. Co., 216 Mich. 391, 398, 185 N.W. 855 (1921); Brown, supra; Rushin, supra. Thus, it is only logical to incorporate this termination point into our adoption of the "Iowa rule".

We hold that in all cases, whether civil or criminal, once a jury has been polled and discharged, its members may not challenge mistakes or misconduct inherent in the verdict. After that point, oral testimony or affidavits by the jurors may only be received on extraneous or outside errors (such as undue influence by outside parties), or to correct clerical errors or matters of form. See Mattox, supra; Harrington v. Velat, 395 Mich. 359, 235 N.W.2d 357 (1975); Hampton v. Van Nest's Estate, 196 Mich. 404, 163 N.W. 83 (1917); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich.App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973). Information on extraneous...